Energy Partisanship by Osofsky, Hari M & Peel, Jacqueline
Scholarship Repository 
University of Minnesota Law School 
Articles Faculty Scholarship 
2016 
Energy Partisanship 
Hari M. Osofsky 
University of Minnesota Law School, hmo8@psu.edu 
Jacqueline Peel 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty_articles 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Hari M. Osofsky and Jacqueline Peel, Energy Partisanship, 65 EMORY L.J. 695 (2016), available at 
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty_articles/478. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in the Faculty Scholarship collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu. 
OSOFSKY_PEEL GALLEYSPROOFS2 2/25/2016 9:30 AM 
 
ENERGY PARTISANSHIP 
Hari M. Osofsky0F* 
Jacqueline Peel1F** 
Whether the topic is the Paris Agreement on climate change, greenhouse 
gas emissions from power plants, the Keystone XL pipeline, hydraulic 
fracturing, offshore drilling, or renewable energy, much of the U.S. policy 
dialogue about energy and climate change is deeply partisan. Republicans and 
Democrats debate individual issues in vitriolic sound bites that indicate 
minimal common ground. For example, officials favoring robust action on 
climate change are charged with engaging in a “War on Coal.” Those 
opposed are labeled “members of the Flat Earth Society.” Set against these 
dysfunctional climate and energy politics, how can progress be made? For 
people who accept the science of climate change, this has become a critical 
question. An emerging body of psychological research indicates that strategies 
attempting to persuade those with opposing views with additional scientific 
evidence have limited effectiveness. Providing more information does not 
change minds because (1) it does not take moral and cultural worldview 
differences into account, or (2) it is presented in ways that do not adequately 
acknowledge how people’s perceptions of the relatability and trustworthiness 
of communicators shape their acceptance of that information. 
 
 * Professor, University of Minnesota Law School; Faculty Director, Energy Transition Lab; Director, 
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Program; Adjunct Professor, Department of Geography, Environment and Society; and Fellow, Institute on the 
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American Geographers Annual Meeting, Florida State University College of Law, University of Denver Law 
School, University of Minnesota Law School, University of San Diego School of Law, and University of Tulsa 
College of Law. We also appreciate the insightful suggestions of June Carbone, Jessica Clarke, Claire Hill, 
Neha Jain, and Brett McDonnell. Maya Batres, Thomas Burman, Sarah Schenck, Nicholas Boyd-Caine, and 
Justin Moor provided invaluable research assistance. The Law Library at the University of Minnesota Law 
School, and particularly Suzanne Thorpe, was extremely helpful. This project has received support through the 
2013-14 Fesler-Lampert Chair in Urban and Regional Affairs, particularly regarding its local government 
analysis; a grant from the Australian Research Council (Discovery Project 130100500, “Transition to a Clean 
Energy Future: the Role of Climate Change Litigation in Shaping our Regulatory Path,” 2013–2015); and the 
University of Minnesota Law School’s summer research support. As always, I am grateful for the love, 
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Visiting Scholar at Woods Institute for the Environment, Stanford University.  
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This Article provides a novel analysis of how to make progress on energy 
and climate change issues by translating this emerging psychological research 
into a framework for action. It proposes two interconnected strategies—
substantive and structural—for moving past imbedded partisanship and 
political dysfunction. Substantively, the Article argues for refocusing 
regulatory efforts on areas where a greater degree of consensus may be 
possible, such as economic development and disaster resilience. Structurally, it 
proposes a shift to arenas that are less gridlocked by energy partisanship than 
the legislative branch of the federal government, such as other branches of the 
federal government, state and local levels, and corporate and private sector 
actors. By drawing on case studies and empirical data, including interviews 
with key stakeholders, the Article illustrates possibilities for progress under 
this framework. 
INTRODUCTION 
In January 2015, during the lengthy debate over the Keystone XL pipeline 
legislation that President Obama had promised to and ultimately did veto, the 
U.S. Senate passed a “landmark” resolution2F1: the Senators agreed, with only 
one “no” vote, that “climate change is real and is not a hoax.”3F2 However, 
Republican senators then proceeded to block two other measures linking 
climate change to human activity.4F3 Senator James Inhofe (R–Okla.) explained 
his contrasting votes by stating that “[c]limate is changing, . . . has always 
changed, and always will. . . . The hoax is that there are some people that are 
so arrogant to think that they are so powerful that they can change climate. 
Man can’t change climate.”5F4 
 
 1 The Keystone XL pipeline is a proposed 1,179 mile oil pipeline project that would run from Alberta 
Canada to Nebraska. See Keystone XL Pipeline: About the Project, TRANSCANADA, http://keystone-
xl.com/about/the-keystone-xl-oil-pipeline-project/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2015). There has been a substantial 
partisan divide in congressional support for this project. See Keystone XL Pipeline Divides Democrats, PEW 
RES. CTR. (Mar. 19, 2014), http://www.people-press.org/2014/03/19/keystone-xl-pipeline-divides-democrats/; 
Republicans Seek Keystone Approval; Foes Vow to Risk Arrest, REUTERS (Feb. 12, 2014, 5:40 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-keystone-idUSBREA1A23S20140212. For a discussion of the Senate’s 
failure to override President Obama’s veto, see Coral Davenport, Senate Fails to Override Obama’s Keystone 
Pipeline Veto, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/05/us/senate-fails-to-override-
obamas-keystone-pipeline-veto.html.  
 2 Jeffrey Kluger, The Senate Discovers Climate Change!, TIME (Jan. 23, 2015), http://time.com/ 
3680447/senate-climate-change/; Frank Thorp & Carrie Dann, Senate Votes 98-1 that ‘Climate Change Is Not 
a Hoax,’ NBC NEWS (Jan. 21, 2015, 6:39 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/senate-votes-98-1-
climate-change-not-hoax-n290831.  
 3 Thorp & Dann, supra note 2. 
 4 Id. 
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Apparently to prove his point, a few weeks later Senator Inhofe tossed a 
large snowball on the Senate floor: “You know what this is? It’s a snowball . . . 
just from outside here so it’s very, very cold out. Very unseasonal. So, Mr. 
President, catch this.”6F5 Media reaction was divided. Fox News provided a 
platform for Senator Inhofe to discuss his “snowballing” of President Obama, 
while other media outlets labeled it an “embarrassment” for the nation and the 
Republican Party. 7F6 Jon Stewart lampooned the incident on the Daily Show in a 
segment headlined Grumpy Cold Men.8F7 “You think global warming’s a hoax 
because you—in February—were able to collect one ball’s worth of snow?” 
Stewart asked. “Clearly, if global warming was a problem,” Stewart said, 
mocking the Senator’s voice, “I would only be able to grab lava balls.”9F8 
Senator Inhofe’s snowball stunt may provide plenty of fodder for 
comedians, but it only underlines a far more serious problem. Whether the 
topic is the Paris Agreement on climate change,10F9 greenhouse gas emissions 
from power plants, the Keystone XL pipeline, hydraulic fracturing, offshore 
drilling, or renewable energy, much of the U.S. policy dialogue about energy 
and climate change is deeply partisan.11F10 Republicans and Democrats debate 
 
 5 Arlette Saenz, Sen. Jim Inhofe Throws Snowball on Senate Floor in Attempt to Debunk Climate 
Change, ABC NEWS (Feb. 26, 2015, 5:22 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/sen-jim-inhofe-throws-
snowball-senate-floor-attempt/story?id=29255635. 
 6 Compare Lawmaker Tosses Snowball on Floor to Disprove Global Warming, FOX NEWS INSIDER 
(Feb. 28, 2015, 12:25 PM), http://insider.foxnews.com/2015/02/28/sen-jim-inhofe-tosses-snowball-senate-
floor-disprove-global-warming, with Editorial, Sen. Jim Inhofe Embarrasses the GOP and the U.S., WASH. 
POST (Mar. 1, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-snowballs-chance/2015/03/01/46e9e00e-
bec8-11e4-bdfa-b8e8f594e6ee_story.html. 
 7 Grumpy Cold Men, DAILY SHOW WITH JON STEWART (Mar. 2, 2015), http://thedailyshow.cc.com/ 
videos/2i8i0f/grumpy-cold-men. 
 8 Id. 
 9 The Paris Agreement, adopted in December 2015 at the Conference of the Parties to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), will require parties to “prepare, communicate 
and maintain successive nationally determined contributions” to global emissions reduction that parties intend 
to achieve and to “pursue domestic mitigation measures, with the aim of achieving the objectives of such 
contributions.” See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Adoption of the Paris Agreement Under 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 12, 2015, FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 
[hereinafter Adoption of the Paris Agreement], http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf 
(draft decision). The “nationally determined contribution” submitted by the United States in the lead up to the 
Paris conference specifies that the United States intends to achieve “an economy-wide target of reducing its 
greenhouse gas emissions by 26-28 per cent below its 2005 level in 2025.” United States—Intended Nationally 
Determined Contribution, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
http://unfccc.int/focus/indc_portal/items/8766.php. However, achievement of this target is tied to successful 
implementation of domestic measures such as new standards for coal-fired power plants under the Clean 
Power Plan. See id. 
 10 For examples of partisan exchanges over support for renewable energy technologies like solar and 
wind power, see Dina Cappiello & Matthew Daly, Republicans, Democrats at Odds on Energy Issues, 
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individual issues in vitriolic sound bites that indicate minimal common 
ground.12F11 For instance, when the Obama Administration announced its Clean 
Power Plan for cutting carbon pollution from the power sector in June 2014, 
Republicans were quick to condemn the new standards as a “war on coal.”13F12 
Senator Chris Murphy (D–Conn.) responded that “[t]his is not a war on coal. 
This is a war on ignorance and negligence.”14F13 Secretary of State John Kerry 
went a step further, mocking “the critics and the naysayers and the members of 
the flat earth society.”15F14 
 
ASSOCIATED PRESS–NORC CTR. FOR PUB. AFF. RES. (June 14, 2012), http://www.apnorc.org/news-media/ 
Pages/News+Media/republicans-democrats-at-odds-on-energy-issues.aspx; Juliet Eilperin & Jon Cohen, 
Support for Federal Backing of Renewables Slips, Driven by GOP Skepticism, WASH. POST (Nov. 10, 2011), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/support-for-federal-backing-of-renewables-slips-
driven-by-gop-skepticism/2011/11/10/gIQA97kX9M_story.html; David Horsey, Opinion, Koch Brothers and 
Big Utilities Campaign to Unplug Solar Power, Top of the Ticket, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2014, 5:00 AM), 
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/topoftheticket/la-na-tt-koch-brothers-and-solar-power-20140422-story.html. 
But see Grace Wyler, A War over Solar Power Is Raging Within the GOP, NEW REPUBLIC (Nov. 21, 2013), 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/115582/solar-power-fight-raging-gop. On divisions over the need for 
environmental regulation of hydraulic fracturing (fracking) and deepwater drilling for oil and gas, see 
Continued Support for Keystone XL Pipeline, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.people-
press.org/2013/09/26/continued-support-for-keystone-xl-pipeline/ (“Nearly eight in-ten Republicans (79%)—
and 90% of Republicans and Republican leaners who agree with the Tea Party—support allowing more 
offshore oil and gas drilling, compared with 44% of Democrats.”); Ben Geman, Senate Republicans Take Aim 
at Obama’s Gas ‘Fracking’ Regulations, HILL (Mar. 29, 2012, 1:36 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/energy-
environment/218969-senate-republicans-take-aim-at-federal-gas-fracking-rules. Cf. David B. Spence, 
Responsible Shale Gas Production: Moral Outrage vs. Cool Analysis, 25 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 141 
(2013) (exploring how to produce shale gas responsibly in a polarized environment). On the desirability of 
energy efficiency measures such as smart grids and smart meters, see, for example, Felicity Barringer, New 
Electricity Meters Stir Fears, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/31/science/earth/ 
31meters.html. 
 11 While these issues do not always divide neatly along party lines—for example, Democrats from 
coal-dependent states often oppose the new power plant standards—partisan politics play an important role in 
the debates. See infra Part I.  
 12 Coral Davenport, McConnell Urges States to Help Thwart Obama’s ‘War on Coal,’ N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 19, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/20/us/politics/mitch-mcconnell-urges-states-to-help-thwart-
obamas-war-on-coal.html. Republicans also made it clear at the time that they planned to introduce legislation 
to block the regulations. Subsequently, lawsuits were filed against the EPA regulations by a suite of coal-
dependent states and mining companies. Neela Banerjee, 12 States Sue the EPA over Proposed Power Plant 
Regulations, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 4. 2014, 6:46 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-epa-lawsuit-
20140805-story.html. For an in-depth discussion of those legislative and litigation efforts, see infra Part 
III.B.2. 
 13 See War on Coal? Republicans and Democrats Spar over EPA Power Plant Regulations, TALK RADIO 
NEWS SERV. (July 30, 2014), http://www.talkradionews.com/congress/2014/07/30/war-coal-republicans-
democrats-spar-epa-power-plant-regulations.html. 
 14 Patrick Goodenough, Kerry Mocks Climate Skeptics: ‘Flat Earth Society,’ CNSNEWS.COM (May 19, 
2014, 7:36 PM), http://cnsnews.com/news/article/patrick-goodenough/kerry-mocks-climate-skeptics-flat-earth-
society. Secretary Kerry then went on to assert that addressing climate change “is not a matter of politics or 
partisanship; it’s a matter of science and stewardship.” Id.  
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Numerous polls and studies reinforce that these exchanges form part of a 
broader pattern: the country has become more split along partisan lines in 
recent years, particularly with respect to environmental protection and climate 
action.16F15 The “persistent gap” in views of Republicans and Democrats on the 
issue of climate change suggests that it “has joined a short list of issues like 
gun control or taxes that define what it means to be a Republican or 
Democrat.”17F16 
These partisan disagreements constrain possibilities not only for U.S. 
legislative efforts18F17 but also for international ones. At the December 2015 
climate change negotiations, for example, the groundbreaking Paris Agreement 
limited what clauses were binding in order to allow the United States to 
participate without Senate ratification; a last minute crisis erupted when one 
“should” turned into a “shall,” which would have crossed that line.19F18 In 
addition, as the Obama Administration joined the “high ambition coalition” 
pushing for an international agreement (with Secretary Kerry using the “flat 
earth” rhetoric again as he made that announcement),20F19 congressional 
Republicans at home worked to undermine the U.S. position through 
 
 15 See infra Part I. 
 16 Matthew C. Nisbet, Communicating Climate Change: Why Frames Matter for Public Engagement, 
ENV’T (Mar.–Apr. 2009), http://www.environmentmagazine.org/Archives/Back%20Issues/March-April% 
202009/Nisbet-full.html.  
 17 The early years of the Obama Administration offered the most favorable political conditions in two 
decades for passing climate legislation. Even so, legislation to establish a nationwide cap-and-trade program 
for greenhouse gas emissions was roundly defeated in Congress, and there has been no hint of equivalent 
climate legislation emerging from the federal legislature since. For the defeated legislation, see American 
Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (Waxman-Markey Bill), H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009). Close 
observers of the U.S. political process note that cap and trade “are going to be fairly dirty words for a while,” 
Telephone Interview with Participant 9 (Dec. 3, 2012), and that “[a]lthough there’s always a little buzz about 
carbon tax, deficits, etc., fiscal cliff, I don’t think a carbon tax is going to be a palatable option anytime soon.” 
Interview with Participant 5 (Nov. 14, 2012). The 2014 midterm elections merely solidified the improbability 
of such legislation during the remainder of the Obama Administration’s time in office. This legislative impasse 
has left executive action by the Obama Administration as the primary way in which climate change is being 
addressed at a federal level in the United States, with regional, tribal, state, local, and private action as an 
important complement. See infra Part B.2.  
 18 John Vidal, How a ‘Typo’ Nearly Derailed the Paris Climate Deal, GUARDIAN: ENV’T BLOG (Dec. 16, 
2015, 7:47 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/blog/2015/dec/16/how-a-typo-nearly-derailed-the-
paris-climate-deal. 
 19 Matt McGrath, COP21: US Joins ‘High Ambition Coalition’ for Climate Deal, BBC NEWS (Dec. 10, 
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-35057282; John Kerry, U.S. Secretary of State, 
Remarks on COP21 and Actions Beyond Paris (Dec. 9, 2015), http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/ 
2015/12/250502.htm. 
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legislative proposals and public statements; presidential candidate and Senator 
Ted Cruz (R–Tex.) even held a hearing questioning climate change science.21F20 
These political constraints pose a major problem if one accepts consensus 
climate change science on the urgent need for action.22F21 A significant gap still 
exists between the national commitments made in the lead up to the Paris 
Agreement and what it would take to limit warming to even 2 degrees Celsius, 
not to mention the more ambitious 1.5 degree goal that many view as critical 
for the most climate vulnerable.23F22 Moreover, an emerging body of 
psychological research indicates that these differences cannot be overcome 
simply by presenting politicians and the public with more and better scientific 
data; strongly divided partisan views are difficult to shift and not responsive to 
change in the face of expert opinion.24F23 
 
 20 Ben Adler, Republicans Still Hope to Throw Wrench in the Paris Climate Deal, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 17, 
2015, 4:49 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/republicans-still-hope-throw-wrench-paris-climate-deal-406635. 
 21 This Article takes the position that, if one accepts consensus climate change science, now is a critical 
time for action on energy transition and climate change. The most recent report of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change stresses the urgency of action by major energy users such as the United States to limit 
greenhouse gas emissions in forestalling the most serious climate change impacts. INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS: SUMMARY FOR 
POLICYMAKERS 3 (T.F. Stocker et al. eds., 2013), http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-
report/ar5/wg1/WG1AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf; see also INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY: SUMMARY FOR POLICY MAKERS (C.B. 
FIELD et al. eds., 2014), https://ipcc-wg2.gov/AR5/images/uploads/WG2AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf; NAT’L RES. 
COUNCIL, ABRUPT IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: ANTICIPATING SURPRISES 64 (2013); RHODIUM GRP., 
AMERICAN CLIMATE PROSPECTUS: ECONOMIC RISKS IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (2014), 
https://gspp.berkeley.edu/assets/uploads/research/pdf/American_Climate_Prospectus.pdf; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, CLIMATE CHANGE INDICATORS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2014, at 8 (3d ed. 2014), 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/science/indicators/download.html; U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RES. PROGRAM, 
CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES: THE THIRD NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT (Jerry M. 
Melillo et al. eds., 2014), http://s3.amazonaws.com/nca2014/high/NCA3_Highlights_HighRes.pdf. 
 22 Even with full implementation of current nationally determined contributions submitted by the United 
States and other UNFCCC parties, it will not be possible to hold global average temperature rises below the 2 
degree ceiling specified in the Paris Agreement, a fact which the COP decision annexing the Agreement 
acknowledges. See Adoption of the Paris Agreement, supra note 9, art. 2, ¶ 1(a); id. art. 4, ¶ 17. 
 23 Indeed, some of those who oppose greenhouse gas regulation of the energy industry have skeptical 
views of climate change undergirded by deeply held moral beliefs and cultural worldviews. Their position may 
prove impervious to scientific information, even as the evidence about the devastating risks and effects of 
climate change continues to mount. Dan Kahan, Why We Are Poles Apart on Climate Change, 488 NATURE 
255, 255 (2012). This resistance to information that goes against existing beliefs may in fact be greater among 
those considered “experts” in their specialist field, e.g., political pundits, economists, specialist professors. 
Philip Tetlock’s study of expert political judgment, for example, showed that the accuracy of an expert’s 
prediction has an inverse relationship to his or her self-confidence, renown, and depth of knowledge. 
Moreover, Tetlock found experts were not good at learning from their mistakes and tended to dismiss 
information that did not fit with what they already believed. In this respect, experts applied a double standard: 
they were much tougher in assessing the validity of information that undercut their theories than in crediting 
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This Article is the first to draw from this psychological research to provide 
a systematic plan for advancing energy and climate change policy despite 
partisan divides. 25F24 The Article uses our original empirical research, including 
interviews we have conducted with key participants in energy and climate 
change policy, 26F25 and case studies to propose substantive and structural 
strategies for progress. Its innovative conceptual framing and new empirical 
work make important and timely contributions to scholarship on energy, 
climate change, and partisanship. 
The Article argues that maximizing constructive action in this context 
requires approaches that either allow for bipartisan agreement (“going 
together” strategies) or circumvent partisan divides (“going around” 
strategies). As illustrated by the opening example, media and public attention 
often focuses on conflict and “going around” strategies. However, both social 
science research and case examples indicate that Republicans and Democrats 
actually agree on some issues critical to addressing climate change and energy 
 
information which supported it. See PHILIP E. TETLOCK, EXPERT POLITICAL JUDGMENT: HOW GOOD IS IT? 
HOW CAN WE KNOW? (2005). Part I, infra, explores these issues in depth. This skepticism about science is not 
confined to energy and climate change debates, but mirrored in many other important policy areas, as the 
recent controversy over vaccination and the measles outbreak illustrates. See Carrie Dann, By the Numbers: 
Republicans, Democrats and the Vaccination Debate, NBC NEWS (Feb. 2, 2015, 1:14 PM), http://www. 
nbcnews.com/politics/first-read/numbers-republicans-democrats-vaccination-debate-n298606; Chris Mooney, 
POLL: Tea Party Members Really, Really Don’t Trust Scientists, MOTHER JONES (May 20, 2014, 10:46 AM), 
http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2014/05/tea-party-climate-trust-science. 
 24 This psychological research, such as that of the Cultural Cognition Project at Yale Law School, 
focuses on analyzing how people perceive risk, but it does not translate that into a framework for legal 
strategies. For an example of these types of papers, see Papers, CULTURAL COGNITION PROJECT YALE L. SCH., 
http://www.culturalcognition.net/browse-papers/ (last visited Dec. 25, 2015). Similarly, while a number of law 
review articles mention this psychological research in the context of climate change, none of them builds on it 
to produce a systematic framework. For instance, as of September 14, 2015, a Westlaw search of all law 
review articles containing the phrase “cultural cognition” and then a search within them for “climate change” 
revealed 106 articles, none of which use this work to develop a systematic strategy for policy progress. Most 
on point is a forthcoming paper by Robert Verchick that applies cultural cognition theory to strategies to 
address climate change adaptation, focusing on case studies of urban adaptation, but this is much narrower in 
scope and does not propose a comprehensive approach to energy partisanship. Robert R.M. Verchick,  
Culture, Cognition, and Climate, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=2516887. For a discussion of this paper in the broader context of this psychological research, 
see infra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 25 We draw on case study and empirical research, including interviews, that we have conducted, jointly 
and independently, across a range of climate change and energy issues over the past decade to explore the 
promise of substantive and structural leverage points and ways they can be paired to maximize effectiveness. 
These real world examples illustrate how such strategies can be and are being used in practice. This empirical 
work was supported in part by a grant from the Australian Research Council to support our collaborative 
research on climate change litigation. 
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transition.27F26 By reframing problems around areas of agreement and focusing on 
fora where there is less conflict, leaders and advocates often can make needed 
progress.28F27 And when such agreement is not possible, “going around” action—
as illustrated by the Obama Administration’s use of executive authority to 
regulate power plant greenhouse gas emissions—provides a crucial 
complement. The Article uses examples of what has worked to illustrate these 
strategies. 
Substantively, instead of confronting political and public views that resist 
action, the Article suggests that those seeking regulatory change should frame 
issues in alternative ways that resonate with a broader range of moral beliefs 
and cultural values. Specifically, framing climate change and energy transition 
as a matter of economic development (as has been possible with respect to 
some energy efficiency and renewable energy projects) or disaster resilience 
(in the aftermath of high profile events like Superstorm Sandy) are two 
promising avenues for “going together.”29F28 To be effective, though, this 
approach must be more than mere “spin”; it should involve a genuine effort to 
identify areas of common ground and shared values that can be the foundation 
for real and tangible action.30F29 Moreover, in such reframing, how climate 
change issues are discussed, including the tone, relatability and perceived 
trustworthiness of communicators, affects cooperativeness significantly. The 
Article argues for the importance of trusted individuals, referred to in the social 
science literature as “vouchers,” in helping to bridge partisan gaps.31F30 
Structurally, we suggest options for pursuing action in spheres that are less 
polarized on climate change or where partisan blocks are less substantial than 
is often the case in the federal congressional setting. Structural shifts may 
involve (1) scaling down actions to the local or state government level;  
(2) shifting across to another branch of government whether via litigation to 
force executive action or the use of executive authority to bypass congressional 
inaction; or (3) incentivizing private sector action to address energy issues. 
Often, substantive and structural strategies interact to promote “going 
together,” with the suggested substantive reframing strategies offering 
particularly good chances of being effective at state and local levels, in other 
 
 26 See infra Parts I & II. 
 27 See infra Parts II & III. 
 28 See Verchick, supra note 24. 
 29 See id. 
 30 See id. at 14. 
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branches, and with corporate and other private actors. However, unlike 
substantive reframing, some of these structural strategies, particularly litigation 
and executive action, involve “going around” partisan roadblocks. 
Part I of the Article begins by exploring the partisan politics surrounding 
climate change and energy transition in the United States, and current 
interdisciplinary understandings of how they interact with possibilities for 
policy progress. Parts II and III build upon that research to propose substantive 
and structural leverage points for fostering more constructive policy dialogue 
and action. The Article concludes by acknowledging that despite these positive 
examples, the strategies proposed may not, on their own, be enough to achieve 
adequate policy action. However, with a fast narrowing window for avoiding 
the worst impacts of climate change, thinking systematically about how to 
overcome the barriers of partisanship is worthwhile despite potential 
limitations. Beyond their direct policy potential, these strategies may make an 
incremental difference in changing the quality of the dialogue about energy 
and climate change, which could contribute constructively to longer-term 
efforts to mount a more coordinated and comprehensive response. 
I. PARTISAN POLITICS ON CLIMATE AND ENERGY 
       32F31   
This Part examines how increasing partisanship and polarization of 
Congress and the U.S. public is inhibiting policy progress on climate and 
 
 31 © Steve Breen. All rights reserved. Distributed by Creators Syndicate, http://media.cagle.com/124/ 
2012/11/14/122400_600.jpg. 
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energy issues. It pairs (1) analysis of partisanship’s role in shaping energy 
policy with (2) a discussion of the interdisciplinary academic literature on 
cognitive psychology, cultural cognition, and public risk perception that helps 
to explain why this partisanship is apparently so intractable. A key message 
from this body of scholarship is that partisan divides and polarized public 
attitudes are rarely amenable to change simply through the presentation of 
reasoned argument, information, and expert knowledge.33F32 Instead, central to 
circumventing partisanship on politically controversial issues like climate 
change and energy transition are strategies that target areas of common ground 
where polarization is reduced and some form of consensus is possible. 
In investigating the relationship between partisanship and energy policy in 
this Part, our intention is not to assert that partisanship is the only barrier to 
progress in this area. Biased or inaccurate media reporting of the issues, the 
strong ties of some regional economies to fossil fuels, and the large part that 
private donors and super-PACs play in electoral politics—particularly 
post-Citizens United v. FEC34F33—all play a role.35F34 Nonetheless partisanship is 
frequently the conduit used to give voice and effect to a range of political and 
public divisions over energy and other policy issues.36F35 In other words, 
partisanship is a key element of climate policy dysfunction in the United States 
even if it is not the sole explanation. 
A. “A House Divided” 
Partisanship is by no means a new feature of politics in the United States. 
Indeed, it was in recognition of the potential “mischiefs of faction” that the 
 
 32 Indeed, and somewhat counterintuitively, studies find that exposure to more scientific “facts” about 
climate change that undercut a person’s strongly held anti-climate action views can serve to further harden 
those views. P. Sol Hart and Eric Nisbet describe this as the “boomerang effect” in which scientific 
information that runs counter to entrenched views produces the opposite result to that intended by amplifying 
partisan differences and deepening people’s existing attitudes. See P. Sol Hart & Erik C. Nisbet, Boomerang 
Effects in Science Communication: How Motivated Reasoning and Identity Cues Amplify Opinion Polarization 
About Climate Mitigation Policies, 39 COMMC’N RES. 701, 704–05, 715 (2012). Interestingly, Hart and Nisbet 
find this effect is greatest where climate change campaigns focus on risks to people in other countries or even 
other regions of the United States. By contrast, locally focused campaigns that highlight risks to fellow 
residents of a state or city are less likely to activate strong partisan differences. This research reinforces the 
utility of a structural reframing strategy focused on local action. See infra Part III.A. 
 33 558 U.S. 310 (2010).  
 34 For a discussion, for example, of political donations since Citizens United, see infra note 419 and 
accompanying text. 
 35 CHRISTOPHER D. JOHNSTON, HOWARD LAVINE & CHRISTOPHER M. FEDERICO, PERSONALITY, PARTIES 
AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC OPINION (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 6–7) (on file with authors) 
(describing partisanship as “a prime determinant and organizer of political attitudes”). 
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founders of this country’s political system devised a series of constitutional 
checks and balances in order to maintain the status quo in the absence of broad 
bipartisan support for policy change.37F36 However, over the last two decades, 
partisanship in the United States has been getting worse.38F37 
In a study released in 2012, the Pew Research Center for the People and the 
Press found that while the core beliefs and principles of the nation have 
remained relatively stable over the past twenty-five years, increasingly these 
beliefs are being sorted along partisan lines.39F38 The most “pointed” area of 
polarization identified in the 2012 study was views on the importance of 
environmental protection. Whereas twenty years ago there was virtually no 
disagreement across party lines on this issue, by 2003, a gap of thirteen points 
had opened up, and by 2012, this had tripled to thirty-nine points, one of the 
largest value gaps recorded in the study. 40F39 
 
 36 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
 37 Chris Cillizza, Partisanship Doesn’t Seem Worse. It Is Worse., WASH. POST (June 4, 2012), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/post/partisanship-doesnt-seem-worse-it-is-worse/2012/06/04/ 
gJQAJIuzDV_blog.html. There is broad scholarly consensus that U.S. politics are more polarized than at any 
time in the recent past. See NOLAN MCCARTY, KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, POLARIZED 
AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL RICHES (2006); Nolan McCarty, What We Know and 
Don’t Know About Our Polarized Politics, WASH. POST: MONKEY CAGE (Jan. 8, 2014), http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/01/08/what-we-know-and-dont-know-about-our-polarized-
politics/.  
 38 While other social divides such as race, gender, ethnicity, class, and religion have remained much the 
same—neither growing nor receding significantly—partisan polarization has starkly increased. Partisan 
Polarization Surges in Bush, Obama Years, PEW RES. CTR. (June 4, 2012), http://www.people-press.org/2012/ 
06/04/section-1-understanding-the-partisan-divide-over-american-values/; see also JOHNSTON ET AL., supra 
note 35 (identifying how partisanship has become strongly linked to liberal and conservative self-identification 
and a range of policy issues on social, cultural and racial issues). Another, more recent, large-scale survey 
conducted by the Pew Research Center confirms these partisan trends. The 2014 study, which surveyed over 
10,000 U.S. adults, found the overall share of respondents who expressed either consistently conservative or 
consistently liberal opinions doubled between 1994 and 2014 from 10% to 21%. It also found that ideological 
thinking is more closely aligned with political partisanship than was the case in the past: “Today, 92% of 
Republicans are to the right of the median Democrat, and 94% of Democrats are to the left of the median 
Republican.” Political Polarization in the American Public, PEW RES. CTR. (June 12, 2014), http://www. 
people-press.org/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public/. 
 39 See Partisan Polarization Surges in Bush, Obama Years, supra note 38. Views on environmental 
regulation were identified as a key area of divergence in the 2014 study as well. In 1994, there was a relatively 
narrow ten-point partisan gap on this issue—a gap that had extended to thirty-five points by 2014. Political 
Polarization in the American Public, supra note 38. 
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Political scientists offer a variety of explanations for worsening 
partisanship in U.S. politics.41F40 Some point to external factors such as 
increasing voter polarization, political realignment of the Southern states from 
largely Democrat to largely Republican, the emergence of the Tea Party 
faction shifting the Republican Party strongly to the right, gerrymandering 
through electoral redistricting, polarization of the primary elections process, 
increasing economic inequality, private campaign financing, and the 
emergence of a more partisan media.42F41 Others emphasize internal factors such 
as congressional rule changes that facilitate the addition of amendments to 
bills, the growing role of the speaker and majority leaders in controlling party 
votes, increasing levels of competition between the parties, and the breakdown 
of bipartisan norms. 43F42 While explanations for partisanship diverge, however, 
broader agreement exists regarding its consequences. As Thomas Mann and 
Norman Ornstein put it in their 2012 book, It’s Even Worse than It Looks: How 
the American Constitutional System Collided with the New Politics of 
Extremism, vehemently adversarial parties in the setting of a separation-of-
powers government “are a formula for willful obstruction and policy 
irresolution.”44F43 
Studies of partisanship in the U.S. population uniformly find that 
polarization is greatest among political elites, such as members of Congress, 
who tend to hold more extreme partisan views than the public at large.45F44 Even 
so, public views on controversial social matters appear to be influenced by the 
framings of issues used in the political debate. Opinion polls on climate change 
reveal persistent partisan divisions; more Republicans than Democrats question 
the validity of climate science and dismiss the urgency of the problem.46F45 
 
 40 For a good overview of the contribution of the social science in the researching causes of polarization, 
see Michael Barber & Nolan McCarty, Causes and Consequences of Polarization, in NEGOTIATING 
AGREEMENT IN POLITICS 19, 23, 26–32 (Jane Mansbridge & Cathie Jo Martin eds., 2013). 
 41 Id.  
 42 See Barber & McCarty, supra note 40, at 33–35. Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson argue, for example, 
that Republican strategies have played a key role in this transition. JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, OFF 
CENTER: THE REPUBLIC REVOLUTION AND THE EROSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2005). 
 43 THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS: HOW THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF EXTREMISM xiii (2012). 
 44 Political Polarization in the American Public, supra note 38; see also JOHNSTON ET AL., supra note 35 
(finding cultural images of the parties have become the most salient aspects of partisan branding among 
politically engaged citizens). 
 45 Marjorie Connelly, Global Warming Concerns Grow, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2014), http://www. 
nytimes.com/2014/09/23/science/global-warming-concerns-grow.html (noting that 18% Republicans but only 
3% of Democrats did not think global warming was real; further, 61% of Democrats said global warming was 
causing an impact now, compared with only 26% of Republicans). Although a majority of people in the United 
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Public support for action on climate change and clean energy in particular 
has waxed and waned over the last decade. It peaked in 2007; Gallup recorded 
its highest levels of public concern about climate change in March 2007 with 
41% of those surveyed worrying “a great deal.”47F46 These levels of public 
concern declined over the next several years, paralleling the failures of 
comprehensive climate legislative proposals in the Congress and weak 
outcomes in climate negotiations at the international level, particularly the 
much-publicized difficulties at the Copenhagen negotiations in 2009.48F47 During 
2011 and 2012, climate change and clean energy had become so politically 
unpalatable that the terms were barely uttered by the President. According to 
Richard Lazarus, it was as if “[c]limate change had become the political 
equivalent of Harry Potter’s Lord Voldemort: the crisis that dared not be 
named.” 49F48 
When Superstorm Sandy hit the East Coast in late 2012, political and 
public attitudes to climate change in the United States shifted once more. 
Successive polls of the U.S. public since then have shown gradually increasing 
levels of public concern about climate change.50F49 There also appears to be 
growing support among the U.S. public for mitigation measures to reduce 
carbon emissions, even if such measures would add to energy costs.51F50 
 
States view climate change as a serious problem, a November 2015 Washington Post–ABC News Poll 
suggests a continuing partisan split in views on the seriousness of climate change. Scott Clement, Poll: 
Partisans Split on Seriousness of Climate Change, WASH. POST (Nov. 30, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost. 
com/politics/poll-partisans-split-on-seriousness-of-climate-change/2015/11/29/2bf552d0-93c3-11e5-8aa0-
5d0946560a97_story.html. 
 46 Frank Newport, Americans Show Low Levels of Concern on Global Warming, GALLUP (Apr. 4, 2014), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/168236/americans-show-low-levels-concern-global-warming.aspx  
 47 For discussion of the failure of the Copenhagen UNFCCC conference of the parties to agree on a new 
climate agreement in 2009, see John Vidal, Allegra Stratton & Suzanne Goldenberg, Low Targets, Goals 
Dropped: Copenhagen Ends in Failure, GUARDIAN (Dec. 18, 2009, 7:47 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
environment/2009/dec/18/copenhagen-deal. More recent international negotiations have achieved greater 
success, culminating in the new, universal climate agreement adopted in Paris in December 2015. See 
Adoption of the Paris Agreement, supra note 9.  
 48 Richard J. Lazarus, Presidential Combat Against Climate Change, 126 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 152 
(2014), http://harvardlawreview.org/2013/03/presidential-combat-against-climate-change/. 
 49 Frank Newport, Americans’ Worries About Global Warming up Slightly, GALLUP (Mar. 30, 2012), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/153653/americans-worries-global-warming-slightly.aspx; Lydia Saad, Americans’ 
Concerns About Global Warming on the Rise, GALLUP (Apr. 8, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/161645/ 
americans-concerns-global-warming-rise.aspx; Lydia Saad, Republican Skepticism Toward Global Warming 
Eases, GALLUP (Apr. 9, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/161714/republican-skepticism-global-warming-
eases.aspx. 
 50 Lisa Lerer, Americans by 2 to 1 Would Pay More to Curb Climate Change, BLOOMBERG BUS. (June 
10, 2014); see also Global Warming: What Should Be Done?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2015) [hereinafter  
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Nevertheless, the political environment for making progress on climate change 
and energy transition remains a difficult one. In 2014, the Pew Research 
Center found that dealing with global warming was ranked by the public 
second to last in a list of twenty priorities for presidential and congressional 
action. In addition, substantial partisan divides were evident. Whereas 42% of 
Democrats cited dealing with climate change as a top priority, only 14% of 
Republicans and 27% of Independents shared this view.52F51 These splits are 
particularly significant because citizens showed their overall dissatisfaction 
with the direction of the country by shifting Congress back to Republican 
hands in fall 2014, intensifying the divide in federal government (as often 
occurs in midterm elections). 
There is some recent evidence that members of the public who identify as 
Republican are becoming more favorably disposed to climate change action. 
For example, a 2015 New York Times–Stanford University–Resources for the 
Future (RFF) poll found that 78% of the U.S. public—including 60% of 
Republicans—support “the federal government limit[ing] the amount of 
greenhouse gases that U.S. businesses put out.”53F52 Among Republican 
respondents, 48% said they were more likely to vote for a candidate who 
supports dealing with climate change.54F53 
However, even with this shift, significant differences remain among those 
who identify as Democrats, Republicans, and Independents. Among 
Democrats, 63% said global warming was very or extremely important to them 
personally; only 18% of Republicans felt the same.55F54 In addition, Republicans 
expressed more concern over the economic consequences of climate change 
policies, with 47% worried that measures to curb global warming would harm 
the economy. 56F55 Republicans are also more likely to vote for those who deny 
climate change science or do not view themselves as qualified to evaluate the 
 
New York Times–Stanford–RFF poll], http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/01/29/us/global-warming-
poll.html. 
 51 Deficit Reduction Declines as Policy Priority, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 27, 2014), http://www.people-
press.org/2014/01/27/deficit-reduction-declines-as-policy-priority/.  
 52 New York Times–Stanford–RFF poll, supra note 50. For a discussion of the poll, see Coral Davenport 
& Majorie Connelly, Most Republicans Say They Back Climate Action, Poll Finds, N.Y. TIMES  
(Jan. 30, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/31/us/politics/most-americans-support-government-action-
on-climate-change-poll-finds.html. 
 53 Davenport & Connelly, supra note 52. 
 54 Id.; see also Clement, supra note 45. 
 55 Davenport & Connelly, supra note 52. 
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science, and are less likely to support policy measures to address climate 
change.57F56 
Moreover, despite the growing concern with climate change in recent 
polls,58F57 people in the United States continue to disassociate themselves from 
the problem. 59F58 For example, in the January 2015 New York Times–Stanford 
University–RFF poll, respondents still tended to view climate change as 
something threatening to “others,” and as having impacts that happen “away” 
rather than affecting them “at home.” 60F59 Asked how much they thought global 
warming had hurt them personally or would do in the future, most believed “a 
little” or “not at all.”61F60 This disassociation against the backdrop of partisanship 
makes it hard to galvanize needed action. 
 
 56 Id. 
 57 The New York Times–Stanford–RFF poll in January 2015 may signal the emergence of higher levels 
of public concern on the issue. For instance, a majority of respondents in the poll thought climate change poses 
a critical future threat. New York Times–Stanford–RFF poll, supra note 50.  
 58 Compared with the citizens of many other developed nations, particularly Europeans, people in the 
United States have tended to exhibit fairly low levels of concern about climate change as a threat and a greater 
ambivalence about climate change science. Irene Lorenzoni & Nick F. Pidgeon, Public Views on Climate 
Change: European and USA Perspectives, 77 CLIMATIC CHANGE 73 (2006) (providing a perspective from 
almost a decade ago). Gallup’s 2014 poll measuring how much the U.S. public worries about climate change 
compared with other environmental problems found only 34% worried “a great deal,” essentially the same 
number as in 1989. Newport, supra note 46. With respect to skepticism about climate change, in a September 
2014 New York Times–CBS News poll, only 54% agreed global warming was caused by human behavior, 
with 31% considering warming a natural phenomenon, and 10% rejecting that global warming existed at all. 
Connelly, supra note 45. This figure of 54% agreeing that climate change is real was hailed as significant as it 
was the first time that polling had recorded that this belief was shared by a majority of the U.S. public. Partisan 
divergence was evident in levels of concern in this poll, with 18% of Republicans saying global warming was 
not real compared with only 3% of Democrats. About half of the Republicans surveyed considered the 
economy more important than the environment. Id.; see also A. LEISEROWITZ ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE 
AMERICAN MIND: AMERICANS’ GLOBAL WARMING BELIEFS AND ATTITUDES IN NOVEMBER, 2013,  
at 5 (2014), http://environment.yale.edu/climate-communication/files/Climate-Beliefs-November-2013.pdf; 
Allison Kopicki, Is Global Warming Real? Most Americans Say Yes, N.Y. TIMES  
(June 1, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/02/upshot/is-global-warming-real-most-in-US-believe-in-
climate-change.html; Julie Ray & Anita Pugliese, Worldwide, Blame for Climate Change Falls on Humans, 
GALLUP (Apr. 22 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/147242/worldwide-blame-climate-change-falls-
humans.aspx. How the poll question is phrased can be influential; for example, people in the United States 
tend to see “global warming” as more of a concern (because of the association with extreme weather events) 
than “climate change” (which suggests more climate variability). See Allison Kopicki, Americans More 
Worried About ‘Warming’ than ‘Climate Change,’ N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/30/upshot/climate-change-or-global-warming-tough-choice-for-
pollsters.html. 
 59 New York Times–Stanford–RFF poll, supra note 50; see also Cass R. Sunstein, On the Divergent 
American Reactions to Terrorism and Climate Change, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 507 (2007). 
 60 New York Times–Stanford–RFF poll, supra note 50; see also Connelly, supra note 45. 
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B. “Can We All Get Along?” 
For those who believe strongly in the necessity of a U.S. clean energy 
transition and robust climate change measures, it is tempting to think that the 
solution to partisan divisions and polarized political views lies simply in 
providing those opposed with better information. Within the scientific 
community, for example, there exists an impressive level of consensus about 
the reality and causes of climate change. 62F61 Scientists’ calls for action to address 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions are increasingly urgent and their 
warnings about the consequences of climate change are ever more dire.63F62 On 
one view then, the key to policy progress lies in getting better about how we 
communicate the science of climate change and the need for energy transition 
to politicians and the general public.64F63 Such communication efforts have 
focused on increasing the amount of quality news coverage of climate 
science.65F64 The underlying assumption of this information “deficit” model is 
that, once presented, the scientific facts will speak for themselves, leading the 
wider public to view climate change with the same urgency scientists do.66F65 
However, the reality—as successive opinion polls demonstrate—is that many 
ignore the coverage, distrust those providing the information, or reinterpret 
scientific claims through a partisan lens.67F66 
Partisan political realities also place significant limits on the capacity to 
achieve prescriptions for clean energy technological innovation and legal 
reform offered by engineers, economists, and lawyers. In an influential article 
published in 2004, for instance, Princeton academics Stephen Pacala and 
Robert Socolow proposed a “wedge” approach to “solve” the climate change 
problem for the next fifty years using existing technologies.68F67 The authors 
 
 61 William R. L. Anderegg et al., Expert Credibility in Climate Change, 107 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. 
SCI. 12107 (2010); Peter T. Doran & Maggie Kendall Zimmerman, Examining the Scientific Consensus on 
Climate Change, 90 EOS 22, 23 (2009); Naomi Oreskes, Beyond the Ivory Tower: The Scientific Consensus on 
Climate Change, 306 SCI. 1686 (2004). 
 62 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: SYNTHESIS REPORT 
(R.K. Pachauri et al. eds., 2014); Carbon Budget Archive, GLOBAL CARBON PROJECT (Sept. 21, 2014), 
http://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/archive.htm (presenting the past budgets, including the 
2014 budget in particular). 
 63 Nisbet, supra note 16. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id.  
 66 See also Hart & Nisbet, supra note 32. 
 67 S. Pacala & R. Socolow, Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Climate Problem for the Next 50 Years 
with Current Technologies, 305 SCI. 968 (2004). In 2011, Socolow published an updated version of the wedges 
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conceptualized the necessary emissions reductions to 2054 as a “stabilization 
triangle,” which could be divided up into wedges, with each wedge allocated to 
an existing low-carbon or renewable technology.69F68 Seven years on, however, 
and with emissions growing largely unchecked,70F69 Robert Socolow 
acknowledged, 
Over the past seven years, I wish we had been more forthcoming with 
three messages: We should have conceded, prominently, that the 
news about climate change is unwelcome, that today’s climate 
science is incomplete, and that every “solution” carries risk. I don’t 
know for sure that such candor would have produced a less polarized 
public discourse. But I bet it would have.71F70 
Legal academics have also been guilty, at times, of ignoring or at least 
underestimating partisan barriers in putting forward legal “solutions” for 
addressing climate change. For example, law review articles and academic 
conferences have continued to debate the ideal form of comprehensive climate 
change legislation even as the political prospects for it look dim. While it is 
important to understand the dimensions of ideal legal frameworks for 
addressing climate change and energy transition, such discussions would 
benefit from a more explicit acknowledgement and assessment of the political 
possibilities. 
With the growing recognition that a “data deficit” is not to blame for 
political inertia, scholars have increasingly explored the psychological basis 
for people’s reluctance—and often outright hostility—around dealing with 
climate change. This section explores recent psychological research that helps 
to explain both why the public at large does not view climate change as an 
urgent problem and also why views, once they become shaped along partisan 
lines, are very difficult to shift. Understanding the nature of these barriers to 
policy progress is key to framing options for moving forward despite imbedded 
partisanship and public ambivalence. 
Polls and public opinion surveys, such as those discussed above, give 
important clues as to what underlies the general lack of public concern over 
climate change and motivates more strongly partisan views resisting policy 
 
approach advocating nine rather than seven wedges. Robert Socolow, Opinion, Wedges Reaffirmed, BULL. 
ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (Sept. 27, 2011, 2:16 PM), http://thebulletin.org/wedges-reaffirmed.  
 68 Pacala & Socolow, supra note 67. 
 69 Carbon Budget Archive, supra note 62. 
 70 Socolow, supra note 67. 
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change. For instance, polls of U.S. public attitudes often record that the 
majority of the public views climate change as a threat in the distant future, 
happening to others, and lower in the hierarchy of environmental concerns than 
other more imminent and perceptible threats.72F71 Harvard psychologist Dan 
Gilbert argues that it is these features of perceived climate change risk that 
make it a hard problem to get the public and politicians excited about. Gilbert’s 
research suggests climate change does not trigger our brains’ most 
fundamental alarm systems because it lacks four key traits that our brains have 
evolved to respond to as threatening.73F72 A threat has these traits if it is the result 
of actions that are intentional, immoral, imminent, and instantaneous.74F73 Gilbert 
quipped in 2006—before the current societal shifts around gay marriage that 
perhaps give some hope in this context—that if climate change was trying to 
kill us, or was caused by gay sex, we would be much more likely as a society 
to leap into action.75F74 Climate change is an extremely dangerous threat, argues 
Gilbert, precisely because “it fails to trip the brain’s alarm, leaving us soundly 
asleep in a burning bed.”76F75 
Other psychological research suggests that people’s general inability to 
grasp climate change as a threat is only one of many mental barriers we face in 
confronting the problem.77F76 For instance, environmental psychologist Robert 
Gifford identifies several categories of psychological barriers to mitigation 
behaviors that he labels “dragons of inaction.”78F77 For some people a key dragon 
may be a lack of perceived behavioral control (what can I as an individual do 
that will make a difference?); for others it may be ideology or worldviews that 
prevent action. An effective policy response to climate change, Gifford argues, 
depends upon understanding which segments of the population need help in 
dealing with which dragons. 79F78 
 
 71 See supra Part I.A. 
 72 Daniel Gilbert, Opinion, If Only Gay Sex Caused Global Warming, L.A. TIMES (July 2, 2006), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2006/jul/02/opinion/op-gilbert2. 
 73 Harvard Thinks Big 2010, Daniel Gilbert–Global Warming and Psychology, VIMEO (Mar. 21, 2010), 
https://vimeo.com/10324258.  
 74 Id. 
 75 Gilbert, supra note 72. 
 76 Kharunya Paramaguru, The Battle Over Global Warming Is All in Your Head, TIME (Aug. 19, 2013), 
http://science.time.com/2013/08/19/in-denial-about-the-climate-the-psychological-battle-over-global-
warming/. 
 77 Robert Gifford, The Dragons of Inaction: Psychological Barriers that Limit Climate Change 
Mitigation and Adaptation, 66 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 290, 298 (2011). 
 78 Id.  
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Getting the general public interested in climate change and energy 
transition is hard enough; it is even harder to persuade partisans—on both 
sides—to evolve in their views in ways needed to achieve consensus, or at 
least compromise. Again, interdisciplinary research gives us insight into why 
that is the case. For example, David Hume’s well-known philosophical maxim 
that “[r]eason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions”80F79 is 
well-supported by evidence from psychology studies into the key moral 
precepts all humans have from birth.81F80 Work by social psychologist Jonathan 
Haidt and others identifies five cross-culturally significant intuitions or 
emotions that guide our behavior and understandings of morality. These are 
preventing harm/caring for others; fairness/reciprocity (justice); in-group 
loyalty; authority/respect; and purity/sanctity.82F81 Haidt’s work also 
demonstrates that, though we share these emotions in common, people pay 
more or less attention to each depending upon whether they are liberal or 
conservative. Liberals tend to pay more attention to issues and arguments that 
engage the moral foundations of harm/care and fairness/reciprocity. 
Conservatives support these values too but also emphasize the other aspects of 
morality associated with loyalty, authority and purity. Both groups—
conservatives and liberals—reason from their own moral perspectives and 
believe their conclusions are right.83F82 Adherence to a particular set of moral 
tenets may thus blind each group to the “truth.” 
Another strand of psychological research that underscores the difficulties of 
attempting to change partisan views around climate change and energy 
transition through persuasive argument is cultural cognition theory. This 
conceptual approach analyzes how people view risks in an effort to explain 
why the public often perceives some risks as very concerning—for example, 
terrorism—despite the low statistical probability of their occurrence. The 
foundation of the theory is that an individual’s attitude to risk is shaped by the 
social structures in which the individual is embedded and the “cultural bias” 
that he or she favors.84F83 Hence, what risks people worry about reflect their 
 
 79 DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 415 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., Clarendon Press 1896) 
(1739). 
 80 See Joshua Knobe, Person as Scientist, Person as Moralist, 33 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 315 (2010). 
 81 JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED BY POLITICS AND 
RELIGION 342 (2012). 
 82 JOHNSTON ET AL., supra note 35 (drawing on Haidt’s work and other literature discussing predictors of 
political orientations and policy preferences, which characterizes the left–right conflict as representing a clash 
over the potential risks associated with change). 
 83 MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN ESSAY ON THE SELECTION OF 
TECHNICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS 8 (1982); see also JOHNSTON ET AL., supra note 35, at 11 
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particular cultural worldviews: “Whatever objective dangers exist in the world 
social organizations will emphasize those that reinforce the moral, political or 
religious order that hold the group together.”85F84 These effects are not 
necessarily overcome with higher levels of education. Indeed, in one study of 
climate change attitudes, researchers found a strong correlation between 
respondents’ cultural worldviews and their opinions on climate change but 
little correspondence between these opinions and respondents’ scientific 
literacy and numeracy scores; in fact, those with higher scores tended to have 
decreased concern about climate change.86F85 
Cultural cognition theory also stresses the importance of “vouchers” in risk 
communication. Vouchers are knowledgeable and trusted members of a 
person’s cultural group who can help to build acceptance of a particular issue 
through “vouching” for information and showing how it fits with the group’s 
pre-existing worldview.87F86 Such vouchers can play an important role in 
breaking through otherwise entrenched understandings of the issues to suggest 
novel approaches that will be acceptable to their social group.88F87 As explored in 
depth in Part II, vouchers from the two parties play an important role in 
determining whether the problem is framed in a way that exacerbates partisan 
divides or helps people “go together.”89F88 
Although academics debate the validity of cultural cognition theory,90F89 a 
growing body of empirical psychological research supports its central findings, 
especially for highly politicized risks like climate change.91F90 A leading 
proponent, Dan Kahan, explains the reason we are “poles apart” on issues of 
climate change and energy transition is not public irrationality in the face of 
overwhelming scientific evidence.92F91 Rather, being right or wrong about climate 
change science is less important to people than the consequences of taking a 
 
(remarking that “the pronounced party tribalism now prevalent in American society appears to be rooted in the 
salience of cultural conflict. These disagreements are . . . about who we are in a deeper moral sense”). 
 84 Steve Rayner, Cultural Theory and Risk Analysis, in SOCIAL THEORIES OF RISK 83, 87 (Sheldon 
Krimsky & Dominic Golding eds., 1992). 
 85 Dan M. Kahan et al., The Polarizing Impact of Science Literacy and Numeracy on Perceived Climate 
Change Risks, 2 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 732, 733 (2012). 
 86 Dan Kahan, Fixing the Communications Failure, 463 NATURE 296, 297 (2010). 
 87 Discussions among like-minded people, on the other hand, often tend to have the opposite effect, 
further hardening views towards a more extreme result. See Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why 
Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 75 (2000). 
 88 See infra Part II. 
 89 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Misfearing: A Reply, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1110, 1111 (2006). 
 90 Kahan, supra note 86, at 296. 
 91 Kahan, supra note 23, at 255. 
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position on the issue that conflicts with that of their cultural group.93F92 
Moreover, people acquire their scientific knowledge of climate change from 
sources and people they trust.94F93 A person who identifies (strongly) as a 
conservative, therefore, is likely to take her cues about what to believe about 
climate change from like-minded members and leaders of her community, and 
conservative segments of the media. Kahan argues that in a situation where the 
science communication environment is “polluted” with “toxic partisan 
meanings—ones that effectively announce that ‘if you are one of us you 
believe this; otherwise we’ll know you are one of them,’” people will favor the 
risk perceptions that accord with those of their social group.95F94 These risk 
attitudes are highly resistant to change because of the detrimental social 
consequences for any person of taking a stand on an issue that is at odds with 
their cultural group. 
Robert Verchick has built on Kahan’s work to explore how an 
understanding of cultural cognition theory might affect strategies for 
addressing climate change. Using case studies in the context of adaptation—
which he regards as an easier avenue than mitigation—he argues for the 
possibilities for multi-level networks to serve as vehicles for reframing 
information and building trust.96F95 
The role of group dynamics in shaping climate attitudes and cementing 
partisan differences is also a theme of recent behavioral studies examining the 
views of strong proponents and opponents of climate action. This research 
finds that U.S. climate change skeptics have some characteristics of a social 
movement associated with a shared social identity and competition with 
believers.97F96 A similar “us” versus “them” attitude is also evident among 
climate action proponents.98F97 Ana-Maria Bliuc and Craig McGarty argue that 
resolving differences between the conflicting skeptic and believer social 
movements on climate change must go beyond attempts to “persuade, educate 
 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Verchick, supra note 24. 
 96 Tom Postmes, Climate Change and Group Dynamics, 5 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 195 (2015). 
 97 Ana-Maria Bliuc et al., Public Division About Climate Change Rooted in Conflicting Socio-Political 
Identities, 5 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 226 (2015). 
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or improve the public’s understanding of climate science. Instead, they should 
incorporate strategies aimed at improving intergroup relations.”99F98 
Overall, these different strands of psychological work on climate change 
highlight both the difficulties and possibilities for making progress in the 
current partisan environment that helps to undergird this Article’s approach. 
Namely, we need strategies that take how people form their views into 
account. Efforts to decrease energy partisanship need to focus on not just what 
the messages about the benefits of climate action and energy transition are, but 
who the messengers are and how they deliver their messages. The next section 
considers how to translate this theory into strategies suited to this partisan 
context. 
C. “Don’t Let the Perfect Be the Enemy of the Good” 
The research highlighted in the previous section suggests that trying to 
argue the case for energy transition or for addressing climate change in 
circumstances where those arguments do not resonate with the socio-political 
identity, cultural worldviews, or deeply held moral beliefs of the audience is 
unlikely to work. That does not mean, however, that partisanship is an 
insurmountable obstacle to policy progress on climate change. Rather it 
requires looking for areas of common ground where progress can be made. 
Perfect agreement may not be possible on the deep moral questions that 
motivate different worldviews or group identities but greater options for 
consensus may be found in the “shallows” through options that allow 
incremental steps forward. 
This approach has some synergies with the theories of John Rawls on 
“overlapping consensus”100F99 and the more practically oriented writings of Cass 
Sunstein on “incompletely theorized agreements” as a way of resolving legal 
disputes in a highly politicized context.101F100 Both approaches recognize the 
difficulties of getting agreement on issues of moral principle in a pluralist 
society. However, they posit that agreement may still be possible about a given 
outcome or result based on relatively low-level or narrow explanations for it 
 
 98 Ana-Maria Bliuc & Craig McGarty, Overcoming the Social Barriers to Climate Consensus, 
CONVERSATION (Feb. 2, 2015, 2:05 PM), http://theconversation.com/overcoming-the-social-barriers-to-
climate-consensus-36889. 
 99 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM xix (expanded ed., 2005).  
 100 Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1746–47 (1995). 
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that do not engage fundamental principles that remain in dispute.102F101 Taking 
this view, areas of common ground can be reached, but with different groups 
rationalizing this agreement in different ways that accord with their own 
principles or moral views. Discussion needs to shift from the differences 
between group positions to similarities and broader goals that both groups 
share.103F102 Often it will be necessary for proponents of climate action to shed the 
“science says” argument in favor of focusing on pragmatic climate policies that 
serve a range of ends.104F103 
Translating these insights to the context of overcoming energy partisanship 
requires thinking about two questions. First, are there things people will agree 
on, perhaps which engage social values that are more broadly shared? For 
instance, “conservatives” may find some portrayals of climate change 
off-putting, particularly those that call for radical lifestyle changes or which 
blame businesses for the problem. Nonetheless, they might agree with 
“liberals” on more general motivations for climate action such as saving 
money, creating jobs or doing things that are good for the economy; protecting 
homes, families, and children; or solidarity with local community. Such areas 
of common ground can provide a foundation for thinking about different ways 
of framing issues of climate change and energy transition that will resonate 
with a broader range of people and across party lines.105F104 
Second, are there avenues for getting things done on climate change and 
energy issues where polarization of views is less evident or poses less of a 
barrier? For example, polarization and partisanship may feature less at the 
local level where people have strong community ties and often do not even 
know the partisan affiliation of their elected officials.106F105 Courts offer a forum 
in which interested citizens and groups are able to advocate for regulatory 
action and arguments and evidence on either side of the issue can be aired and 
deliberated; their rulings, as discussed in Part III.B, have formed an important 
 
 101 Id. at 1735–36; RAWLS, supra note 99, at xix. 
 102 Bliuc & McGarty, supra note 98. 
 103 Mathis Hampel, Want to Convince People That Climate Change Is Real? Stop Talking About the 
Science of It, WASH. POST (Jan. 22, 2015, 1:54 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/ 
2015/01/22/want-to-convince-people-that-climate-change-is-real-stop-talking-about-the-science-of-it/. 
 104 These values are widely shared across society as a whole. The 2009 survey conducted by the Pew 
Research Center about the public’s priorities for government action recorded global warming in twentieth 
place, the economy in first place, and job creation in second place, whereas mid-ranking issues included 
dealing with the problems of the poor and needy, protecting the environment, and dealing with the nation’s 
energy problem. Nisbet, supra note 16, at 15. 
 105 See infra Part III.A. 
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basis for policy action.107F106 Partisan obstacles in Congress can also be bypassed 
more directly through the President’s use of executive authority to forward 
federal and international action on climate change.108F107 In business settings, 
partisan views may be less influential than the overall goal of improving 
corporate economic performance and shareholder returns. If climate and 
energy policy are gridlocked in Congress, it may be that these forums provide 
alternative sites where action can be taken and progress made. 
In the next two Parts, we explore these strategies as interlinked substantive 
and structural leverage points for moving forward on climate and energy issues 
in a polarized political environment. We focus on reframing the dialogue when 
possible around issues about which people largely agree and on pairing this 
substantive shift with relocating policy efforts to less partisan spaces. 
II. SUBSTANTIVE LEVERAGE POINTS FOR MAKING PROGRESS 
Climate advocates have long recognized the benefits of a multi-pronged 
approach to tackling the massive problem of climate change.109F108 Its 
wide-ranging and cumulative effects limit the scope for solving the problem 
“in one fell regulatory swoop.”110F109 While most favor national legislation and 
international agreement as forming the core optimal approach, this has not 
prevented experimentation with multiple policy options, regulatory tools, and 
litigation strategies in an attempt to make progress on the issue. Moreover, a 
“significant gap” remains between emissions reductions needed to avoid 
dangerous levels of warming and the national commitments made in the lead 
up to the Paris Agreement.111F110 Even those who used to focus on centralized 
 
 106 See infra Part III.B. 
 107 This is a “go-around” strategy which is often controversial and has the potential to exacerbate partisan 
divides, at least in the short-term. Other substantive and structural strategies offer more scope for cooperative 
or “go-together” approaches. See infra Parts II & III; see also Hari M. Osofsky & Jacqueline Peel, The Grass 
Is Not Always Greener: Congressional Dysfunction, Executive Action, and Climate Change in Comparative 
Perspective, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 139 (forthcoming 2016) (part of symposium issue on congressional 
dysfunction and executive power). 
 108 J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the 
Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 59, 66 (2010). 
 109 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 524 (2007). 
 110 See Adoption of the Paris Agreement, supra note 9, pmbl. 9. Accordingly, the decision recognizes that 
“much greater emissions reduction efforts will be required than those associated with the intended nationally 
determined contributions in order to hold the increase in the global average temperature to below 2 °C above 
pre-industrial levels.” Id. at 2. 
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solutions increasingly have come to embrace a more “polycentric” approach, in 
which many people and actors in multiple forums are part of a solution.112F111 
This Part and the next focus on operationalizing polycentric strategies that 
concentrate on issues and contexts where partisanship serves as less of a 
barrier. However, in so doing, our intention here is not to “teach grandma how 
to suck eggs.” 113F112 We are aware that many may feel that the practical, the 
possible, and the realistic are what they are already doing. As one interviewee 
put it to us in discussing his approach to forwarding energy transition: “Even if 
at the end of the day we don’t change and our society just continues on this 
suicidal approach of burning fossil fuels, I think we have to do what we can 
now, with the tools we have, to try and protect the future.”114F113 
Our sense, though, from our years of research on climate and energy issues 
and many discussions and interviews with colleagues, practitioners, 
environmental advocates, agency officials, judges, and politicians is that these 
strategies are often pursued opportunistically and that those in the trenches 
rarely have time to step back to examine the big picture across the myriad of 
relevant players. Moreover, a common theme that comes through, even among 
the most innovative advocates, is exhaustion and sometimes perplexity from 
their extensive on-the-ground experiments about what can work—what can 
make a difference—in the face of often deeply divided political views and 
hostile public opinion. 
In this Part and the one that follows, we take that step back. We draw from 
our own experience and findings, and those of people on the front line who 
have varying perspectives, to explore areas where progress can be made. We 
focus first in this Part on the role of framing in communicating climate change 
risk and motivating policy action, along with examples of where substantive 
reframing of climate and energy issues—either in terms of economic 
 
 111 See Elinor Ostrom, A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate Change 39 (World Bank, Policy 
Research Working Paper No. 5095, 2009), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/4287; see also 
Daniel H. Cole, From Global to Polycentric Climate Governance (European Univ. Inst. Robert Schuman Ctr. 
for Advanced Studies, Working Paper No. 2011/30, 2011), http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/ 
17757. The important role of non-state actors in taking climate action is also recognized by the decision of the 
conference of the parties adopting the Paris Agreement which contains a specific section on “non-party 
stakeholders.” See Adoption of the Paris Agreement, supra note 9, at 19.  
 112 This saying refers to people giving advice to someone who already knows about the subject, perhaps 
more than the advice-giver. 
 113 Interview with Participant 17 (Mar. 20, 2013). 
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development or as a strategy for disaster resilience—has been effective in 
bringing people on board to tackle issues in a cooperative way. 
In Part III, we turn to instances of structural reframing—essentially options 
for shifting climate action to other, less polarized forums. We examine 
examples of how state and local government, judicial and executive branch, 
and business settings may provide practical options for moving forward on 
climate and energy concerns. In many cases, the effectiveness of the two sets 
of strategies can be enhanced by combining them. For instance, using an 
economic development or disaster resilience framing to promote local 
government action or shift private sector behavior. These Parts thus explore 
these synergies as part of a systematic strategy for progress in a partisan 
environment. 
A. “The Question Is Not What You Look at, but What You See” 
       115F114   
 One of the great insights offered by social science research about public 
communication of risks like climate change is that frames matter. 116F115 Frames 
are “cognitive shortcuts” that help us interpret and represent the world around 
us.117F116 They are like selective filters that emphasize some aspects of what is 
observed or heard while discounting other aspects that appear irrelevant or 
 
 114 Mike McKee, Global Warming Alarmists, CAGLE POST (Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.cagle.com/2013/ 
09/global-warming-alarmists.  
 115 See Nisbet, supra note 16, at 14 (explaining that “[r]eframing the relevance of climate change . . . can 
generate the level of public engagement required for policy action”). 
 116 Sanda Kaufman, Michael Elliott & Deborah Shmueli, Frames, Framing and Reframing, BEYOND 
INTRACTABILITY, http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/framing (last updated June 2013). 
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counterintuitive.118F117 In essence, it is not what you say but what people “hear” 
that is crucial in communicating information about risks. 
To make sense of policy debates people often use frames provided by 
others (the media, policymakers, experts). However, these supplied frames are 
integrated with their preexisting interpretations forged through personal 
experience, social identity, conversations with others, partisanship, or 
ideology.119F118 People employing mutually incompatible frames—climate change 
regulation is imperative to avoid environmental catastrophe versus climate 
change regulation is “a war on coal”—contribute significantly to the 
intractability of an issue.120F119 Furthermore, people are only likely to accept an 
alternative way of framing “if it is relevant—or applicable—to the audience’s 
preexisting interpretations.”121F120 
In U.S. public debates over climate change and energy transition, two 
mutually incompatible frames have tended to dominate. The first—often 
employed by Republican politicians and the conservative media—has 
emphasized themes of scientific uncertainty, dire economic consequences 
associated with climate action, and the unfairness of U.S. citizens being 
required to take action if other countries such as China and India do not.122F121 The 
second, epitomized by Al Gore’s documentary, An Inconvenient Truth, 
represents climate change as a terrifying environmental catastrophe.123F122 
Reactions to these frames have often perpetuated and exacerbated partisan 
divides. Dramatization of potential climate change impacts has bolstered 
skeptic commentators’ allegations of liberal “alarmism.”124F123 In response, 
Democrats, during the George W. Bush Administration, accused the 
 
 117 Id. 
 118 Nisbet, supra note 16, at 17. 
 119 Kaufman et al., supra note 116. For an example of the “war on coal” framing, see Peter Roff, Opinion, 
The War on Coal Is Just the Beginning, U.S. NEWS (Aug. 12, 2015, 4:45 PM), 
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/ 
blogs/peter-roff/2015/08/12/the-war-on-coal-and-the-clean-power-plan-are-just-the-beginning. 
 120 Nisbet, supra note 16, at 17. 
 121 See Oliver Burkeman, Memo Exposes Bush’s New Green Strategy, GUARDIAN (Mar. 3, 2003, 8:48 
PM), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2003/mar/04/usnews.climatechange (discussing Republican 
strategist Frank Luntz’s memo on party strategy for dealing with the global warming issue); Ed O’Keefe et al., 
GOP Congressional Leaders Denounce U.S.-China Deal on Climate Change, WASH. POST (Nov. 12, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/gop-congressional-leaders-denounce-us-china-deal-on-climate-
change/2014/11/12/ff2b84e0-6a8d-11e4-a31c-77759fc1eacc_story.html (providing statements from 
Republican leaders about costs and concerns that the United States will have greater obligations than China). 
 122 See Global Warming: Be Worried, Be VERY Worried, TIME, Apr. 3, 2006, at cover. 
 123 Andrew C. Revkin, In Climate Debate, Exaggeration Is a Pitfall, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/25/science/earth/25hype.html.  
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Administration of being climate change “deniers” conducting a “war on 
science.”125F124 
Frames can be used not only as an aid in interpreting information or events 
but also as a tool to strategically reach out to a broader audience, build 
coalitions, and shape personal behavior.126F125 In an effort to break policy gridlock 
on climate change, various new framings of climate change and clean energy 
have been proposed and have enjoyed varying levels of success. Some have 
sought to cast safeguarding the planet from climate change as a matter of 
morality and ethics.127F126 This frame has especially targeted evangelical 
Christians and their belief in the religious duty to be stewards of God’s 
creation.128F127 It can also be a strong framing for conservatives in discussing 
climate change. For instance, as observed by former Navy Rear Admiral David 
Titley, once a “pretty hard-core climate skeptic” but later a leader of the U.S. 
Navy’s Climate Change Taskforce, 
A lot of people who doubt climate change got co-opted by a 
libertarian agenda that tried to convince the public the science was 
uncertain—you know, the Merchants of Doubt. Unfortunately, 
there’s a lot of people in high places who understand the science but 
don’t like where the policy leads them: too much government control. 
Where are the free-market, conservative ideas? The science is 
settled. Instead, we should have a legitimate policy debate between 
the center-right and the center-left on what to do about climate 
change. If you’re a conservative—half of America—why would you 
take yourself out of the debate? C’mon, don’t be stupid. Conservative 
people want to conserve things. Preserving the climate should be high 
on that list.129F128 
 
 124 See UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, FEDERAL SCIENCE AND THE PUBLIC GOOD (2008), 
http://www.ucsusa.org/scientific_integrity/solutions/big_picture_solutions/federal-science-and-the.html; see 
also CHRIS MOONEY, THE REPUBLICAN WAR ON SCIENCE (2005). 
 125 Kaufman et al., supra note 116. 
 126 EDWARD O. WILSON, THE CREATION: AN APPEAL TO SAVE LIFE ON EARTH 8 (2006). 
 127 Kate Galbraith, Churches Go Green by Shedding Fossil Fuel Holdings, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/16/business/international/churches-go-green-by-shedding-holdings-of-
carbon-emitters.html. 
 128 Eric Holthaus, “Climate Change War” Is Not a Metaphor, SLATE (Apr. 18, 2014), http://www.slate. 
com/articles/technology/future_tense/2014/04/david_titley_climate_change_war_an_interview_with_the_retir
ed_rear_admiral.html.  
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Another example of substantive reframing is the increasing emphasis on 
climate change as a public health problem.130F129 For instance, EPA Administrator 
Gina McCarthy often describes the EPA’s mission as centered on protecting 
public health and new climate change regulation as advancing that goal.131F130 
Similarly, in his book Overheated: The Human Cost of Climate Change, 
Andrew Guzman discusses the many ways that “climate change is bad for your 
health” in issuing a call to arms on climate and energy transition.132F131 This health 
framing may be useful in building support for adaptation measures that 
respond to climate change-related risks such as heat waves. However, its use in 
a mitigation context as part of a public relations campaign around restrictions 
on coal plant emissions so far appears to have had more mixed results,133F132 
notwithstanding scientific evidence highlighting the potential health benefits of 
these regulations.134F133 
To be effective, efforts at “reframing” the issue of climate change must be 
more than just “spin.” Instead, reaching those with varying viewpoints often 
requires taking on new perspectives and searching for common ground around 
a smaller set of issues.135F134 Equally important is the manner in which 
information is communicated. In line with the insights from cultural cognition 
theory, social scientists working on climate change communication are 
increasingly finding that factors like whether communicators use a friendly 
tone, display respect for and openness to different views, and work to establish 
trust are key to effective communication of climate risks.136F135 Or as Verchick has 
 
 129 See, e.g., Climate Change and Human Health, NAT’L INST. ENVTL. HEALTH SCI., http://www.niehs. 
nih.gov/research/programs/geh/climatechange/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2015); Climate Change and Public 
Health, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/globalchange/en/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2015). 
 130 Cheryl K. Chumley, EPA’s Gina McCarthy: Climate Change ‘Biggest Public Health Challenge We 
Face,’ WASH. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/apr/22/epas-gina-
mccarthy-climate-change-biggest-public-h/. 
 131 ANDREW T. GUZMAN, OVERHEATED: THE HUMAN COST OF CLIMATE CHANGE 172–73 (2013). 
 132 See Umair Irfan, Most Americans Fail to Link Health Impacts to Climate Change, Polls Shows, 
CLIMATEWIRE (June 12, 2014), http://www.climatechangecommunication.org/sites/default/files/reports/ 
Irfan_climatewire.pdf. 
 133 JOEL SCHWARTZ ET AL., HARVARD SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, HEALTH CO-BENEFITS OF CARBON 
STANDARDS FOR EXISTING POWER PLANTS (2014), http://www.chgeharvard.org/resource/health-co-benefits-
carbon-standards-existing-power-plants. 
 134 Kaufman et al., supra note 116. 
 135 Research being conducted on climate change communication at the University of Exeter in the U.K. by 
Thomas Morton and Hebba Haddad is particularly relevant. See Thomas Morton & Hebba Haddad, Dynamics 
of Communicating Climate Change Information, U. EXETER, http://www.exeter.ac.uk/slt/ourresearch/ 
communicatingclimatechange/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2015). 
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put it, we need to focus on both frames and “vouchers,” those who build trust 
in a community and so are able to vouch for the validity of information.137F136 
For those in the policy and legal spheres—interested in action and not just 
risk communication—there is also a need to match new ways of talking with 
practical on-the-ground strategies. In the following sections, we focus on two 
examples of substantive reframing around economic development and disaster 
resilience that, in our experience, have been particularly successful in 
circumventing partisan divides to move forward on climate and energy issues. 
Discussion of these two “going together” frames is paired with real world case 
examples of where their use has been effective in aiding needed policy change. 
B. “It’s the Economy, Stupid”  
       138F137   
During then-Governor Bill Clinton’s successful 1992 presidential bid 
against sitting president George H.W. Bush, campaign strategist James 
Carville wrote the following “Rules” on a whiteboard in campaign 
headquarters: 
1. Change vs. More of the Same 
2. The Economy, Stupid 
3. Don’t Forget Health Care139F138 
That second rule became a key campaign slogan and has since been 
popularized in many variations, including often the addition of “It’s.”140F139 
 
 136 Verchick, supra note 24, at 14–15. 
 137 © Joel Pett. All rights reserved. Distributed by Cartoonist Group. 
 138 Michael Kelly, The 1992 Campaign: The Democrats—Clinton and Bush Compete to Be Champion of 
Change; Democrat Fights Perceptions of Bush Gain, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
1992/10/31/us/1992-campaign-democrats-clinton-bush-compete-be-champion-change-democrat-fights.html.  
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Part of the popular appeal of Carville’s approach was that it spoke to a key 
truth of U.S. politics (and politics around the world). People, regardless of 
partisan affiliation, care deeply about the economy and their job prospects. As 
mentioned above, in a survey conducted by the Pew Research Center for the 
People and the Press in 2014, the top two policy priorities for the President and 
Congress were “[s]trengthening the nation’s economy” (supported by 80%) 
and “[i]mproving the job situation” (supported by 74%).141F140 These priorities 
have altered little in the last five years. The same survey conducted in 2009 
also had the economy and jobs as the two top priorities (supported by 85% and 
82% respectively). 142F141 
Along similar lines, economists have long analyzed the extent of political 
business cycles, in which politicians make decisions based on short-term 
election results rather than the long-term interest.143F142 They largely agree that 
economic conditions influence election outcomes, with some disputes over the 
extent of political manipulation and the role of partisanship.144F143 For the 
 
 139 Id. 
 140 Deficit Reduction Declines as Policy, PEW RES. CTR. (2014), http://www.people-press.org/2014/01/27/ 
deficit-reduction-declines-as-policy-priority/.  
 141 Id.; see also Connelly, supra note 45 (“Economic issues continue to top the list of most important 
problems, and only 1 percent of those surveyed . . . offered the environment as a top concern for the 
country.”). 
 142 Economist William Nordhaus defined the concept of political business cycles in his classic 1975 
article, The Political Business Cycle: 
The general conclusion was that a perfect democracy with retrospective evaluation of parties will 
make decisions biased against future generations. Moreover, within an incumbent’s term in office 
there is a predictable pattern of policy, starting with relative austerity in early years and ending 
with the potlatch right before elections. 
William D. Nordhaus, The Political Business Cycle, 42 REV. ECON. STUD. 169, 187 (1975).  
 143 Allan Drazen provided an assessment of the political business cycle work over its first twenty-five 
years, reaching the conclusion that 
[a]lthough there is wide (but not universal) agreement that aggregate economic conditions affect 
election outcomes in the United States, there is significant disagreement about whether there is 
opportunistic manipulation that can be observed in the macro data. There is a clear partisan effect 
in the United States (as well as in some other countries), with economic activity being lower in 
the first part of Republican than Democratic administrations, but still disagreement about the 
underlying driving mechanisms. 
Allan Drazen, The Political Business Cycle After 25 Years, in 15 NBER MACROECONOMICS ANNUAL 2000, at 
75 (Ben S. Bernanke & Kenneth Rogoff eds., 2001), http://www.nber.org/chapters/c11055.pdf. For an 
additional analysis of voter focus on the state of their pocketbooks close to election time, see Christopher H. 
Achen & Larry M. Bartels, Musical Chairs: Pocketbook Voting and the Limits of Democratic Accountability 
4–5 (Sept. 2004) (unpublished manuscript), https://my.vanderbilt.edu/larrybartels/files/2011/12/musical-
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purposes of this Article, we do not need to resolve these economics debates. 
The key point here—which comports with that of the economics literature—is 
that politicians and the electorate are highly influenced by perceptions (and at 
times the reality) of economics. 
As a consequence, climate change and energy transition debates are often 
framed in economic terms by both sides. Those opposing energy transition or 
action on climate change claim that the economic costs are too high; they argue 
that energy costs will rise, making electricity or fuel more expensive, or that 
the impact on companies will hurt the economy. 145F144 This concern is heightened 
in hard economic times. Responding to a 2014 New York Times–CBS News 
poll, Steven Swoboda, from Victorville, California remarked, “Because our 
economy is so bad . . . we need to focus on it and on jobs and not worry so 
much about global warming.” 146F145 
To counter such views, those pushing for transition work to demonstrate 
the economic win-wins that can emerge, whether in terms of green jobs or 
savings from energy efficiency initiatives.147F146 For example, Administrator 
McCarthy directly attacked the position that dealing with climate change hurts 
the economy in her September 2014 remarks. “When it comes to the American 
economy,” said McCarthy, “cutting pollution doesn’t dull our competitive 
edge, it sharpens it.”148F147 She also took aim at critics who “hide behind the word 
‘economy’ to protect their own special interests; when the truth is, climate 
action is in everyone’s best interests. . . . Simply put: the economy isn’t a 
reason to fear action, it’s a reason to take it.”149F148 She then highlighted specific 
studies showing that climate action could propel economic growth and “that 
U.S. states that are still skeptical, like Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma and 
Texas, would actually see an annual net economic benefit of up to about $16 
 
chairs.pdf (prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association held 
on September 1–5, 2004). 
 144 For an example of economic arguments to oppose carbon regulation by a partisan group, see ENERGY 
VENTURES ANALYSIS, ENERGY MARKET IMPACTS OF RECENT FEDERAL REGULATIONS ON THE ELECTRIC 
POWER SECTOR (Nov. 2014), https://www.heartland.org/sites/default/files/nov-2014.-eva-energy-market-
impacts-of-recent-federal-regulations-on-the-electric-power-sector.pdf.  
 145 Connelly, supra note 45. 
 146 TED NORDHAUS & MICHAEL SHELLENBERGER, BREAK THROUGH: FROM THE DEATH OF 
ENVIRONMENTALISM TO THE POLITICS OF POSSIBILITY 9 (2007). 
 147 Gina McCarthy, EPA Adm’r, Remarks by EPA Administrator Gina McCarthy at Resources for the 
Future (Sept. 25, 2014), http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/0/20AE16F3DF46A9A185257D5E004 
F6059.  
 148 Id.  
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billion dollars. That’s billion with a ‘b.’”150F149 President Obama echoed this 
theme in his 2016 State of the Union Address, stating, “But even if the planet 
wasn't at stake; even if 2014 wasn't the warmest year on record—until 2015 
turned out even hotter—why would we want to pass up the chance for 
American businesses to produce and sell the energy of the future?”151F150 
These references to the economic benefits of climate change action are just 
a couple examples of many such efforts over the last several years by the 
Obama Administration and others pushing for energy transition. While there is 
no shortage of politicians on both sides making economic arguments, the 
important question from a substantive reframing perspective is when economic 
development framings are most appropriate. In other words, (1) when and how 
does energy transition actually help the overall economy and people’s 
individual budgets and job opportunities, and (2) in what contexts are 
economic arguments about energy transition most effective? 
Numerous sets of economic experts have worked to answer the first 
question. For instance, at a global scale, the Global Commission on the 
Economy and Climate—a group comprised of former heads of government and 
finance ministers, as well as other leaders in the fields of economics, business, 
and finance advised by an expert group of economists—produced a September 
2014 report assessing how to address climate change while supporting 
economic growth and development 152F151: 
The report’s conclusion is that countries at all levels of income 
now have the opportunity to build lasting economic growth at the 
same time as reducing the immense risks of climate change. This is 
made possible by structural and technological changes unfolding in 
the global economy and opportunities for greater economic 
efficiency. The capital for the necessary investments is available, and 
the potential for innovation is vast. What is needed is strong political 
leadership and credible, consistent policies. 
The next 15 years will be critical, as the global economy 
undergoes a deep structural transformation. It will not be “business as 
 
 149 Id. Louisiana is a good case study of the complex dynamics relating to economic development, oil and 
gas exploitation, and climate change impacts. See Zoë Carpenter, The Invisible Oil in Louisiana’s Senate Race, 
NATION (Oct. 1, 2014), http://www.thenation.com/article/181832/well-oiled-race?page=0,1. 
 150 Transcript: President Obama's Final State of the Union Address, NPR NEWS (Jan. 13, 2016), 
http://www.npr.org/2016/01/12/462831088/president-obama-state-of-the-union-transcript. 
 151 GLOB. COMM’N ON ECON. & CLIMATE, BETTER GROWTH BETTER CLIMATE: THE NEW  
CLIMATE ECONOMY REPORT, THE SYNTHESIS REPORT 8 (Sept. 2014), http://newclimateeconomy.report/ 
TheNewClimateEconomyReport.pdf. 
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usual.” The global economy will grow by more than half, a billion 
more people will come to live in cities, and rapid technological 
advance will continue to change businesses and lives. Around US$90 
trillion is likely to be invested in infrastructure in the world’s urban, 
land use and energy systems. How these changes are managed will 
shape future patterns of growth, productivity and living standards.153F152 
The report goes on to detail more specific strategies for cities, land use, and 
energy with an emphasis on three “drivers of change”: raising resource 
efficiency, investing in infrastructure, and stimulating innovation.154F153 Another 
October 2014 report by the International Energy Agency (IEA) finds that the 
global market for energy efficiency investments had grown to between $310 
and $360 billion in 2012, with 59% lower final consumption in IEA countries 
as a result.155F154 
Other reports have focused more specifically on the U.S. context. For 
example, the Metropolitan Policy Program at Brookings did a 2011 study of 
where and how the “clean economy” 156F155 has been producing jobs around the 
United States by examining data from every county from 2003 to 2010.157F156 It 
found that the clean economy employs 2.7 million workers across numerous 
sectors, with the most growth in major metropolitan areas (64% overall and 
75% of newer jobs) and the greatest regional concentration in the South.158F157 
These “green” jobs are manufacturing and export intensive and pay 
comparatively well for those without a high school diploma; almost half of 
these jobs are held by such workers (as compared to 37.2% in the economy as 
a whole), and “[a]pproximately 28.1 percent of all occupations in the clean 
economy are strong-wage (paying above the U.S. median) and low-skill (the 
percentage of workers with a high school diploma or less is higher than the 
 
 152 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 153 Id. at 8–9. 
 154 INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, ENERGY EFFICIENCY MARKET REPORT 2014: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2014), 
https://www.iea.org/Textbase/npsum/EEMR2014SUM.pdf. 
 155 MARK MURO, JONATHAN ROTHWELL & DEVASHREE SAHA, BROOKINGS INST., SIZING THE CLEAN 
ECONOMY: A NATIONAL AND REGIONAL GREEN JOBS ASSESSMENT 13–14 (2011), http://www.brookings.edu/ 
~/media/Series/resources/0713_clean_economy.pdf. The study defines the “clean economy” as “economic 
activity—measured in terms of establishments and the jobs associated with them—that produces goods and 
services with an environmental benefit or adds value to such products using skills or technologies that are 
uniquely applied to those products.” Id. It looks specifically at a number of job categories in agricultural and 
natural resources conservation; education and compliance; energy and resource efficiency; greenhouse gas 
reduction, environmental management, and recycling; and renewable energy using the Brookings–Batelle 
Clean Economy Database. Id. at 20. 
 156 Id. at 3. 
 157 Id. at 4. 
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national average) compared to 13.3 percent in the national economy.”159F158 The 
report maps the different types of jobs being created in specific metropolitan 
areas around the country and links to a more detailed database.160F159 Together, 
these studies and others provide helpful insights into how economic 
development can be and is being paired with energy transition. 
In this Article, however, we are particularly concerned with addressing the 
second question: When can this pairing can help bridge partisan divides? The 
rest of the section focuses on specific examples of when this has occurred. An 
examination of “successes”—situations in which bipartisan support exists for 
energy transition on economic development grounds—reveals three common 
attributes. First, the economic benefits are real, tangible, and significant. 
Second, the transitional steps are cost-effective and easy to implement. Third, 
an established or growing industry sees a profit opportunity that aligns with 
goals of the environmental and labor coalitions. 
Instances of Republican leaders’ support for renewable energy 
development and other clean energy technologies provide helpful examples of 
these attributes in action. In Michigan, for example, the wind industry 
expanded massively from 2.4 megawatts (MW) in capacity in 2007 to 287 MW 
in 2011.161F160 This transition was likely aided by Michigan’s October 2008 
renewable portfolio standard, which required utilities to generate at least 10% 
of the energy from renewable sources by 2015 and allows them to trade 
renewable energy certificates to meet this goal.162F161 Sixty-nine of Michigan’s 
seventy-two utilities were on track to meet this goal.163F162 The Natural Resources 
Defense Council reported that the state currently has 121 companies that 
supply wind components and that these companies employ 4,000 workers. 164F163 
Michigan’s solar industry also expanded over a similar time period. It grew 
at a rate of 15.8% a year between 2003 and 2010, making it one of the fastest 
growing areas of Michigan’s economy.165F164 As with the wind industry, this rapid 
development has translated into jobs; 121 companies that manufacture 
 
 158 Id. at 23–24. 
 159 Id. at 25–30. 
 160 Renewable Energy for America, Michigan, NAT. RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL, http://www.nrdc.org/ 
energy/renewables/michigan.asp (last visited Dec. 29, 2015). 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Id. 
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components for the solar industry employ 6,300 workers.166F165 Michigan had 
1,041 kilowatts of installed solar photovoltaic systems by the end of 2009, with 
an estimated 3,500 gigawatt capacity in the longer term. 167F166 
The growth of the renewable energy industry and its jobs has helped to 
provide a basis for bipartisan support. Republican Governor Rick Snyder gave 
a December 2013 speech in which he outlined a vision for energy transition 
that involved decreasing coal consumption, increasing renewable energy 
targets, and simultaneously maintaining affordability, reliability, and 
environmental protection. A former political director for the Michigan 
Republican Party explained this support for energy transition in economic 
terms: “Renewable energy is an important piece of the economic puzzle, with 
Michigan’s manufacturing tradition and the sheer number of engineers we 
produce from state colleges and universities . . . . We are very well positioned 
to be a major player in the clean energy manufacturing sector.”168F167 The 
combination of an economy in transition with considerable Midwestern wind 
resources seems to be making support for energy transition politically palatable 
across party lines. 
However, even with this broad bipartisan support for the industry, the 
partisan politics around energy in Michigan remain complex and battles over 
the form that laws should take persist. On the one hand, Governor Snyder 
announced in March 2015 that he would like Michigan to meet 30% to 40% of 
its energy needs through a combination of renewable energy and energy 
efficiency measures.169F168 This goal is significantly above the legally required 
10%. On the other hand, Republicans in the Michigan legislature put forward a 
July 2015 energy policy proposal that would repeal the renewable portfolio 
standard and move towards a more flexible approach.170F169 John Proos, a 
Michigan state senator, explained that the new policy would focus on carbon 
 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. 
 167 Ben Adler, Why Michigan’s Republican Governor Supports Clean Energy—Or Does He?, GRIST 
(Jan. 3, 2014), http://grist.org/politics/why-michigans-republican-governor-supports-clean-energy-or-does-he/; 
see also Melissa Anders, Gov. Rick Snyder Outlines Broad Vision for Michigan’s Energy Policy,  
MLIVE (Dec. 19, 2013, 11:53 AM), http://www.mlive.com/business/index.ssf/2013/12/michigan_snyder_ 
renewable_ener.html.  
 168 Emily Lawler, Michigan Gov. Rick Snyder Wants up to 40 Percent Clean Energy by 2025,  
MLIVE (Mar. 13, 2015, 11:18 AM), http://www.mlive.com/lansing-news/index.ssf/2015/03/michigan_gov_ 
rick_snyder_wants.html. 
 169 Lindsey Smith, New Energy Policy Would Get Rid of Michigan’s Renewable Energy Mandate, MICH. 
RADIO (July 2, 2015), http://michiganradio.org/post/new-energy-policy-would-get-rid-michigan-s-renewable-
energy-mandate#stream/0.  
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emissions, price, and reliability in order to give Michigan maximum flexibility 
to comply with the new federal rules on power plant greenhouse gas emissions 
discussed in depth in Part III.B.171F170 Democrats, in contrast, proposed a bill, 
which has not gotten out of committee, that would raise the mandate to 20% by 
2022.172F171 
A similar phenomenon of greater bipartisan agreement over renewable 
energy paired with partisan conflict over the laws that support the industry 
occurs in other states with abundant renewable energy resources.173F172 For 
example, in Texas, the largest wind-producing state in the U.S., the politics are 
quite nuanced. Troy Fraser, a Republican state senator, co-sponsored the bill 
that created the state’s Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) in 1999.174F173 The 
Republican comptroller has explained the important economic role of its RPS: 
“After the RPS was implemented, Texas wind corporations and utilities 
invested $1 billion in wind power, creating job . . . and increasing the rural tax 
base.”175F174 
However, Senator Fraser led an effort to repeal the RPS in 2015, which 
passed in the Senate and then died in the House.176F175 His publicly stated reasons 
for wanting to repeal the law, though, were economically based and he 
maintained his supportiveness of the renewable energy industry.177F176 Senator 
Fraser explained that Texas met its renewables mandate in 2005 due to the 
rapid growth of the wind industry, and that federal production tax credits and 
 
 170 Id.; see infra Part III.B.2. 
 171 Smith, supra note 169. 
 172 Beyond Michigan and Texas, for example, in the “red” state of Kansas, 73% of Republicans, 82% of 
Democrats, and 75% of Independents support the state’s 2009 renewable energy law. Two-thirds of those 
polled supported augmenting the state’s renewable energy law, even if energy bills increased. Jim Marston, 
Fossil Fuel Industry’s Tired Battle Against Clean Energy Is Also a Losing One, FORBES (Apr. 12, 2014), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/edfenergyexchange/2014/04/12/fossil-fuel-industrys-tired-battle-against-clean-
energy-is-also-a-losing-one/. Kansas’s renewable energy laws have also come under attack, along with those 
of other states. See Maria Gallucci, Renewable Energy: Kansas Gov Brownback Pushes Plan to Weaken State 
Mandate; Texas, North Carolina Advance Similar Bills, INT’L BUS. TIMES (May 6, 2015, 1:52 PM), 
http://www.ibtimes.com/renewable-energy-kansas-gov-brownback-pushes-plan-weaken-state-mandate-texas-
north-1911052. 
 173 Herman K. Trabish, ‘Mission Accomplished?’ Inside the Battle over Texas Renewable Energy 
Incentives, UTILITY DIVE (Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/mission-accomplished-inside-the-
battle-over-texas-renewable-energy-incen/389444/. 
 174 Marston, supra note 172 (ellipsis in original).  
 175 See Jim Malewitz, Senate Votes to End Renewable Energy Programs, TEX. TRIB. (Apr. 14, 2015), 
http://www.texastribune.org/2015/04/14/senate-votes-end-renewable-energy-programs/; Trabish, supra note 
173.  
 176 See Trabish, supra note 173.  
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the availability of transmission currently drive the market rather than state 
renewable energy credits.178F177 Those opposing the repeal also make economic 
arguments about the effect it would have on the price of renewable energy 
credits.179F178 While some contend that Senator Fraser’s effort may form part of 
the broader national campaign by the American Legislative Exchange Council 
(ALEC) to repeal renewable energy laws (discussed in more depth in Part III), 
Senator Fraser claims to have had no communication with ALEC in years and 
to simply be trying to make better policy.180F179 Regardless of what motivates 
Senator Fraser, the key point for purposes of this Article is that the existence of 
a strong wind industry has helped shift the debate from the value of renewables 
to how law should interact with them. 
As the Michigan and Texas examples illustrate, meaningful economic 
success, rather than just lip service to “green jobs,” seems to help build support 
for programs that support energy transition and reduce emissions, often 
without using the words “climate change.” Although this support is not 
immune to partisan battles, and even disagreements within parties, the 
economic alignment helps build broader support. As discussed in more depth 
in Part III.A, these kinds of alignments can be particularly effective at local 
scales. Within Texas, for example, one city chose to go 100% renewable 
because it was the cheapest form of energy available. Interim City Manager 
Jim Briggs explained, “I’m probably the furthest thing from an Al Gore clone 
you could find . . . . We didn’t do this to save the world—we did this to get a 
competitive rate and reduce the risk for our consumers.” 181F180 
The potential for economic opportunity to create greater partisan alignment 
is not simply in individual states and their cities. Interactions with “green” 
companies show a similar pattern. The shift in the last decade of Republican 
public portrayal of electric car company Tesla, for example, further reinforces 
the ways in which economic success and benefits can dampen partisanship. 
Tesla has experienced radical shifts in how Republican leaders have 
portrayed it over time as it has become more economically successful. 
Although Tesla received support from moderate Republican Governor Arnold 
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 178 Id. 
 179 Id. 
 180 Tom Dart, Texas City Opts for 100% Renewable Energy—To Save Cash, Not the Planet, GUARDIAN 
(Mar. 29, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/mar/28/georgetown-texas-renewable-green-
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Schwarzenegger as early as 2003, it became a target for Republican politicians 
after receiving a $465 million Advanced Technology Vehicle Manufacturing 
loan from the Department of Energy in 2010.182F181 Following the bankruptcy of 
Solyndra, which also received such a loan, Governor Mitt Romney described 
Tesla as a “loser,”183F182 a sentiment Governor Sarah Palin echoed.184F183 Governor 
Palin went on in a Facebook post to portray the company’s product as the 
“Obama-subsidized Tesla that turns into a ‘brick’ when the battery completely 
discharges and then costs $40,000 to repair.”185F184 
However, in 2013, Tesla paid back its loan with interest nine years early 
even as Detroit’s traditional car companies continued to owe the federal 
government money from their bail out.186F185 Tesla then developed plans to invest 
in a lucrative battery factory. As a result, Republican Governor Rick Perry and 
Senator Marco Rubio (R–Fla.) began to support repealing state laws that 
prevent Tesla from selling through traditional franchise agreements.187F186 Even 
conservative commentator Bill O’Reilly said on his show in March 2014 that 
“[e]verybody on the planet should be rooting for Tesla.”188F187 Mark Muro, a 
senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, explicitly connected Tesla’s 
 
 181 See Ashlee Vance, Tesla Pays off Its $465 Million ‘Loser’ Loan, BLOOMBERG BUS. (May 22, 2013), 
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2012, 3:47 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/04/mitt-romney-tesla_n_1939531.html; see, e.g., 
Nia-Malika Henderson, Mitt Romney Visits Solyndra Headquarters, Knocks President Obama, WASH. POST 
(May 31, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/mitt-romney-visits-solyndra-headquarters-knocks-
president-obama/2012/05/31/gJQAAnge5U_story.html.  
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 186 David R. Baker, Republicans Who Once Reviled Tesla, Now Praise It, SFGATE  
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2015, 5:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-14/texas-isn-t-open-for-tesla-s-direct-
sales-says-governor-abbott; Micheline Maynard, Michigan to Tesla Motors: You’re Not Welcome, FORBES 
(Oct. 21, 2014, 2:33 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/michelinemaynard/2014/10/21/michigan-to-tesla-
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economic success with partisan dampening: “This could be, for either party, a 
pillar for a very appealing story on economic change.”189F188 
This Republican support for Tesla is likely driven by multiple factors, such 
as Governor Perry wanting Tesla to site its lucrative new battery factory in 
Texas, Governor Perry and Senator Rubio trying to distance themselves from 
Governor Chris Christie, and both of them desiring to convey support for free 
markets. Moreover, the story of why San Antonio ultimately lost out in its bid 
for the factory includes Nevada offering financial state support that Texas did 
not (although San Antonio claims its package was still bigger). As San Antonio 
Economic Development Foundation head Mario Hernandez put it, “Our 
package didn’t have any state incentives. It was San Antonio vs. Nevada, the 
entire state.”190F189 But these nuances do not undermine the core idea running 
across these situations: when energy transition has tangible and demonstrable 
economic benefits, politicians on both sides of the aisle and the public who 
elect them are more willing to get on board. 
Moreover, just as in the above-described conflicts in Michigan and Texas, 
the divides are not always along partisan lines. Republicans take different 
positions on the value of Tesla and renewable energy. Climate Desk’s 
Associate Producer Tim McDonnell explained, 
The Republican-eat-Republican battle over Tesla mirrors another 
clean energy fight playing out nationwide. Conservatives aligned 
with large utility companies are squaring off with the solar power 
industry and libertarian-leaning Republicans over rules to allow 
homeowners with solar panels to sell excess power back to the grid, a 
policy known as net metering, which is allowed in more than 40 
states. 191F190 
The battles thus become about competing economic interests rather than 
entrenched partisan differences. 
Overall, these examples of wind energy and electric cars illustrate that once 
clean energy industries get a significant economic foothold, they can generate 
 
 188 Id. 
 189 Neal Morton, Memo: S.A.’s Incentives for Tesla Topped Nevada’s, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS 
(Sep. 9, 2014, 10:12 PM), http://www.expressnews.com/business/local/article/Memo-S-A-s-incentives-for-
Tesla-topped-Nevada-s-5744838.php.  
 190 Tim McDonnell, GOP Lawmakers Scramble to Court Tesla, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 27, 2014, 6:00 
AM) (citation omitted), http://www.motherjones.com/blue-marble/2014/03/gop-lawmakers-scramble-green-
energy-cash. 
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their own momentum and support for ramping up clean energy programs. They 
also often become advocates for energy transition against those who seek to 
block it. An interesting instance of such advocacy is clean energy firms, 
including power companies with significant investments in low carbon energy 
sources, increasingly intervening in opposition to lawsuits brought to block 
climate change regulation. These companies work to support the case of 
regulators seeking to expand clean energy programs. One lawyer, who works 
for a major power generator, noted that in the context of the company 
increasing its own clean-energy-generating portfolio: “They’re generally 
interested from a financial perspective in anything that moves or requires 
moves towards cleaner generation.” 192F191 Like in the above examples of 
Republican politicians, these companies see the bottom line benefits of 
supporting energy transition. 
Moreover, these companies’ support for climate change or clean energy 
regulation does not simply influence what regulatory approaches are possible. 
It also helps to dampen the partisan quality of the debate by making these 
disputes among industry rather than environmentalists in opposition to 
industry. As one of the litigators in these cases explained, “[I]t changes the 
discourse to have it not being industry versus government agencies and 
enviros. [It c]hanges the discourse dramatically when they can no longer say, 
well its power generators versus EPA; well, there’s power generators on each 
side.”193F192 
Clean energy initiatives that are cost-effective and economically beneficial 
to industry and communities thus can be a basis for building broader coalitions 
of interested stakeholders than an appeal to act on climate change would. 
 
 
 191 Interview with Participant 5, supra note 17. 
 192 Id. 
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C. “Every Crisis Is an Opportunity” 
        193  
 Just as meaningful linkages to economic development provide an 
opportunity to advance energy transition in ways that help to mitigate climate 
change, extreme weather can increase receptivity to adaptive action. People 
tend to connect extreme weather events to climate change, even though, as a 
scientific matter, sea level rise or broader patterns of extreme events are easier 
to link than a particular disaster.195F194 For example, the Yale Project on Climate 
Change Communication and the George Mason University Center for Climate 
Change Communication found in a joint study that 
[a] large majority of Americans believe that global warming made 
several high profile extreme weather events worse, including the 
unusually warm winter of December 2011 and January 2012 (72%), 
record high summer temperatures in the U.S. in 2011 (70%), the 
drought in Texas and Oklahoma in 2011 (69%), record snowfall in 
the U.S. in 2010 and 2011 (61%), the Mississippi River floods in the 
spring of 2011 (63%), and Hurricane Irene (59%).196F195 
 
 193 © 2012 Horsey. Los Angeles Times. All rights reserved. Distributed by Tribune Content Agency. 
David Horsey, L.A. TIMES (2012), http://www.psu.edu/dept/e-education/blogs/energy_policy/la-tot-cartoons-
pg-obama-romney-climate-change-hurricane-sandy.png. 
 194 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, MANAGING THE RISKS OF EXTREME EVENTS AND 
DISASTERS TO ADVANCE CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION 40 (2012), https://www.ipcc-
wg2.gov/SREX/images/uploads/SREX-All_FINAL.pdf. 
 195 YALE PROJECT ON CLIMATE CHANGE COMMC’N & GEORGE MASON UNIV. CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE 
COMMC’N, EXTREME WEATHER, CLIMATE & PREPAREDNESS IN THE AMERICAN MIND 3 (2012), 
http://environment.yale.edu/climate-communication/files/Extreme-Weather-Climate-Preparedness.pdf.  
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However, like broader questions of climate change science, there is a 
partisan divide in how people view natural disaster and climate change, even 
following a severe weather event. The good news from the perspective of 
fostering action is that, even with partisan differences, a substantial majority of 
people—including almost half of Republicans—support governmental 
assistance for communities affected by natural disaster (80.1% of Democrats, 
62.0% of Independents, and 48.2% of Republicans, which resulted in 64.3% 
overall).197F196 However, the parties were far more sharply divided on whether 
climate change is related to more frequent and severe natural disasters (71.6% 
of Democrats, 50.7% of Independents, and 24.8% of Republicans, which 
resulted in 51.2% overall).198F197 
This gap suggests that a key to adaptation planning may be to frame action 
in terms of disaster resilience and response rather than climate change itself.199F198 
This strategy appears to bear out in practice, as the examples we explore in this 
section illustrate. This section provides in-depth exploration of Superstorm 
Sandy, which, because of its timing and location, provides a particularly 
helpful example of the complex dynamics around disaster, climate change, and 
partisanship. We also highlight other examples that provide additional insights 
into the ways in which disaster can help shift framing and provide 
opportunities for bipartisan action. 
When Superstorm Sandy ravaged the East Coast one week before the 2012 
election, the disaster caused a major shift in the partisan dialogue about energy 
and climate change. In the intense presidential contest between President 
Obama and Governor Romney, climate change finally lost its “Lord 
Voldemort” status.200F199 As Mike Tidwell of left-leaning magazine The Nation 
put it, “The presidential candidates decided not to speak about climate change, 
but climate change has decided to speak to them.”201F200 
This shift in the public dialogue reinforces the ways in which disaster 
resiliency framing can not only support action but also help overcome the 
 
 196 Omnibus Poll, YOUGOV (Oct. 29, 2012), http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/hurricaneclimatetabs. 
pdf.  
 197 Id. 
 198 See Verchick, supra note 24, at 41. 
 199 See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 200 Dan Merica, Sandy Reminds Us of Climate Change and Other Forgotten Campaign Issues, CNN 
(Oct. 30, 2012, 5:40 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/30/politics/forgotten-campaign-issues/.  
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silencing effect that partisanship can have in this context.202F201 Until the 
devastating storm, climate change had not been mentioned by either candidate 
since their statements to a science organization in September 2012.203F202 
Although the candidates did at times mention renewable energy, climate 
change had not come up either on the campaign trail or in presidential debates. 
The storm changed that in the last few days of the election campaign and, 
perhaps more importantly, for politicians and litigators—especially 
Democrats—in the months that followed. In effect, Superstorm Sandy made it 
acceptable for Democratic, and even some Republican, candidates to talk about 
climate change by giving it a new frame of reference. Climate change was not 
an abstract global pollution problem but rather something that, left 
unaddressed, could harm people, homes, and families.204F203 
Perhaps the most dramatic moment in this political reaction took place a 
few days after the storm, and just three days before the election. New York 
City Mayor Michael Bloomberg, a political independent, cited climate change 
as he endorsed President Obama in an article entitled A Vote for a President to 
Lead on Climate Change: 
The devastation that Hurricane Sandy brought to New York City 
and much of the Northeast—in lost lives, lost homes and lost 
business—brought the stakes of next Tuesday’s presidential election 
into sharp relief. 
. . . . 
Our climate is changing. And while the increase in extreme 
weather we have experienced in New York City and around the 
world may or may not be the result of it, the risk that it may be—
given this week’s devastation—should compel all elected leaders to 
take immediate action.205F204 
 
 201 The political silencing of dialogue over climate change does not just occur in the election context. For 
example, a number of news outlets reported that Florida Department of Environmental Protection employees 
may have been forbidden to use the term “climate change” or “global warming” in their official 
communications. See Terrence McCoy, Threatened by Climate Change, Florida Reportedly Bans the Term 
‘Climate Change,’ WASH. POST (Mar. 9, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-
mix/wp/2015/03/09/florida-state-most-affected-by-climate-change-reportedly-bans-term-climate-change/. 
Spokespeople from the state and governor’s office deny this claim, however. Id. 
 202 Merica, supra note 200. 
 203 See id. The fact that Democrats who believed in climate action did not feel comfortable talking about 
climate change in that election prior to the storm reinforces the kinds of differences between the parties and 
their strategies highlighted by Hacker and Pierson in Off Center. See HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 42, at 2. 
 204 Michael R. Bloomberg, A Vote for a President to Lead on Climate Change, BLOOMBERG VIEW 
(Nov. 1, 2012, 2:55 PM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2012-11-01/a-vote-for-a-president-to-lead-
on-climate-change.  
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President Obama responded to Mayor Bloomberg’s endorsement by also 
mentioning the issue directly for the first time in weeks: “Climate change is a 
threat to our children’s future, and we owe it to them to do something about 
it.”206F205 
The Mayor Bloomberg incident was not an isolated one; rather, it 
epitomized a changed Democratic campaign. Leading Democratic campaign 
surrogates also started referencing climate change directly in the week after 
Superstorm Sandy. For example, President Clinton said at a Minnesota rally, 
“[Governor Romney] ridiculed the president for his efforts to fight global 
warming in economically beneficial ways. He said, ‘Oh, you’re going to turn 
back the seas . . . . In my part of America, we would like it if someone 
could’ve done that yesterday.” 207F206 Vice President Gore made similar statements 
that week.208F207 In addition, environmental advocacy groups made an attack ad 
highlighting Governor Romney’s comments on sea level rise, which ended 
with “Tell Mitt Romney: climate change isn’t a joke.”209F208 
President Obama’s public and explicit focus on climate change continued 
following his reelection. For instance, he mentioned climate change as one of 
his main priorities in his Time “Person of the Year” interview that 
December.210F209 He also often continued to make links to natural disaster when he 
did so. In his second inaugural address, President Obama stated, “Some may 
still deny the overwhelming judgment of science, but none can avoid the 
devastating impact of raging fires and crippling drought and more powerful 
storms.” 211F210 Throughout his second term, President Obama has continued to roll 
out new executive branch initiatives—at times quite controversial, like his 
efforts to regulate power plants—to advance both mitigation and adaptation, 
often using similar rhetoric. Secretary of State John Kerry’s remarks during the 
2015 Paris negotiations reinforced this theme: “In recent years, what we used 
 
 205 Katherine Bagley, Climate Science Makes an 11th-Hour Comeback in 2012, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS 
(Dec. 28, 2012), http://insideclimatenews.org/news/20121228/climate-change-science-global-warming-
hurricane-sandy-obama-mayor-bloomberg-drought-wildfires-arctic-melt-ipcc.  
 206 Suzanne Goldenberg, Sandy Puts Climate Change Back on the US Election Agenda, GUARDIAN (Oct. 
31, 2012, 3:56 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/oct/31/sandy-climate-change-us-election.  
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 208 Elise Foley, Mitt Romney Climate Change Brush-off Highlighted in New Ad, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Nov. 3, 2012, 1:07 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/03/mitt-romney-climate-change_n_ 
2069003.html.  
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 210 Barack Obama, U.S. President, Inaugural Address (Jan. 21, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
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to think of as extreme weather has become the new normal. It’s hard to even 
turn on the news without hearing about a particularly devastating storm, a 
drought, a flood, or a wildfire.”212F211 
However, this change in public behavior by Democratic politicians was not 
necessarily a harbinger of massively decreased partisanship. The increasingly 
vocal focus on climate change and its link to disaster by Democrats did not 
generally change the ways in which many Republican politicians were 
referencing the problem during the election or since. Governor Romney, when 
pushed by someone in a crowd about whether he still thought climate change 
was a joke, said, “As a matter of fact, if you’d like to, I know you’re filming, if 
you’d like to see my view on global warming, I wrote a book, and there’s a 
chapter on global warming and you’ll see what I think we can do to deal with 
it.”213F212 That book acknowledged that climate change was happening and that 
human activity was a contributing factor, but queried the extent of the 
contribution by human activity versus factors outside our control.214F213 
Similarly, although Governor Christie praised President Obama’s disaster 
response in the immediate aftermath of the storm and acknowledged 
anthropogenic climate change prior to the storm in 2011, he has largely 
avoided direct discussion of climate change since. Governor Christie did 
maintain in 2013 that there was no proof the climate change caused 
Superstorm Sandy; while this statement received a lot of press at the time, 
climate scientists largely agree that one cannot prove that climate change 
caused any particular storm, though it increases the risks in a variety of 
ways. 215F214 In the lead up to the 2016 elections, Governor Christie has continued 
to resist climate change mitigation measures such as New Jersey rejoining  
 
 211 Kerry, supra note 19. 
 212 Elyse Siegal, Mitt Romney Pressed on Climate Change: ‘Do You Still Think the Rising of the Seas Is 
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 213 Id. 
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Change, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (May 21, 2013, 11:39 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/chris-
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obama.html.  
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the region’s cap-and-trade efforts.216F215 And New York-based 2016 presidential 
candidate Donald Trump—as well as several other leading Republican 
candidates in that election—has been consistent in his denial of climate change 
science regardless of severe weather events. He tweeted in November 2012 
just after Superstorm Sandy: “It’s extremely cold in NY & NJ—not good for 
flood victims. Where is global warming?”217F216 
But, even in this polarized environment, the response to Superstorm Sandy 
did change some politicians’ views and allowed new bipartisan efforts to move 
forward. For instance, Representative Michael Grimm (R–N.Y.), who 
represented a district hard-hit by Superstorm Sandy, reversed his initial 
skepticism of climate science and publicly accepted the scientific consensus.218F217 
At a more macro level, New York’s Community Risk and Resiliency Act—the 
first law in the nation to require that communities design projects to 
incorporate climate impacts into project permitting and funding—passed with 
bipartisan support.219F218 
Public opinion polling reinforces both that Superstorm Sandy has had some 
influence on public views of climate change—particularly in the immediate 
aftermath of the storm and in regions most affected by the storm—and that a 
partisan divide remains. With respect to the 2012 presidential election, 
although it is unclear how much Mayor Bloomberg’s eleventh-hour 
endorsement helped President Obama, CBS News exit polling suggested that 
Superstorm Sandy mattered in the election.220F219 Not surprisingly, based on the 
discussion of the previous section, 60% of voters said the economy was the 
most important issue in their vote.221F220 Forty-two percent, though, said that 
President Obama’s response to Superstorm Sandy, which was viewed 
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positively according to polls, was a factor as well.222F221 However, the polls did 
not indicate how climate-specific those views were.223F222 
Beyond the 2012 election itself, polls suggest that at least in the aftermath 
of Superstorm Sandy, people in both parties connected the storm to climate 
change, albeit with a partisan gap. For example, a Zogby Analytics poll in 
November 2012 highlighted 
the dramatic impact 2012’s extreme weather has had across party 
lines, with half of Republicans, 73 percent of independents and 82 
percent of Democrats saying they’re worried about the growing cost 
and risks of extreme weather disasters fueled by climate change.224F223 
Pollster John Zogby noted that this represented “a major change from our 
December 2009 poll, which showed two-thirds of Republicans and nearly half 
of political independents saying they were ‘not at all concerned’ about global 
climate change and global warming.”225F224 He concluded, “The political climate 
has shifted and members of Congress need to catch up with their 
constituents.”226F225 A poll by Siena Research Institute of New Yorkers in that 
time period found similar results: “In every region of New York, at least 63 
percent of voters say that the extreme weather of 2011 and 2012 demonstrates 
that climate change in action. More than two-thirds of independents and nearly 
half of Republicans also say that Superstorm Sandy was the result of climate 
change.”227F226 
However, these post-disaster shifts in opinion and focus on these issues 
may lack staying power. For example, a trends analysis done a year after 
Superstorm Sandy found that web searches and media references spiked in the 
aftermath of that storm and other climate-related events, but then declined 
again.228F227 Moreover, in April 2013 polling in New Jersey, just six months after 
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Superstorm Sandy, a clear partisan divide existed in how people viewed the 
relationship between disasters and climate change. “More than 80 percent of 
Democrats see climate change causing recent disasters, as do 60 percent of 
independents. But only about 33 percent of Republicans agree, while 61 
percent think the storms were not climate change driven.”229F228 
In essence, disaster may provide a short-term window for bipartisan action 
on climate change, with the effectiveness of this framing receding with the 
public memory of the event. A similar dynamic appears to be playing out with 
respect to other high-profile weather-related impacts, such as the ongoing 
drought in California.230F229 The unprecedented nature of the drought and the 
severity of its effects have opened up space for discussions of law reform that 
would be too hard at other times. Not only has the state—led by Governor 
Jerry Brown’s office—ramped up the drought response by casting it as an issue 
of emergency management,231F230 but lawmakers have also passed a suite of new 
water measures, in some cases with bipartisan support. In August 2014, 
Governor Brown signed bipartisan legislation (which passed the Senate 37–0 
and the Assembly 77–2) that put a comprehensive water bond (later accepted) 
before voters at the November elections.232F231 
More controversially, and over opposition from Republican legislators and 
farming groups,233F232 in September 2014, the state passed historic groundwater 
legislation that will overhaul California’s long-standing “pump-as-you-please” 
policy to require statewide regulation of underground water resources and 
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impose requirements for sustainable use.234F233 Water policy advocates argue now 
is the time for action to achieve long-lasting policy changes that will improve 
both water and climate change resilience.235F234 As one advocate put it, “In the 
world of public policy, a drought is a terrible thing to waste.”236F235 Public polling 
reinforces this view. In September 2014, 24% of Californians named dealing 
with the drought as the state’s top issue, a marked increase from the 1% who 
took this view in 2012 before the drought began.237F236 
In addition to influencing policymakers and the public directly, disasters 
and other tangibly felt impacts can also open the door for litigation that can 
shift policy.238F237 For instance, in the aftermath of Superstorm Sandy, there was a 
flurry of cases in the United States focused on the extent to which public 
authorities must compensate landowners when undertaking protective coastal 
armoring measures;239F238 the scope for insurers to avoid coverage or impose 
“hurricane deductibles” for damage from the storm;240F239 and claims in 
negligence against building owners who failed to take out adequate insurance 
to protect common property assets.241F240 Most of these cases have not raised 
climate change explicitly, but they influence the measures that people will take 
in the future to prepare for severe storms. Given that climate change increases 
of the likelihood of such storms and the vulnerability of coastal communities to 
them, such measures serve as a form of climate change adaptation.242F241 
Some of the post-Superstorm Sandy cases did focus on climate change 
more explicitly and form part of a broader body of emerging adaptation 
litigation that we have explored in our prior scholarship. 243F242 One of the most 
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interesting, and potentially most influential, cases to emerge post-Sandy is the 
rates case involving the power company Consolidated Edison (ConEd), which 
was decided by the New York Public Services Commission (PSC) in early 
2014. The case itself was preceded by a petition filed with the PSC by the 
Columbia University Center for Climate Change and a group of 
non-governmental organizations in the aftermath of Superstorm Sandy. The 
PSC serves as the primary regulator of New York’s utilities, which provide 
power throughout the state. The petition asked the commission to “use its 
regulatory authority to require all utility companies within its jurisdiction to 
prepare and implement comprehensive natural hazard mitigation plans to 
address the anticipated effects of climate change.”244F243 The petition linked 
energy and environmental planning in its call for public utilities to plan for 
hazard mitigation and disaster response under conditions of increased risk from 
climate change.245F244 
The petition was only the first step in this case. When ConEd—the largest 
utility in the State of New York—filed a petition with the Commission in 
January 2013 for changes to its rates, the Columbia University Center for 
Climate Change and other NGOs formally intervened and subsequently 
participated in the adjudicatory hearings that followed.246F245 During the rate case 
litigation, a Storm Hardening and Resiliency Collaborative formed to negotiate 
terms of a settlement and to implement the settlement agreement.247F246 The 
Collaborative included four working groups that focused on storm hardening 
design standards, alternative resiliency strategies, natural gas system resiliency, 
and risk assessment/cost benefit analysis. 248F247 
As a result of discussions in the Collaborative’s working groups, ConEd 
committed to several measures to improve the resiliency of its electricity and 
gas systems in the settlement agreement approved by the PSC. These included 
 
 243 Letter from Anne R. Siders et al., Associate Director, Columbia Univ. Ctr. for Climate Change Law, to 
Jaclyn A. Brilling, Secretary, N.Y. State Pub. Serv. Comm’n (Dec. 12, 2012), 
http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/climate-change/files/Publications/PSCPetition 
NaturalHazardPlanning_0.pdf. 
 244 Id. 
 245 Anita Jain et al., Con Edison to Take New Measures to Protect Against the Effects of Climate Change, 
ENVTL. DEF. FUND (Feb. 20, 2014), https://www.edf.org/media/con-edison-take-new-measures-protect-
against-effects-climate-change. 
 246 Id. 
 247 Id. 
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a new design standard for infrastructure in flood zones; 249F248 implementation of 
capital programs and projects to “storm harden” its electric, gas, and steam 
systems in the face of anticipated climate change and sea level rise;250F249 and 
conduct of a climate change vulnerability study encompassing risks such as 
rising heat and more severe storms.251F250 
Already, the ConEd Rate Case decision is being hailed as “an historic 
decision that will serve as a nationwide model.”252F251 Beyond its contribution to 
growing adaptation efforts in the United States, the case neatly illustrates how 
a high profile weather disaster can provide an opportunity for the emergence of 
a new dialogue around climate issues focused on issues of harm prevention, 
property and infrastructure protection, and resilience. Moreover, “[t]he 
infrastructure concerns that were the focus of the original 2012 petition and the 
subsequent rate case occur in many places around the United States.”253F252 
Summarizing a general sentiment, one interviewee in our climate litigation 
work remarked of Superstorm Sandy, “it’s going to change things.”254F253 Not 
only did it have “a lot of elements of climate change to it,” but it also 
“impacted a huge number of people, and people are worried about the next one 
now.”255F254 
This section’s example of the Superstorm Sandy response illustrates the 
many ways in which disasters can create opportunities for politicians’ framing 
 
 248 Order Approving Electric, Gas and Steam Rate Plans in Accord with Joint Proposal at 63, Rates, 
Charges, Rules & Regulations of Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. for Elec. Serv., No. 13-E-0030 (N.Y. State Pub. 
Serv. Comm’n Feb. 21, 2014) [hereinafter Order], http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Common/ 
ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefId={1714A09D-088F-4343-BF91-8DEA3685A614}; CONSOL. EDISON CO. OF N.Y., 
STORM HARDENING AND RESILIENCY COLLABORATIVE REPORT (Dec. 4, 2013), http://documents.dps.ny.gov/ 
public/Common/ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefId={E6D76530-61DB-4A71-AFE2-17737A49D124}. In its Order, 
the Commission noted that ongoing review of the standard is appropriate “in light of the rapid developments in 
climate science forecasts, and in federal, state and city policies.” Order, supra, at 67. 
 249 Consol. Edison Co., No. 13-E-0300, at 116–18 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Dec. 31, 2013) (joint 
proposal), http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Common/ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefId={3881B193-8115-4BA0-
A01A-B8D373D59726}. 
 250 This study is intended to provide a longer-range basis for ongoing review of design standards, such as 
the FEMA+3 floodproofing standard, and the Commission indicated that it “expect[ed] to revisit this issue.” 
Order, supra note 248, at 67. 
 251 Ethan Strell, Public Service Commission Approves Con Ed Rate Case and Climate Change Adaptation 
Settlement, COLUM. L. SCH.: CLIMATE CHANGE BLOG (Feb. 21, 2014), http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/ 
climatechange/2014/02/21/public-service-commission-approves-con-ed-rate-case-and-climate-change-
adaptation-settlement. 
 252 JACQUELINE PEEL & HARI M. OSOFSKY, CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION: REGULATORY PATHWAYS TO 
CLEANER ENERGY 108, 158 (2015). 
 253 Interview with Participant 6 (Nov. 14, 2012). 
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or reframing of issues. They can also open windows for policy action—either 
directly or through forcing litigation—by highlighting the very real and 
devastating effects on people’s homes, property, lives, and livelihoods that 
climate change is likely to bring about. Beyond just the Superstorm Sandy 
context, in the last few years, “building resilience” has become the focus of 
numerous planning efforts; such efforts, even if they do not mention climate 
change directly, are often intimately linked to adaptation and, in some cases, 
also to mitigation.256F255 
Disasters can also see the emergence of new coalitions of actors that have a 
substantial stake in policy progress; for example, insurance companies and 
re-insurers are becoming major players in policy debates about disaster 
preparation and adaptation.257F256 Moreover, the decisions of these actors can exert 
a very direct influence on behavior: “[I]f insurance companies won’t write 
insurance for floodplains, you know, that changes policy.” 258F257 
Economic development and disaster resiliency are just two examples of 
ways in which substantive reframing could move discussions related to energy 
transition or climate change to areas of greater agreement. From our 
perspective, the key to progress is not whether people can agree on the 
problem of climate change or the need for energy transition, but that they take 
the steps needed to address it. Because there are things that people agree about 
that also serve mitigation and adaptation goals, reframing issues around those 
areas of agreement has been and will continue to be an important strategy for 
progress in the current partisan climate. 
III. STRUCTURAL LEVERAGE POINTS FOR MAKING PROGRESS 
The previous Part has focused on substantive reframing of actions that 
contribute to addressing climate change or advancing energy transition. It has 
argued for the value of moving away from divisive frames that trigger partisan 
disputes to those where greater social consensus is possible. It is noteworthy, 
though, that in many of the examples discussed, bipartisan action is being 
taken outside of the federal congressional setting; the federal executive branch, 
 
 255 See Clay Nesler, Building Resilience: 6 Lessons from Superstorm Sandy, U.S. GREEN BUILDING 
COUNCIL (Dec. 20, 2012), http://www.usgbc.org/articles/building-resilience-6-lessons-superstorm-sandy; State 
and Local Adaptation Plans, GEO. CLIMATE CTR., http://www.georgetownclimate.org/node/3324 (last visited 
Dec. 30, 2015). 
 256 See infra Part III.C. 
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states and their governors, local authorities, courts, and businesses are often the 
actors taking a lead role. Opportunities for multi-scalar efforts of this kind are 
a function of the complexity of climate change and energy issues, which can be 
addressed at a variety of different governance levels by a range of different 
actors. 259F258 Many of these forums may also be less prone to partisanship than the 
federal congressional context, or at least less prone to adopt partisan framings 
of issues.260F259 Structural reframing of climate and energy transition efforts—
pursuing pathways “off the beaten track” that tap into different coalitions of 
stakeholders and institutions—may thus aid policy progress in conjunction 
with substantive reframing. 
The notion of structural reframing is one familiar to the social science 
literature on organizations and organizational change. In that context, the 
seminal work by Lee Bolman and Terence Deal on Reframing Organizations 
attempts to simplify organizational complexities and diagnose problems by 
using a series of frames that allow an organizational observer to view the same 
situation from a variety of different perspectives. Bolman and Deal assert that 
“[t]he key to accomplishing something that requires concerted action with 
other people is to reframe your perception of the situation to take account of 
the divergent perspectives of the various players.”261F260 According to Bolman and 
Deal, one such frame that can be used in seeking to understand organizations is 
a structural frame. This frame emphasizes organizational architecture, rules, 
roles, policies, procedures, and lines of authority. Problems viewed through a 
structural frame are the result of misalignment. In this context, reframing 
becomes an exercise in determining what structures are necessary to get the job 
done. 
In a similar way, we see structural reframing of climate and energy 
transition work as an attempt to utilize different sets of institutions, regulatory 
pathways, and coalitions of actors than the conventional top-down national 
legislative pathway that faces substantial partisan roadblocks. Some structural 
reframing strategies focus on government actors, shifting the locus of climate 
 
 258 Hari M. Osofsky, Multiscalar Governance and Climate Change: Reflections on the Role of States and 
Cities at Copenhagen, 25 MD. J. INT’L L. 64 (2010); Hari M. Osofsky, Suburban Climate Change Efforts: 
Possibilities for Small and Nimble Cities Participating in State, Regional, National, and International 
Networks, 22 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 395 (2012) [hereinafter Osofsky, Suburban Climate Change 
Efforts]. 
 259 See Dennis Chong, Explaining Public Conflict and Consensus on the Climate, in CHANGING CLIMATE 
POLITICS 110, 132 (Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias ed., 2015). 
 260 LEE BOLMAN & TERENCE DEAL, REFRAMING ORGANIZATIONS 270 (1997). 
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action either vertically to a different level of government (e.g., from the federal 
government to state or local governments), or horizontally to a different branch 
of government (e.g., from the legislature to the executive branch or courts).262F261 
Recognizing that the vast majority of emissions are not created by 
governments, but rather through the use of products created and sold by private 
actors such as corporations, other structural reframing strategies focus on 
non-governmental actors. These strategies aim to influence those private actors 
directly, rather than just through the governments that regulate them. 
The following sections discuss three potential structural leveraging 
strategies that hold particular promise: (1) scaling down to local levels, 
(2) shifting across to other branches (executive or judicial) to influence or go 
around partisan blocks in one branch, and (3) altering focus from policy 
change to directly changing the behavior of non-governmental actors such as 
corporations. This Article highlights these three pathways given the lower 
(though not non-existent) barriers that partisanship generally poses in these 
contexts, whether this is due to a greater focus on shared community values 
and needs, executive powers, conventions of judicial independence, or 
economic bottom lines. We argue that pairing action in these forums with the 
kinds of substantive reframing strategies described in the previous Part has and 
can help to promote needed energy transition. 
These structural strategies have a more complex relationship to partisanship 
than the substantive ones do. While substantive reframing focuses on finding 
issues about which people actually agree, structural reframing includes “going 
together” and “going around” strategies that emerge in varying combinations 
over time. Branch shifting—to lawsuits and executive action—particularly 
exemplifies the mixed quality of structural reframing. Lawsuits often pit the 
two sides against one another, but sometimes result in moments of cooperation. 
For example, as discussed in depth below, litigation helped spur the federal 
government, California, and automobile companies to come together around 
motor vehicle greenhouse gas regulations.263F262 Similarly, the Obama 
Administration’s use of executive authority consists of both the high profile 
 
 261 Structural leverage points for encouraging regulatory action on energy transition can helpfully be 
considered by envisioning government on a spatial grid. A vertical axis ranges from the individual to the local 
to the state to the federal to the international, with interstitial regional levels. A horizontal axis captures the 
myriad of actors functioning at a particular governmental level; in the U.S. context of separation of powers and 
checks and balances, that axis includes three branches—executive, legislative, and judicial—and the many 
different individuals and entities functioning within each branch at a particular level. 
 262 See infra Part III.B.1. 
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actions that invoke partisan responses, such as the Clean Power Plan and Paris 
Agreement, and other actions that are relatively uncontroversial.264F263 This Part 
explores these nuances in order to understand the role that structural reframing 
can play in advancing policy action in a partisan environment. 
A. “Small Is Beautiful” 
       264   
 This section focuses on vertical reframing, in which advocates shift their 
focus to a different level of government. In our earlier discussion of 
substantive reframing, we examined a number of successful bipartisan efforts 
at the state level; at that scale, action on renewable energy, energy efficiency, 
and disaster planning at times has been able to move forward even as the 
Congress remains deadlocked.266F265 This section augments that discussion by 
focusing even smaller, on local efforts at energy transition and climate action. 
In examining possibilities at the local level, it is important to first note that, 
independent of structural reframing to address partisanship, local action serves 
as a crucial component of any holistic strategy to advance energy transition or 
to respond to climate change. Over half of the world’s population and nearly 
 
 263 See infra Part III.B.2. 
 264 Sidney Harris ©, All rights reserved (Distributed by Artist/Science Cartoons Plus), http://www. 
sciencecartoonsplus.com/pages/global_warming.php. 
 265 For a discussion of these federalism dynamics and partisanship, see Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan 
Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077 (2014). 
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82% of the U.S. population live in cities.267F266 NASA estimates that 70% of 
global carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions come from cities.268F267 Local planning 
decisions shape energy usage, emissions trajectories, and resiliency. 
Moreover, as national action in the United States has often been stymied by 
partisan divides, many local governments (and states) have chosen to take 
steps to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions and participate in local, state, 
national, and international networks of cities working on climate change. For 
example, 1,060 U.S. mayors have joined the U.S. Mayors Climate Protection 
Agreement (Mayors Agreement)—pledging to meet what would have been 
U.S. Kyoto Protocol commitments—representing about 28% of the total U.S. 
population (though only 5% of cities).269F268 Leader cities also have met during the 
last several international negotiations and formed their own agreements on 
both mitigation and adaptation. For example, at the September 2014 
negotiations, the Compact of Mayors was launched: 
Mayors from cities around the globe announced an expansion of their 
commitments to scale up climate resilience efforts, energy efficiency 
programmes and resilient financing mechanisms, including through 
an initiative to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 454 
megatons by 2020. The Compact of Mayors is comprised of more 
than 2000 cities.270F269 
However, most crucial for the partisanship concerns that are this Article’s 
focus, cities are not simply important places in which to address energy 
transition and climate change. They are also a scale at which partisanship is 
often less intense. Many cities across the United States do not include party 
affiliation on their election ballots, and local officials, especially in smaller 
towns, often do not publicly tout their party membership; a 2001 study found 
that 77% of responding cities held non-partisan elections, reinforcing the 
 
 266 See World Factbook, Urbanization, U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/ 
library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2212.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2015).  
 267 Megacities Carbon Project, NASA JET PROPULSION LAB., http://megacities.jpl.nasa.gov/portal/ (last 
visited Dec. 30, 2015). 
 268 As of October 24, 2013, 1,060 mayors representing a total population of 88,962,982 citizens had 
joined the Mayors Agreement. List of Participating Mayors, MAYORS CLIMATE PROT. CTR., 
http://usmayors.org/climateprotection/list.asp (last visited Sept. 15, 2015). The Census Bureau estimated the 
total U.S. population at 316,938,793 on that date. U.S. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS, 
http://www.census.gov/popclock/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2013).  
 269 Compact of Mayors Launched at UN Climate Summit, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Sept. 23, 
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dominance of this trend.271F270 Scholarly studies of the impact of non-partisan 
elections have shown what makes sense intuitively: People rely less on party 
affiliation when the ballot does not indicate it.272F271 In addition, people often 
know each other personally in communities, which tends to lessen the 
destructive name-calling and create opportunities for a few motivated people to 
make a difference.273F272 
While these qualities of smaller-scale governments and elections make it 
tempting to just say “small is beautiful,” the on-the-ground reality is more 
complex. First and perhaps most fundamentally, local governments are not 
islands. As geographer Kevin Cox has argued, each scale is comprised not only 
by interactions at that level but also through a myriad of interactions with other 
levels; in other words, local is not just local, but also has individual, 
community, state, national, and international dimensions.274F273 Moreover, 
geographer Julie Cidell’s work makes clear that one of the key ways in which 
every scale is in fact multi-scalar is through the people involved.275F274 The same 
people voting in non-partisan local elections are also voting in the very 
partisan national elections, and with greater turnout when they overlap. The 
 
 270 Partisan vs. Nonpartisan Elections, NAT’L LEAGUE CITIES, http://www.nlc.org/build-skills-and-
networks/resources/cities-101/city-officials/partisan-vs-nonpartisan-elections.  
 271 Brian F. Schaffner, Matthew Streb & Gerald Wright, Teams Without Uniforms: The Nonpartisan 
Ballot in State and Local Elections, 54 POL. RES. Q. 7 (2001). 
 272 The psychology literature often discusses this phenomenon in terms of social capital. See, e.g., 
Douglas D. Perkins & D. Adam Long, Neighborhood Sense of Community and Social Capital: A Multi-Level 
Analysis, in PSYCHOLOGICAL SENSE OF COMMUNITY: RESEARCH, APPLICATIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS 291, 
291–95 (Adrian T. Fisher, Christopher C. Sonn & Brian J. Bishop eds., 2002).  
 273 Kevin R. Cox, Spaces of Dependence, Spaces of Engagement and the Politics of Scale, or: Looking for 
Local Politics, 17 POL. GEOGRAPHY 1, 19–21 (1998). 
 274 Julie Cidell, The Place of Individuals in the Politics of Scale, 38 AREA 196, 196–97, 202 (2006). Cidell 
concludes as follows:  
In the literature on the politics of scale, the individual has largely been treated as a 
separate scale: the site of multiple and conflicting identities, a locus of struggle for political 
power and control, or an entry point into the sphere of social reproduction. However, 
jurisdictions and organizations at higher scales are themselves composed of individuals, and 
therefore consideration needs to be made of the role that individuals play within the politics of 
scale. . . .  
. . . [I]n multi-scalar conflicts . . . individuals as scales are not politically powerful . . . .  
Because individuals are themselves the sites of multiple scales, they can be torn between 
those scalar identities, sometimes expressed as keeping the professional separate from the 
personal. . . .  
Finally, there is the question of individuals within scales. The conflation of the identities 
of individuals with the identities of their jurisdiction is a common practice. 
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people participating in the vitriolic national dialogue, whether directly in 
politics or through blogs, Facebook, and Twitter, live in particular places. 
The partisan divides play out especially clearly at the interface of the local 
with the national dialogue on climate change. For instance, the mayors that 
have committed to the Mayors Agreement come from cities that vote 
Democratic in national elections by a wide margin. Participation patterns in 
three major metropolitan regions—Atlanta, Chicago, and the Twin Cities—
exemplify these trends. All five cities in the Atlanta area to join the Agreement 
lean Democratic.276F275 For participating cities for which there was sufficient data 
to determine partisan leaning in the Chicago area, twenty-three leaned 
Democratic and five leaned Republican. In the Twin Cities, nineteen leaned 
Democratic and three leaned Republican, with one of the Democratic ones 
(Edina) more of a swing city. 277F276 These patterns suggest that partisan divides 
influence which mayors are willing to commit explicitly to an agreement 
focused on climate change commitments. 
Second, and connected to the first point, the local itself is multiscalar and 
includes cities, counties, and metropolitan regions that partially overlap. For 
the largest cities in the United States, the well-known center cities are actually 
part of metroregions, which have both population and emissions focused in the 
suburbs. For example, in the Twin Cities, the center cities of Minneapolis and 
Saint Paul contain only about a quarter of the overall population of the 
metroregion.278F277 In considering the possibilities for bipartisan local action on 
climate change, then, it is important to look beyond just individual cities, as 
Hari Osofsky has explored in her prior scholarship; in order for major 
metropolitan areas to reduce their emissions, their suburbs must participate.279F278 
State and metropolitan regional planning entities and multi-level networks 
of cities—climate focused and not—can play an important role in encouraging 
more cities to do more. 280F279 The bipartisan participation in Minnesota’s 
 
 275 Hari M. Osofsky, Rethinking the Geography of Local Climate Action: Multi-Level Network 
Participation in Metropolitan Regions, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 173, 235, 239. 
 276 For the details of this data, see id. at app.  
 277 As of 2013, the Twin Cities Metropolitan Region’s population was 2,951,000; Minneapolis’s was 
401,000, and St. Paul’s was 296,500. The combined population of Minneapolis and St. Paul was therefore 
23.6% of the metro region’s overall population. METRO. COUNCIL, POPULATION GROWTH ACROSS THE 
REGION: THE TWIN CITIES IN 2013, at 3 (2014), http://metrocouncil.org/getattachment/b09e532c-ca54-4452-
b913-34116bfec037/.aspx. 
 278 Id.; see Osofsky, supra note 275; Osofsky, Suburban Climate Change Efforts, supra note 258. 
 279 Osofsky, Suburban Climate Change Efforts, supra note 258. 
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Greenstep Cities program illustrates the possibilities for practical, constructive 
action by suburban cities. Minnesota Greenstep Cities emerged from a 2008 
legislative order directing the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, 
Department of Energy Resources, and Minnesota Clean Energy Resource 
Teams’ to recommend voluntary actions that cities could take as part of a 
program to recognize “green star” sustainable cities.281F280 The program launched 
in June 2010 and provides cities with three “steps” that they can reach 
depending on how many of the twenty-eight best practices participating cities 
take.282F281 The program is not simply governmentally based; a number of 
nongovernmental organizations are involved in the steering committee, and 
businesses and other organizations can sponsor GreenStep Cities Awards and 
receive public recognition for their role in the program.283F282 The program is 
growing rapidly, with ninety-one cities as of January 2016 and new cities 
continuing to join.284F283 
From the start, the program has not had as heavy a Democratic 
participation bias as the Mayors Agreement, perhaps in part because the 
program is explicitly framed as a sustainability program rather than a climate 
change one. Of the first twelve cities to join GreenStep cities, four leaned 
Republican and one was a swing city, and all were suburbs in the Twin Cities 
metroregion.285F284 Moreover, some of those Republican-leaning cities had a 
history of making explicit commitments on climate change and had even 
received national recognition for this work.286F285 Although the numbers have not 
stayed as equal as the program has grown, they still remain more balanced than 
metro area Mayors Agreement participation: eighteen Democratic, eight 
Republican, and one swing city in the Twin Cities as of August 2014.287F286 
The local context also illustrates the ways in which substantive and 
structural reframing can be paired. While localities are taking a variety of steps 
within their authority relevant to energy transition and climate change, 
initiatives framed around economic development and disaster resiliency have a 
greater likelihood of being politically palatable across the political spectrum. 
 
 280 The Minnesota Green Step Cities Program: History and Development, MINN. GREENSTEP CITIES, 
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 284 Osofsky, Suburban Climate Change Efforts, supra note 258, at 400, 416, 442–43.  
 285 Id. at 416 tbl.1, 442 tbl.2. 
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Or, as a director of one network of cities confidentially put it, “If you frame it 
as a purely environmental [thing], that’s the kiss of death.”288F287  
However, as at larger scales, this framing must be grounded in reality. 
Measuring progress in some objective and tangible way is helpful. For 
example, a number of Minnesota cities are participating in the Regional 
Indicators Initiative (RII), which tracks community greenhouse gas emissions 
and the effectiveness of reduction measures. Falcon Heights Mayor Peter 
Lindstrom explained the importance of such tracking: 
I think the worst thing any city can do is greenwashing—to say 
you’re making a difference but then not really making a difference at 
all . . . . So through the Regional Indicators Initiative, it’s going to tell 
us whether our programs are making a difference.289F288 
One of the problems, of course, is that there are so many different 
measurement systems, and not enough consistency in which systems cities use 
right now. Hari Osofsky has explored elsewhere the need for multi-level 
networks of cities on climate change to harmonize—or at least coordinate—
their toolkits and modeling more to increase their effectiveness.290F289 At a global 
scale, the Compact of Mayors, launched in 2014 at the United Nations Summit, 
is working to standardize measurement and reporting, though as of December 
2015, only 431 cities representing 5.21% of the global population have signed 
on. Participation rates need to be higher for the Compact of Mayors to achieve 
these goals.291F290  
However, measurement questions aside, what makes economic 
development framing particularly promising at a local level is that many 
energy efficiency, renewable energy, and land use efforts can pay off very 
quickly and then bring savings.292F291 Often, these economic and energy benefits 
come in small and not very glamorous forms. Yet if they can be scaled up—so 
that many places do them—the savings, both in money and emissions, add 
 
 287 Notes of Hari Osofsky from Pushing the Envelope on Sustainability and Energy Use Roundtable (Oct. 
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 289 See supra note 258. 
 290 COMPACT OF MAYORS, http://www.compactofmayors.org/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2015). 
 291 For a discussion of cost savings through local energy efficiency efforts, see, for example,  
Residential Energy Efficiency, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www3.epa.gov/statelocalclimate/ 
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up.293F292 For example, moderately Republican Twin Cities suburb Eden Prairie, a 
developed second ring job center,294F293 was awarded an honorable mention at the 
2011 U.S. Mayors Climate Protection Awards in the “small city” category for 
its “20-40-15” initiative.295F294 This initiative, which started in 2006, set the target 
of a 20% increase in city facility energy efficiency and a 40% increase in city 
vehicle fleet fuel efficiency by the year 2015.296F295 
By June 2011, Eden Prairie had made measurable progress toward those 
goals, reporting that it had reduced city facility energy consumption by over 
8% and increased city fleet fuel efficiency by 10%.297F296 The city’s energy 
efficiency initiatives have included motion sensor and LED lighting and 
stoplights, as well as a City Center energy management system.298F297 It has 
improved fuel efficiency by adding several fuel-efficient vehicles to its fleet.299F298 
The city also participates in programs with Centerpoint and Xcel Energy that 
provide it with rebates.300F299 
These kinds of efficiency measures taken by Eden Prairie have been 
adopted by many Democratic and Republican leaning cities simply because 
they make economic sense; when cities use less electricity and fuel, their bills 
go down. Many examples of this kind of low-hanging fruit exist across local 
government functions, at city, county, and metroregional scales. For instance, 
the Twin Cities metropolitan region brought down its wastewater treatment 
 
 292 See id. 
 293 “Developed job centers are not simply relatively affluent bedroom communities within commuting 
distance of central cities, but rather have become important players in their regional economies. They have 
comparatively large tax bases but support less of the social costs of poverty than their central cities.” Osofsky, 
Suburban Climate Change Efforts, supra note 258, at 423 (first citing MYRON ORFIELD, AMERICAN 
METROPOLITICS: THE NEW SUBURBAN REALITY 44–46 (2002); and then citing MYRON ORFIELD & THOMAS F. 
LUCE JR., REGION: PLANNING THE FUTURE OF THE TWIN CITIES 46 (2010)). 
 294 See MAYORS CLIMATE PROT. CTR., TAKING LOCAL ACTION: MAYORS AND CLIMATE PROTECTION BEST 
PRACTICES 13 (2011), http://usmayors.org/79thAnnualMeeting/documents/BestPractices2011ClimateAward 
Winners.pdf; see also 20-40-15 Initiative, EDEN PRAIRIE, http://www.edenprairie.org/community/living-
green/20-40-15-initiative (last visited Oct. 6, 2011) (discussing implementation of the plan). 
 295 20-40-15 Initiative, supra note 294. 
 296 Press Release, Eden Prairie, Mayor Receives Honorable Mention for Eden Prairie Climate Protection 
Efforts (June 17, 2011), http://www.edenprairie.org/home/showdocument?id=1022. 
 297 City of Eden Prairie, MINN. GREENSTEP CITIES, http://greenstep.pca.state.mn.us/cityInfo.cfm?ctu_ 
code=2394614 (last visited Oct. 6, 2011).  
 298 See id.; Leah Shaffer, On the Road to a More Efficient Fleet, EDEN PRAIRIE NEWS (May 12, 2010, 1:35 
PM), http://www.swnewsmedia.com/eden_prairie_news/news/on-the-road-to-a-more-efficient-fleet/article_ 
681470fa-b038-52a4-8445-d91c2db74bd1.html. 
 299 Utility Companies, EDEN PRAIRIE, http://www.edenprairie.org/community/about-eden-prairie/utility-
companies (listing the utility companies Eden Prairie does business with, including Xcel and Centerpoint) (last 
visited Sept. 9, 2015).  
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costs significantly and saved energy in the process through implementing a 
new aeration approach in Saint Paul.301F300 
Similar opportunities exist with respect to disaster resilience at a local 
scale, and at times they take the form of collaboration among federal, state, and 
local governments. President Obama’s November 2013 Climate Action Plan 
established a State, Local, and Tribal Leaders Task Force on Climate 
Preparedness and Resilience.302F301 Republican Mayor James Brainard of Carmel, 
Indiana serves on the taskforce and has conveyed a bipartisan message about 
its focus: “We need to work on bipartisan solutions, and put politics aside . . . . 
The climate is changing, and we need to be prepared for it.”303F302 He specifically 
has framed the need for this kind of planning by talking about the crippling 
drought that Midwestern farmers faced that year. He explained the local 
emphasis on addressing these kinds of problems rather than engaging in 
debates over climate change science: “A lot of people debate why the climate 
is changing . . . . That’s not important. Mayors are very practical people, so the 
real question is, what are we going to do about it?”304F303 
Of course, these planning decisions at times become contentious, which 
only sometimes relates to partisan differences. For example, we have written 
elsewhere about emerging U.S. climate change adaptation litigation, most of 
which is focused at state or local levels.305F304 At times, the suits are brought by 
pro-regulatory individuals or entities that are trying to push for greater 
adaptation. In other instances, pro- or anti-regulatory advocates intervene in 
pending suits; one set of interveners in a broader lawsuit about sewage 
planning, for instance, argued that Miami–Dade county’s approach violates the 
Clean Water Act because it fails to address sea level rise and other impacts of 
climate change.306F305 Others are brought by those impacted by the adaptation 
efforts, such as a takings suit brought by homeowners affected when the 
 
 300 Minn. Tech. Assistance Program, MCES Improves Aeration Process to Reduce Energy Use, UNIV. OF 
MINN., http://www.mntap.umn.edu/potw/resources/151.MCES.html (last modified Sept. 13, 2012); 
Roundtable, supra note 287. 
 301 Id. 
 302 Tim McDonnell, Why This Red-State Republican Mayor Backs Obama on Climate Change, MOTHER 
JONES (Nov. 1, 2013, 5:04 PM), http://www.motherjones.com/blue-marble/2013/11/what-you-need-know-
about-obamas-new-climate-order.  
 303 Id.; see also MINN. GREENSTEP CITIES, http://greenstep.pca.state.mn.us/bestPractices.cfm (last visited 
Nov. 28, 2015). 
 304 Peel & Osofsky, supra note 237. 
 305 Complaint in Intervention at 7, United States v. Miami-Dade County, No. 12-24400-FAM (S.D. Fla. 
June 25, 2013). 
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Borough of Harvey Cedars built a dune to serve as a barrier wall.307F306 The New 
Jersey Supreme Court in that case held that the just compensation calculation 
should take the protective effects of the dune into account, which ultimately 
resulted in the plaintiffs receiving $1 instead of $375,000.308F307 
Beyond the litigation context, there are partisan policy debates at state and 
local levels over the value of adaptation. One of the most prominent examples 
is when North Carolina banned the use of sea level rise data in coastal planning 
in 2012.309F308 But there are many other examples of when localities, often in 
conjunction with statewide adaptation planning efforts, take steps to address 
impacts that they are experiencing, sometimes calling it climate change and at 
other times simply focusing on the impact itself.310F309 
The key point here is that the combination of the less partisan environment 
that many localities provide with the practical economic and resiliency benefits 
of mitigation and adaptation measures means that local governments can often 
be encouraged to take action in circumstances where partisan divides prevent 
larger scale progress. Of course, focusing on the local, and pairing it with 
substantive reframing, will not serve as a panacea to partisanship. People do 
sometimes fight in partisan terms about local land use planning decisions. But 
scaling down helps bring these issues into potentially less contentious fora, 
which in many instances helps to avoid the kind of partisan gridlock that 
Congress exhibits. 
B. “Beauty Is in the Eye of the Beholder” 
While scaling down to focus on local governments both addresses a large 
segment of emissions and provides opportunities for bipartisan agreement, 
some aspects of climate change and energy transition need to be addressed at 
larger scales. One strategy for doing so despite imbedded partisanship has been 
to shift branches. In the years of the George W. Bush Administration when 
executive action on climate change was not forthcoming, many environmental 
 
 306 Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524 (N.J. 2013). 
 307 Id. 
 308 Alon Harish, New Law in North Carolina Bans Latest Scientific Predictions of Sea-Level Rise, ABC 
NEWS (Aug. 2, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/US/north-carolina-bans-latest-science-rising-sea-level/story?id 
=16913782. 
 309 See, e.g., Delaware Climate and Energy Profile, GEO. L. CTR., http://www.georgetownclimate.org/ 
adaptation/state-information/overview-of-delawares-climate-change-preparations (last visited Sept. 30, 2015); 
New Jersey Climate and Energy Profile, GEO. L. CTR., http://www.georgetownclimate.org/adaptation/state-
information/overview-of-new-jerseys-climate-change-preparations (last visited Sept. 30, 2015). 
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advocates sought to use the courts to force regulatory progress or to create 
independent action.311F310 More recently, under the Obama Administration, the 
President has supported action but faced a Congress in which climate change 
legislation did not pass and climate change treaties will not be ratified.312F311 
President Obama’s use of executive authority to advance mitigation and 
adaptation measures, at times relying on court decisions for justification, 
includes both branch shifting to get around a gridlocked Congress and less 
controversial measures about which there is broader agreement.313F312 In this 
section, we focus on the role that separation of powers and checks and 
balances among branches have played in advancing U.S. energy transition. 
1. “The Devil Made Me Do It” 
       314F313  
 Litigation has long served as a means for forcing, or attempting to block, 
action by other branches to address important social issues in the U.S. 
regulatory landscape. Climate change and energy transition have not been 
exceptions.315F314 While climate change litigation emerged in the United States in 
 
 310 For an analysis of that period, see Hari M. Osofsky, Is Climate Change “International”?: Litigation’s 
Diagonal Regulatory Role, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 585 (2009). 
 311 For an analysis of the Obama Administration’s legislative barriers and early initatives, see Hari M. 
Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change: Implications for the Obama Administration, 62 ALA. L. 
REV. 237 (2011). 
 312 For an exploration of the role of agencies and courts in advancing regulatory policy when Congress is 
gridlocked, see Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PENN. L. REV. 1 
(2014). 
 313 Henry Payne. All rights reserved. © (Distributed by Universal iclick), http://www.classicalvalues.com/ 
archives/2007/04/post_294.html. 
 314 PEEL & OSOFSKY, supra note 252, at 266, 298. 
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the 1990s,316F315 it really began to take hold during the presidency of George W. 
Bush when the executive branch refused to take action and Congress lacked 
adequate consensus to move forward. 317F316 The Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in 
Massachusetts v. EPA318F317—finding that the EPA had abused its discretion in the 
way in which it justified not regulating motor vehicle greenhouse gas 
emissions under the Clean Air Act319F318—served as an important turning point in 
the possibilities for litigation as a key leverage point. This decision has since 
played a significant role in shaping the U.S. regulatory landscape on climate 
change and clean energy. As we discuss in depth in the following section, the 
Obama Administration has used that case to justify actions to regulate both 
vehicles and stationary sources like power plants under Clean Air Act but also 
more recently has faced setbacks from the Supreme Court staying the 
centerpiece to those regulatory efforts in response to litigation. But 
Massachusetts v. EPA also more broadly reinforced the courts as a forum for 
influencing other branches. At this point, there have been several hundred 
cases involving climate change mitigation in some way, in both state and 
federal courts, and an emerging set of lawsuits addressing adaptation issues.320F319 
In a divisive partisan environment, court rulings endorsing climate action 
can serve as a gridlock breaker, allowing regulation to move forward that 
might not otherwise have been politically possible. High profile climate cases 
calling on governments to act can provide political cover for willing regulators 
in the executive branch to make progress despite obstacles. Action in such 
cases is often framed as being compelled by the court decision. Unlike the 
vertical structural reframing strategy described in the previous section, the turn 
to courts is not usually coupled with a substantive reframing of climate change 
issues by litigants (although in some cases petitioners are beginning to use this 
approach, for example, by casting action on emissions as an environmental 
justice issue for low income communities of color, 321F320 as an element of building 
 
 315 City of Los Angeles v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 912 F.2d 478 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 316 Dave Markell & J.B. Ruhl, An Empirical Assessment of Climate Change in the Courts: A New 
Jurisprudence or Business as Usual?, 64 FLA. L. REV. 15 (2012). 
 317 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 318 Id. at 533–35. 
 319 A comprehensive database of climate change cases filed and decided in U.S. courts, including links to 
judgments, is maintained by the Columbia Climate Change Law Center. See MICHAEL B. GERRARD, J. CULLEN 
HOWE & L. MARGARET BARRY, ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION IN THE U.S., 
http://www.climatecasechart.com (last modified Dec. 7, 2015). 
 320 Cases brought by Communities for a Better Environment together with other NGOs over adverse 
health impacts of vehicle pollutants like carbon monoxide that also contribute to climate change exemplify this 
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disaster resilience,322F321 or as part of an approach to improve corporate climate 
risk disclosure). 323F322 
Given the constitutionally based status of federal courts and valuing of 
judicial independence in all U.S. courts, a litigation strategy has the advantage 
of giving legitimacy—as well as a degree of perceived non-partisanship—to 
both the climate change problem and the need for action to address it. As one 
litigant interviewee explained, 
[I]n this country, as much as we sometimes ridicule and complain 
about them, we do tend to have high regard for courts, especially 
federal courts and most especially the Supreme Court, 
notwithstanding all the hits that it has taken, from right and left, and 
there is this degree to which having court decisions that take this 
problem seriously . . . causes everybody to perk up and take notice.324F323 
However, in exploring the possibilities for litigation as a mechanism for 
leverage in a partisan environment, it is important to acknowledge that courts 
are not a panacea to partisanship and that the dynamics around litigation and 
partisanship are complex. As discussed in Part I, many key stakeholders have 
deeply entrenched views on climate change, which litigation is unlikely to alter 
significantly.325F324 In addition, partisanship influences the ways in which those in 
other branches respond to lawsuits, and the reactions to those responses. While 
some regulators may remain hostile to moving forward even in the face of 
judicial and broader public support for climate action, others will be bolstered 
by positive court rulings paired with supportive public opinion to push harder 
in their efforts to regulate climate change. When public opinion on climate 
change is more ambivalent or divided, regulators may either resist action 
 
approach. See Current Cases and Campaigns: Air Quality, COMMUNITIES FOR BETTER ENV’T, http://www. 
cbecal.org/legal/current-cases-2/. 
 321 The petition to the New York Public Services Commission exemplifies such an approach. See supra 
notes 245–52 and accompanying text. 
 322 See Cal. Pub. Emps. Retirement Sys. et al., Petition for Interpretive Guidance on Climate Risk 
Disclosure, at 19 (2007), http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2007/petn4-547.pdf; British Columbia Investment 
Managament Corporation et al., Supplemental Petition for Interpretive Guidance on Climate Risk Disclosure, 
at 2 (2008), http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2008/petn4-547-supp.pdf; Second Supplemental Petition for 
Interpretive Guidance on Climate Risk Disclosure, File No. 4-547 (Nov. 23, 2009), 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2009/petn4-547-supp.pdf. For other petitions on point, see Steven J. Milloy 
& Thomas J. Borelli, Free Enter. Action Fund, Petition for Interpretive Guidance on Business Risk of Global 
Warming Regulation (2007), http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2007/petn4-549.pdf; infra note 448. 
 323 Telephone Interview with Participant 8 (Nov. 26, 2012). 
 324 Kahan, supra note 23. 
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despite the court decision or derive comfort from judgments that mandate 
action that would otherwise be politically difficult to undertake. 
This section attempts to capture these complexities. As the examples it 
explores illustrate, the combination of partisan politics and entrenched 
viewpoints mean that litigation and the public reaction to court cases may not 
be enough to bolster a proactive regulator or force action by a reluctant one. 
Those opposing regulation often will not accept litigation-based justifications, 
and hostile regulators sometimes resist decisions requiring them to act. 
For regulators who are proactive in addressing climate change, litigation 
brought by industry or other challengers can often act as a restraint on 
regulatory initiatives or at least slow down the process of regulatory 
development. On occasion, however, proactive regulators also use climate 
change cases as a justification for and legitimation of a policy approach the 
administration or agency wants to undertake, particularly where this course 
carries political risks.326F325 Court decisions can confer legitimacy for action by 
allowing regulators to represent that their actions are founded on a legal base 
and are mandated by the courts.327F326 In effect, litigation can provide “cover” for 
regulators who are willing to act but feel concerned about the political 
consequences. 
The dispute over what action the decision in Massachusetts required 
provides a helpful illustration of these dynamics. After the Obama 
Administration failed to pass comprehensive climate change legislation,328F327 the 
President used his executive branch authority to direct climate regulatory 
measures under the Clean Air Act—discussed further below—by relying 
explicitly on the Supreme Court’s Massachusetts decision to justify his 
action.329F328 Partisan divisions also have framed how other politicians have 
reacted to this justification. Many Democrats have argued that the decision 
required the president to act while numerous Republicans deny that 
 
 325 Bradley C. Canon, Studying Bureaucratic Implementation of Judicial Policies in the United States: 
Conceptual and Methodological Approaches, in JUDICIAL REVIEW AND BUREAUCRATIC IMPACT: 
INTERNATIONAL AND INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 80 (Marc Hertogh & Simon Halliday eds., 2004). 
 326 Maurice Sunkin, Conceptual Issues in Researching the Impact of Judicial Review on Government 
Bureaucracies, in JUDICIAL REVIEW AND BUREAUCRATIC IMPACT: INTERNATIONAL AND INTERDISCIPLINARY 
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 325, at 43, 53. 
 327 American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 328 Memorandum from President Barack Obama to the Secretary of Transportation and the Administrator 
of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (Jan. 26, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_ 
press_office/Presidential_ Memorandum_ fuel_ economy/. 
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justification.330F329 Senator Diane Feinstein (D–Cal.) stated, “I believe EPA  
has to act under the Massachusetts case.”331F330 In contrast, Senator John  
Barrasso (R–Wyo.), author of unsuccessful legislation that would have stripped 
the EPA authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, contended, “The 
Supreme Court gave EPA permission to act, but it did not mandate it to act . . . 
I think EPA is overstepping what it should be doing in terms of impacting 
Americans’ ability to compete globally.”332F331 While the decision thus gave 
President Obama a basis for justifying his actions both legally and politically, 
those opposed to his actions often did not accept that justification.333F332 
As the example of President Obama’s greenhouse gas regulations 
illustrates, willing regulators may use a climate change opinion to legitimize, 
justify, or enable regulatory action. However, anti-regulatory officials do not 
welcome such opinions and may seek to minimize compliance or forgo it 
altogether.334F333 Although they cannot ignore direct edicts requiring them to act, 
they can delay their response or minimize the action that they take to comply. 
A comparison of the George W. Bush and Obama Administrations’ regulatory 
response to Massachusetts illustrates this point. The Bush Administration’s 
response to the same opinion that the Obama Administration used to justify 
action was limited, despite public claims of compliance, reflecting its 
continued hostility to this federal regulatory approach. 
In making these comparisons, though, it is important to acknowledge the 
complex nature of organizations. Regulatory entities are not monolithic but 
rather are comprised of individuals who may vary in their views and 
interaction with partisan debates, even within a particular administration. As 
one interviewee pointed out, when Massachusetts came down, “the career 
staff” at EPA favored using the Clean Air Act to address greenhouse gas 
pollution while Bush Administration appointees who made up “the political 
staff” reacted oppositely, stressing the need for congressional rather than 
agency action.335F334 Ultimately, only when the political and professional 
 
 329 Lawrence Hurely & Elana Schor, Congress Emits Half-Truths in Spin War Over Mass. v. EPA, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/03/17/17greenwire-congress-emits-half-truths-in-
spin-war-over-im-12380.html. 
 330 Id. 
 331 Id. 
 332 For examples of the partisan interchange, see id.  
 333 Canon, supra note 325, at 81. 
 334 Telephone Interview with Participant 9, supra note 17. 
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personnel aligned under the Obama Administration could EPA action 
proceed.336F335 
Of course, courts themselves—despite protections of judicial 
independence—are at times not entirely non-partisan actors. In the judicial 
appointment process, candidates are screened for partisan views that can lead 
to left-leaning or right-leaning nominees depending on the administration in 
power. This partisan appointment process sometimes correlates to how climate 
change cases fare before the courts, a reality well-recognized by litigants: 
I’ve yet to encounter an Obama appointed or a Clinton appointed 
judge who doesn’t understand that climate change is real. They very 
well may not appreciate the severity of it, they may think that the 
appropriate role of the courts is very narrow and that it is a question 
for the Congress and the President, not the courts to deal with, but 
they are clearly aware of the problem. Versus there is still a large 
subset of the American judiciary that either actually or at least 
ideologically takes a position that climate change is not real or not 
established or uncertain or otherwise not something to be dealt with. 
And those judges are not particularly friendly to climate litigation.337F336 
Moreover, at times, opinions—both in the language that they use or in their 
treatment of climate science—have paralleled the broader political debates, 
whether or not the judges were intending to enter the partisan fray. The 
Supreme Court’s June 2014 decision in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA—
the third time the U.S. Supreme Court directly focused on climate change—
provides an interesting example of the contentious language that dominates 
legislative and media dialogue entering a judicial opinion.338F337 The Court 
partially upheld and partially struck down EPA’s approach to regulating 
greenhouse gas emissions from stationary sources under the Clean Air Act in a 
manner that largely allowed the EPA to proceed. Justice Scalia’s opinion—
most relevant to dynamics among partisanship, litigation as political cover, and 
inter-branch dynamics—used strong language decrying the EPA’s 
overstepping of its authority: 
[I]n EPA’s assertion of that authority, we confront a singular 
situation: an agency laying claim to extravagant statutory power over 
the national economy while at the same time strenuously asserting 
that the authority claimed would render the statute “unrecognizable to 
 
 335 Id. 
 336 Telephone Interview with Participant 12 (Dec. 2, 2013). 
 337 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014). 
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the Congress that designed” it. . . . Since, as we hold above, the 
statute does not compel EPA’s interpretation, it would be patently 
unreasonable—not to say outrageous—for EPA to insist on seizing 
expansive power that it admits the statute is not designed to grant.339F338 
Although Justice Scalia may not have had any sort of partisan intent in the tone 
of the opinion—he often writes opinions with colorful language—the wording 
parallels that of federal legislators opposed to President Obama’s approach. 
These partisan dynamics around climate change do not simply manifest in 
disputes over how regulators should respond to cases. Rather, the courtrooms 
themselves become important public stages for debates over the science and 
impacts of climate change. The shift over time in how the Supreme Court 
treated climate change science, which we have explored in more depth 
elsewhere, exemplifies these complicated dynamics. Although the Court did 
not rule on climate change science directly in Massachusetts, it treated the 
science as having legitimacy. For example, the Court concluded its standing 
analysis as follows: 
In sum—at least according to petitioners’ uncontested affidavits—the 
rise in sea levels associated with global warming has already harmed 
and will continue to harm Massachusetts. The risk of catastrophic 
harm, though remote, is nevertheless real. That risk would be reduced 
to some extent if petitioners received the relief they seek. We 
therefore hold that petitioners have standing to challenge EPA’s 
denial of their rulemaking petition.340F339 
This acknowledgment of climate change by the nation’s highest court had an 
important impact on the public dialogue. The “massive public and professional 
attention” drawn by the case341F340 has been a conduit for this view to reverberate 
throughout subsequent public and political debate on climate change. 
However, as influential as Massachusetts was and continues to be, one 
strong opinion—even a landmark U.S. Supreme Court opinion—faces limits in 
its ability to reshape public perceptions in a partisan environment. Opinions are 
issued in a broader context in which many other political, media, new media, 
and even judicial statements also matter. And judges and the courts that they 
sit on are not completely immune to the societies in which they live no matter 
 
 338 Id. at 2444 (footnotes omitted). 
 339 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 526 (2007). 
 340 Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermule, Massachusetts v EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. 
REV. 51, 51.  
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how much they strive for independence. A mere four years after 
Massachusetts, in American Electrical Power Co. v. Connecticut (AEP) the 
Court treated climate science much differently, an important reminder that 
these conversations remain evolutionary. Professor Maxine Burkett explained, 
[T]he AEP Court takes time in its relatively slender decision to inject 
doubt about elements of climate science. Abandoning the confidence 
demonstrated in Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court cites to a magazine 
article expressing doubt about climate change impacts as a 
counterweight to the voluminous peer-reviewed articles on which the 
EPA based its findings. Further, the Court pauses again to make a 
facile indictment of all breathing, sentient beings. In an instant, it 
dismisses the relative excess with which some have burned carbon 
for luxury and profit versus those who have for food and shelter.342F341 
Regardless of whether the Supreme Court’s treatment of science in AEP was 
influenced by shifting public attitudes towards climate change, its discussion of 
the science evolved in parallel with those attitudes. 
Moreover, AEP did not simply address the substance of climate science but 
also concerns about courts as appropriate arbiters of the scientific debates. The 
Court explained that “[f]ederal judges lack the scientific, economic, and 
technological resources an agency can utilize in coping with issues of this 
order” and then described specific mechanisms that agencies have but courts 
lack.343F342 The Court’s concern is not new. This language, for example, parallels 
Justice Scalia’s comment in the Massachusetts oral argument: “I told you 
before I’m not a scientist. . . . That’s why I don’t want to deal with global 
warming, to tell you the truth.”344F343 But the combination of more skepticism 
about climate change science and about the Court’s role in assessing it 
constitutes a substantial step back from Massachusetts.345F344 
 
 341 Maxine Burkett, Climate Justice and the Elusive Climate Tort, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 115, 118 (2011), 
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/climate-justice-and-the-elusive-climate-tort. 
 342 Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2531, 2539–40 (2011). 
 343 Transcript of Oral Argument at 12–13, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), 2006 WL 
3431932, at *12–13; see also Hari M. Osofsky, The Intersection of Scale, Science, and Law, in Massachusetts 
v. EPA, 9 OR. REV. INT’L L. 233 (2007). 
 344 This step back has taken place in a broader context in which the Supreme Court has become more pro-
business. Lee Epstein, William Landes, and Richard Posner have conducted an empirical study which 
concludes that 
[w]hether measured by decisions or Justices’ votes, a plunge in warmth toward business during 
the 1960s (the heyday of the Warren Court) was quickly reversed; and the Roberts Court is much 
friendlier to business than either the Burger or Rehnquist Courts, which preceded it, were. The 
Court is taking more cases in which the business litigant lost in the lower court and reversing 
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Together, the ways in which regulators use these opinions and the 
evolution that they represent reinforce the complex interaction between 
partisanship and litigation. The U.S. Supreme Court and other courts have 
provided forums where pro- and anti-regulatory forces can contribute to often-
partisan interactions about science and regulation. Briefs, oral arguments, and 
opinions, especially in the Supreme Court, are well publicized and function as 
vehicles for high-profile debates over these issues. This respected body’s 
articulation of views on climate science and regulation influences partisan 
discourse, but that discourse in turn comes through in the documents filed with 
and opinions articulated by this Court.346F345 
As with the other strategies we have described, using the courts to advance 
policy on climate change and to foster energy transition has its limits, dictated 
in part by the broader environment in which cases take place. The Supreme 
Court’s February 2016 stay of the Clean Power Plan, described in the 
following section, dramatically reinforced the ways in which court decision 
can constrain regulatory efforts. Even so, litigation remains a worthwhile 
complement to other strategies and an important component of the iterative 
evolution of policy over time.347F346 In part, courts represent another forum in 
which partisan debates can take place in the face of gridlock. As one 
environmental litigator that we interviewed put it, 
[A] lot of this stuff is born of, less of the sense that litigation is the 
optimal strategy and more of the sense that at least courtroom doors 
are open and if you think you can put together some good arguments 
you can get a court to do something whereas a legislature, this 
Congress, is difficult.348F347 
 
more of these—giving rise to the paradox that a decision in which certiorari is granted when the 
lower court decision was anti-business is more likely to be reversed than one in which the lower 
court decision was pro-business. The Roberts Court also has affirmed more cases in which 
business is the respondent than its predecessor Courts did. 
Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 MINN. 
L. REV. 1431, 1472 (2013). 
 345 These debates over climate change science form part of broader legal and political dynamics around 
science. For analyses of these dynamics, see RESCUING SCIENCE FROM POLITICS: REGULATION AND THE 
DISTORTION OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH (Wendy Wagner & Rena Steinzor eds., 2006); Holly Doremus & A. 
Dan Tarlock, Science, Judgment, and Controversy in Natural Resource Regulation, 26 PUB. LAND & 
RESOURCES L. REV. 1 (2005); Holly Doremus, Science Plays Defense: Natural Resource Management in the 
Bush Administration, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 249 (2005). 
 346 Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097 (2009); Osofsky, 
supra note 310; Osofsky, supra note 311. 
 347 Telephone Interview with Participant 8, supra note 323. 
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Moreover, shifting branches to the courts provides important advantages 
beyond just an available forum. Namely, the partisan barriers are not as overt; 
court processes facilitate transparency, debate, and deliberation; and positive 
decisions can move the law forward. These qualities make litigation an 
important place for advancing change in a partisan environment, even if it 
often fails to mitigate the partisanship itself. 
2. “If Congress Won’t Act, I Will”349F348 
 
                                                    349 
                                                 350 
 
 348 Obama: ‘If Congress Won’t Act, I Will,’ ABC NEWS (Oct. 29, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/ 
video/obama-congress-wont-act-14841368.  
 349 © A.F. Branco, CONSERVATIVE DAILY NEWS (2012), http://www.climatechangedispatch.com/images/ 
pics6/cartoon-obama-dictator.jpg.  
 350 © Jim Margulies. All rights reserved. Distributed by Cagle Political Cartoons (2014), http://media. 
cagle.com/46/2014/12/23/157855_600.jpg.  
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 Although the courts serve as an important forum and impetus in a partisan 
environment, the previous discussion illustrates that the executive’s view on 
climate change action and use of authority also deeply impact possibilities for 
progress in a partisan environment. A reluctant regulator like President George 
W. Bush and his appointees limited climate change action in a variety of ways, 
even when pushed by litigation, while President Obama has relied on executive 
authority throughout his presidency.352F351 At times, and most controversially, the 
Obama Administration has used executive power as a form of branch shifting 
that allows him to “go around” a gridlocked Congress.353F352 
However, representing all of the Obama Administration’s executive action 
in that manner would be a vast oversimplification. Some of the 
Administration’s actions, particularly on adaptation, are far less controversial. 
And even the Administration’s mitigation regulations have invoked varying 
partisan reactions. The power plant regulations are far more controversial than 
the motor vehicle ones, in part because the automobile industry is relatively 
neutral about vehicle specifications so long as it makes money from them and 
can operate under clear national standards. This section examines how 
executive authority, at times operating in conjunction with litigation, has 
interacted with partisanship during the Obama Administration. 
In the early days of the Obama Administration, many expressed optimism 
that climate policy was entering a new era both domestically and 
internationally. The subsequent failure of cap-and-trade legislation despite 
strong Democratic majorities in Congress and the collapse of international 
negotiations at Copenhagen in 2009 dealt a major blow to a vision of 
cooperative forward motion.354F353 In ensuing years, it became increasingly clear 
that possibilities for bipartisan cooperation on climate and other energy issues 
were minimal if not non-existent. One of our interviewees summarized the 
bleak possibilities for congressional action as follows: 
[A]t the federal level, I’d be shocked if there was federal climate 
change legislation for the foreseeable future. It’s just too difficult an 
issue. And not just the Republicans fitting about it. If the Republicans 
weren’t screaming about . . . There are a lot of Democrats that take 
cover under the Republican screaming about it; Democrats from coal 
 
 351 Osofsky & Peel, supra note 107. 
 352 Id. 
 353 See supra note 17. 
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states and things like that. OK, so, I just think that there’s a lot of 
opposition out there. I don’t see that changing anytime soon.355F354 
As possibilities for comprehensive climate legislation faded, the issue of 
climate change itself suffered a backlash in polls as described in previous 
sections. Superstorm Sandy provided a temporary shift in politicians’ and the 
public’s willingness to engage climate change, but significant partisanship over 
climate change remained in its aftermath.356F355 
Even during the early period of the Obama Administration, in which 
climate change legislation seemed possible, executive action formed a key part 
of the Obama Administration’s approach. The EPA began taking steps 
pursuant to Massachusetts v. EPA within a week of Barack Obama assuming 
the presidency. The Administration both commenced considering whether 
greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles endanger public health and 
welfare and whether California should receive a waiver to regulate motor 
vehicle emissions at the state level (a waiver which had been denied by the 
Bush Administration and challenged by California in subsequent litigation).357F356 
Since making the Endangerment Finding and granting the waiver less than 
a year into Barack Obama’s presidency,358F357 the EPA has created and continues 
 
 354 Interview with Participant 4 (Nov. 14, 2012). Beyond the limitations of the international negotiations 
discussed supra note 17, congressional partisanship may constrain U.S. efforts to make new bilateral and 
multilateral climate change agreements. For example, substantial uncertainty exists regarding domestic 
implementation of the November 2014 agreement between the United States and China that helped smooth the 
road to the Paris Agreement. Philip Bump, What the Big U.S.–China Climate Deal Means for Obama’s Last 
Two Years, WASH. POST: THE FIX (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/ 
11/12/the-politics-of-the-big-u-s-china-climate-deal/. Senator McConnell, for example, critiqued the deal on 
economic terms just after it was announced: “Our economy can’t take the president’s ideological war on coal 
that will increase the squeeze on middle-class families and struggling miners. . . . This unrealistic plan, that the 
president would dump on his successor, would ensure higher utility rates and far fewer jobs.” Timothy Cama, 
McConnell: U.S.-China Deal ‘Unrealistic,’ HILL (Nov. 11, 2014, 11:43 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/energy-
environment/223810-mcconnell-blasts-unrealistic-us-china-climate-deal. Moreover, while this bilateral 
agreement between the United States and China and the Paris Agreement both represent important progress, it 
is important to put these laudable new commitments into scientific and political perspective. The U.S. pledge 
to “reduce emissions by 26–28% below 2005 levels by 2025” translates into less than the reductions it would 
have made under the Kyoto Protocol, only 4%–5% below 1990 baselines. Email from William Burns, Co-
Exec. Dir., Forum for Climate Geonengineering Assessment, to Environmental Law Professors Listserve, 
Univ. of Or. (Nov. 12, 2014, 12:21 AM) (on file with authors). 
 355 See supra Part II.C. 
 356 For a discussion of the Obama Administration’s campaign positions and early action on climate 
change, see Osofsky, supra note 310. 
 357 Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the 
Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009); EPA California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control 
Standards; Notice of Decision Granting a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s 2009 and 
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to develop substantial new regulations for both motor vehicles and major 
stationary sources of greenhouse gas emissions.359F358 The Administration’s most 
significant accomplishment with respect to motor vehicles and climate change 
thus far is its National Program for emissions and fuel economy standards for 
new vehicles. Under this program, the EPA and Department of Transportation 
have promulgated joint rules on fuel economy and tailpipe greenhouse gas 
emissions, bridging the statutory and agency divide between applicable energy 
and environmental law. The plan—which emerged from the Obama 
Administration’s efforts to forge a compromise between automakers360F359 and 
California361F360—allows manufacturers “to build a single light-duty national fleet 
that would satisfy all requirements under both programs and would provide 
significant reductions in both greenhouse gas emissions and oil 
consumption.” 362F361 The agencies finalized their first set of rules for model years 
 
Subsequent Model Year Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,744 
(July 8, 2009). 
 358 For an overview of EPA’s mitigation efforts, see Climate Change: Regulatory Initiatives, U.S. ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/EPAactivities/regulatory-initiatives.html. (last visited Nov. 
28, 2015). 
 359 For automakers’ reactions, see, for example, Letter from Frederick A. Henderson, CEO of Gen. 
Motors Corp., to Lisa P. Jackson, EPA Adm’r, and Raymond H. LaHood, Sec’y of Transp. (May 17, 2009); 
Letter from Stefan Jacoby, President and CEO of Volkswagen Group of Am., to Lisa P. Jackson, EPA Adm’r, 
and Raymond H. LaHood, Sec’y of Transp. (May 17, 2009); Letter from James E. Lentz, President of Toyota 
Motor Sales, U.S.A., to Lisa P. Jackson, EPA Adm’r, and Raymond H. LaHood, Sec’y of Transp. (May 17, 
2009); Letter from Dave McCurdy, President and CEO of the Alliance of Auto. Mfrs., to Raymond H. 
LaHood, Sec’y of Transp., and Lisa P. Jackson, EPA Adm’r (May 18, 2009); Letter from John Mendel, Exec. 
Vice President of Auto. Sales for Am. Honda Motor Co., to Raymond H. LaHood, Sec’y of Transp., and Lisa 
P. Jackson, EPA Adm’r (May 17, 2009); Letter from Alan R. Mulally, President and CEO of Ford, to 
Raymond H. LaHood, Sec’y of Transp., and Lisa P. Jackson, EPA Adm’r (May 17, 2009); Letter from Robert 
L. Nardelli, Chairman and CEO of Chrysler LLC, to Raymond H. LaHood, Sec’y of Transp., and Lisa P. 
Jackson, EPA Adm’r (May 17, 2009); Letter from James J. O’Sullivan, President and CEO of Mazda North 
Am. Operations, to Raymond H. LaHood, Sec’y of Transp., and Lisa P. Jackson, EPA Adm’r (May 18, 2009); 
Letter from Norbert Reithofer, Chairman of the Bd. of Mgmt. of The BMW Group, to Lisa P. Jackson, EPA 
Adm’r, and Raymond H. LaHood, Sec’y of Transp. (May 18, 2009); Letter from Dieter Zetsche, Chairman of 
the Bd. of Mgmt. of Daimler AG and Head of Mercedes-Benz Cars, and Thomas Weber, Member of the Bd. of 
Mgmt., Group Research, and Mercedes-Benz Cars Dev., to Raymond H. LaHood, Sec’y of Transp., and Lisa 
P. Jackson, EPA Adm’r (May 18, 2009). 
 360 For California’s pledge to adopt the less stringent federal standards for Model Years 2012–2016, see 
Letter from Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Att’y Gen. of Cal., to Lisa P. Jackson, EPA Adm’r, and Raymond H. 
LaHood, Sec’y of Transp. (May 18, 2009); Letter from Mary D. Nichols, Chairman of the Cal. Air Res. Bd., to 
Lisa P. Jackson, EPA Adm’r, and Raymond H. LaHood, Sec’y of Transp. (May 18, 2009); Letter from Arnold 
Schwarzenegger, Governor of Cal., to Lisa P. Jackson, EPA Adm’r, and Raymond H. LaHood, Sec’y of 
Transp. (May 18, 2009). 
 361 Notice of Upcoming Joint Rulemaking to Establish Vehicle GHG Emissions and CAFE Standards, 
74 Fed. Reg. 24,007 (May 22, 2009). The EPA regulations focus on tailpipe emissions under the Clean Air 
Act, and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration regulations involve CAFE standards under the 
Energy Independence and Security Act and the Energy Policy Conservation Act. They are coordinated for the 
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2012–2016 of light-duty vehicles in 2010.363F362 Additional rulemaking efforts 
have addressed post-2017 model years of light-duty vehicles and emissions 
from medium and heavy vehicles.364F363 Over time, the federal agencies and 
California, in collaboration with the automobile industry, have also worked to 
harmonize state and federal standards.365F364 
In addition to the legal challenges brought against the Obama 
Administration’s motor vehicle regulations, prominent Republicans at times 
have criticized them. For example, a spokesperson for Mitt Romney’s 
presidential campaign responded to the release of 2017–2025 vehicle standards 
by saying, “The president tells voters that his regulations will save them 
thousands of dollars at the pump, but always forgets to mention that the 
savings will be wiped out by having to pay thousands of dollars more upfront 
for unproven technology that they may not even want.”366F365 However, 
significant industry involvement in developing and supporting the standards—
thirteen major automakers supported the standards even as other industry 
organizations criticized them367F366—paired with the failure of legal challenges 
has dampened partisan disputes. This industry role dovetails with the corporate 
strategies discussed in the next section. 
Far more controversially, the Obama Administration has used executive 
authority to require major industrial emitters to reduce their greenhouse gas 
emissions from stationary sources under § 111 of the Clean Air Act; in fact, 
contentious politics have repeatedly resulted in the Obama Administration’s 
 
first time under this program on the basis that “[t]he close relationship between emissions of CO2 [carbon 
dioxide]—the most prevalent greenhouse gas emitted by motor vehicles—and fuel consumption, means that 
the technologies to control CO2 emissions and to improve fuel economy overlap to a great degree.” Id. at 
24,009 n.7. For further discussion of compliance and measurement under the program, see id.  
 362 See Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy 
Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010); see also Barack Obama, U.S. President, Remarks on National 
Fuel Efficiency Standards (May 19, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-
President-on-national-fuel-efficiency-standards/ (the Rose Garden agreement).  
 363 2017 and Later Model Year Light Duty Vehicle GHC Emissions and CAFE Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 
62,739 (Oct. 13, 2010); Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and 
Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles, 75 Fed. Reg. 74,152 (Nov. 30, 2010). For correction to proposed rules, see 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines 
and Vehicles, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,952 (Dec. 29, 2010). 
 364 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Transp., DOT and California Align Timeframe for Proposing Standards 
for Next Generation of Clean Cars (Jan. 21, 2011), http://www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/epa-dot-and-
california-align-timeframe-proposing-standards-next-generation-clean-cars. 
 365 Bill Vlasic, U.S. Sets High Long-Term Fuel Efficiency Rules for Automakers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 
2012, at B1. 
 366 See id. 
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delaying aspects of these regulations.368F367 Starting in 2010, EPA established 
threshold greenhouse gas permit requirements—aimed at the most significant 
emitters that account for 70% of emissions—for new and existing power 
plants, refineries, and other major industrial emitters under the New Source 
Review Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas 
Tailoring Rule.369F368 In September 2013, the EPA proposed a “Carbon Pollution 
Standard” for new power plants under Clean Air Act § 111(b), which was 
particularly highlighted in the “war on coal” rhetoric because coal-fired power 
plants would have to use partial carbon sequestration and storage to meet it.370F369 
EPA Administrator Gina McCarthy publicly justified that decision as being in 
line with where the market was going, claiming that coal facilities being built 
now use this technology, but this justification did not allay Republican and 
industry critique.371F370 In June 2014, the EPA took its next contentious step with 
its draft “Clean Power Plan,” which complemented its regulation of new power 
plants by proposing “emission guidelines for states to follow in developing 
plans to address greenhouse gas emissions from existing fossil fuel-fired 
electric generating units”; the plan aims to reduce carbon dioxide emissions 
from the power sector by 30% from 2005 levels by 2030.372F371 The Obama 
Administration released the final version of the Clean Power Plan in August 
 
 367 In February 2010, in response to political pressure regarding the economic impact of planned 
mandates, the EPA modified its plans to slow down the regulatory process. Then-Administrator Jackson 
indicated that the EPA would begin to phase in permitting in 2011 for large stationary sources and would wait 
until after 2016 for the smallest sources. See Letter from Lisa P. Jackson, EPA Adm’r, to Jay D. Rockefeller 
IV, U.S. Senator (Feb. 22, 2010).  
 368 Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 
31,514, 31,537 (June 3, 2010); Clean Air Act Permitting for Greenhouse Gas Emissions—Final Rules: Fact 
Sheet, EPA (Dec. 23, 2010), http://www3.epa.gov/nsr/ghgdocs/20101223factsheet.pdf; Press Release, EPA, 
EPA to Set Modest Pace for Greenhouse Gas Standards / Agency Stresses Flexibility and Public Input in 
Developing Cost-Effective and Protective GHC Standards for Largest Emitters (Dec. 23, 2010), 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/6424ac1caa800aab85257359003f5337/d2f038e9daed78de85257802
00568bec!OpenDocument. 
 369 See 2013 Proposed Carbon Pollution Standard for New Power Plants, EPA, http://www2.epa.gov/ 
carbon-pollution-standards/2013-proposed-carbon-pollution-standard-new-power-plants (last updated July 17, 
2015); Gina McCarthy, Keynote Remarks at the University of Michigan Environmental Law and Public Health 
Conference, 3 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 243, 247 (2014). For examples of the Republican critique, see 
Tom Cohen et al., Obama’s Big Environmental Move: Power Plants to Cut Carbon Pollution, CNN (Sept. 8, 
2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/06/02/politics/epa-carbon-emissions/. 
 370 Cohen et al., supra note 369; McCarthy, supra note 369; Ben Geman, EPA Assailed on Power Plan 
Regulations, HILL (Nov. 14, 2013), http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/190269-epa-assailed-on-
power-plant-carbon-regs; Notes of Hari Osofsky from Keynote Address by EPA Administrator Gina 
McCarthy at the Michigan Environmental Law and Public Health Conference (Sept. 26, 2013) (on file with 
author). 
 371 Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating 
Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830, 34,832 (June 18, 2014). 
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2015, which amended it somewhat in response to feedback though did not alter 
these fundamental goals.373F372 
The state and federal dynamics around the Clean Power Plan embody the 
complexities of “go around” strategies based on federal executive action as an 
approach to progress in a divisive partisan environment. As detailed in the 
Introduction, reactions to the plan split along partisan lines from the start. 
Since then, Republican opponents of the plan have sought to block 
implementation along multiple pathways. At a federal level, Energy and Power 
Subcommittee Chairman Ed Whitfield (R–Ky.) circulated a discussion draft of 
the Ratepayer Protection Act in March 2015.374F373 This bill, which was passed by 
the House but has little prospect of becoming law, would extend the rule’s 
compliance dates, including dates for submission of state plans, pending 
judicial review.375F374 More fundamentally, it would allow states to avoid 
implementation if the governor, in consultation with relevant state officials 
determines that compliance would have an adverse affect on retail, commercial 
or industrial ratepayers, or on the electricity system’s reliability.376F375 Full 
Committee Chairman Fred Upton (R–Mich.) described this bill as “about 
protecting families and jobs. It gives states the time they need before this 
expensive and legally shaky new rule puts affordable, reliable power at 
risk.”377F376 
Given the limited prospects for federal legislative overrule, however, the 
primary battlegrounds over the Clean Power Plan have been and will continue 
to be courtrooms and state-level governments. Lawsuits brought in response to 
the draft regulation by Murray Energy Corporation, the largest privately-
owned coal company in the United States, and several states opposed to the 
Clean Power Plan, argued that EPA’s 2012 promulgation of national emissions 
standards for power plants under Clean Air Act § 112 deprives it of legal 
 
 372 EPA Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility 
Generating Units, Prepublication Version of the Final Rule 849-850 (proposed Aug. 3, 2015) [hereinafter 
Clean Power Plan] (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). 
 373 Comm. on Energy & Commerce, Whitfield Unveils Ratepayer Protection Act to Address EPA’s 
Overreaching Power Plant Rule, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (Mar. 23, 2015), http://energycommerce.house. 
gov/press-release/whitfield-unveils-ratepayer-protection-act-address-epa%E2%80%99s-overreaching-power-
plant-rule.  
 374 Id.  
 375 Id.  
 376 Id. 
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authority to establish state-by-state standards for those power plants.378F377 The 
two cases were consolidated and argued before the D.C. Circuit in April 2015, 
which in June 2015 denied the petition because the rule was not yet final.379F378 
Challenges to the final plan were brought even before the Federal Register 
published the rule, with sixteen states filing a stay request380F379 and an 
overlapping group of fifteen states filing an emergency petition for 
extraordinary writ in the first two weeks after the Obama Administration’s 
announcement. 381F380 Following the final rule’s publication in the Federal 
Register on October 23, 2015, twenty-seven states and numerous industry 
groups filed another fifteen challenges, which were consolidated in the D.C. 
 
 377 Specifically, a key part of the legal challenges in the cases focused on conflicting House and Senate 
versions of the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act: the House version bars § 111(d) regulation of sources 
already regulated under § 112, and the Senate version only bars re-regulation of the same pollutant. Petition for 
Extraordinary Writ at 18–19, Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA (No. 14-1112), 2015 WL 5062506 (D.C. Cir. June 
18, 2014). West Virginia, Alabama, Alaska, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Nebraska, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Wyoming intervened on behalf of Murray Energy Corporation, while 
California, Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oregon, 
Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, and District of Columbia intervened on behalf of the EPA. Brief of the 
States of West Virginia et al. as Intervenors In Support of the Petitioner, Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA (In re 
Murray Energy Corp.), 788 F.3d 330 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Nos. 14-1112, 14-1151), 2014 WL 7273776 (D.C. Cir. 
Dec. 22, 2014); Final Brief of the States of New York et al. as Intervenors in Support of Respondent, In re 
Murray Energy Corp., 788 F.3d 330 (Nos. 14-1112, 14-1151), 2015 WL 1022480. West Virginia v. EPA is 
framed around the same legal challenge, but in the context of a settlement agreement with intervenors. Petition 
for Review, West Virginia, et al. v. EPA, 788 F.3d 330 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (No. 14-1146). In that case, 
petitioners are West Virginia, Alabama, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
South Carolina, South Dakota, and Wyoming, and intervenors in support of respondent EPA are New York 
City, Massachusetts, District of Columbia, Environmental Defense Fund, Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Sierra Club, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, New Mexico, New York State, Oregon, Rhode Island, 
Vermont, and Washington. Id.; Brief for State Intervenors in Support of Respondent, West Virginia et al. v. 
EPA, 788 F.3d 330 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (No. 14-1146). For a summary of the cases and potential future 
challenges, see Legal Challenges—Overview and Documents, E&E PUBL’G, http://www.eenews.net/ 
interactive/clean_power_plan/fact_sheets/legal (last visited Apr. 25, 2015).  
 378 In re Murray Energy Corp., 788 F.3d at 334; Coral Davenport, Judges Are Skeptical of Challenge to 
Proposed E.P.A. Rule on Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2015, at A24.  
 379 The states applying for a stay include Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and 
Wyoming. Application for Administrative Stay by the State of West Virginia and 15 Other States at 2, Carbon 
Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electricity Generating Units; Final Rule, EPA 
Docket  No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.ago.wv.gov/Documents/WV%20-%20 
Administrative%20Request%20for%20Stay%20CPP.PDF; see also John Funk, Shelve Clean Power Plan 
Until Courts Rule, Ohio, West Virginia and 13 Other States Ask EPA, CLEV. (Aug. 5, 2015, 6:41 PM), 
http://www.cleveland.com/business/index.ssf/2015/08/shelve_clean_power_plan_until.html. 
 380 Those states petitioning for an extraordinary writ include Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Indiana, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, West Virginia, 
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Emergency Petition for Extraordinary Writ, In re West Virginia et al., No. 15-1277 
(D.C. Cir. Aug. 13, 2015), http://www.eenews.net/assets/2015/08/14/document_ew_04.pdf. 
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Circuit Court of Appeals. These challenges again address the conflicting 
versions of § 111(d), as well as the question of whether the EPA can regulate 
broader energy decision-making beyond the “fence line” of power plants.382F381 
On November 4, 2015, eighteen states, the District of Columbia, five cities, 
and a county intervened in the consolidated cases on behalf of the EPA.383F382 The 
pattern in these Clean Power Plan challenges of states dividing into pro- and 
anti-regulatory groupings follows one that has occurred repeatedly in climate 
change litigation, including in Massachusetts v. EPA and the litigation over the 
denial of California’s request for a waiver to regulate motor vehicle 
greenhouse gas emissions by the Bush Administration’s EPA.384F383 The D.C. 
Circuit denied the stay request on January 21, 2016, which allowed the Obama 
Administration to continue Clean Power Plan implementation while the legal 
challenges are being resolved.384 
However, less than three weeks later, on February 9, 2016, the Supreme 
Court granted the stay, which prevents implementation and enforcement of the 
Clean Power Plan during the disposition of the legal challenges. In response to 
this setback, the Obama Administration indicated that it will continue to “work 
with states that choose to continue plan development and will prepare the tools 
those states will need,” as well as “take aggressive steps to make forward 
progress to reduce carbon emissions.” Unsurprisingly, there was a strong 
partisan divide in reactions to the stay ruling.385 
 
 381 See Legal Challenges—Overview and Documents, supra note 377; Emily Holden, 2016 Holds Flurry 
of State Planning, Legal Drama for Clean Power Plan, E&E PUBL’G (Jan. 4, 2016), 
http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060030047. 
 382 The intervenors include 
[t]he States of New York, California (by and through Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr., the 
California Air Resources Board, and Attorney General Kamala D. Harris), Connecticut, 
Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota (by and through the Minnesota 
Pollution Control Agency), New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, 
Washington, the Commonwealths of Massachusetts and Virginia, the District of Columbia, the 
Cities of Boulder, Chicago, New York, Philadelphia, and South Miami, and Broward County, 
Florida. 
Unopposed Motion for Leave to Intervene as Respondents at 1, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. 
2015). 
 383 See Osofsky, supra note 310; Osofsky, supra note 343. 
 384 See West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 21, 2016). The court also expedited 
consideration. Id. 
 385 West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15A773 (U.S. Feb. 9, 2016) (granting the stay); Press Release, White 
House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Press Secretary Josh Earnest on the Supreme Court's Decision to Stay the 
Clean Power Plan (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/09/press-secretary-
josh-earnest-supreme-courts-decision-stay-clean-power; For examples of the divergent responses, see Adam 
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The cooperative federalist implementation structure under the Clean Air 
Act—in which states have flexibility to create their own plans to implement a 
federal standard—has complicated how partisan divisions have translated into 
state action. A group of Democratic-leaning states, which overlaps 
significantly with those states supporting EPA climate change regulation 
across numerous cases, filed joint comments in December 2014 supporting the 
Clean Power Plan with some suggested revisions.386F386 Another group of states, 
largely Republican and many of which have major coal industries, oppose the 
Clean Power Plan, but vary in their approach to implementation.387F387 Senator 
Mitch McConnell (R–Ky.) has led an effort, supported by the American 
Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) and its campaign to disseminate model 
legislation, to encourage states to resist implementation.388F388 However, few 
states have chosen to follow that course out of a practical concern about the 
regulatory consequences; if they do not create a state implementation plan and 
the Clean Power Plan goes into effect, the EPA will impose a federal 
implementation plan on them.389F389 While many states have passed resolutions 
reinforcing their authority and joined courtroom challenges, most state 
legislation passed in this context thus far has been to advance their 
implementation efforts (though substantial state legislation is still pending, 
 
Liptak & Coral Davenport, Supreme Court Deals Blow to Obama’s Efforts to Regulate Coal Emissions, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 9, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/10/us/politics/supreme-court-blocks-obama-epa-coal-
emissions-regulations.html; Supreme Court Puts Obama’s Power Plant Regs on Hold, FOXNEWS.COM (Feb. 9, 
2016), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2016/02/09/supreme-court-puts-obamas-clean-power-plan-on-
hold.html. 
 386 Letter from State Envtl. Agency Leaders, Energy Agency Leaders, and Pub. Util. Comm’rs from 14 
States, to Gina McCarthy, EPA Adm’r, Joint State Comments in Response to EPA’s Proposed Carbon 
Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units (Dec. 1, 
2014), http://www.georgetownclimate.org/sites/www.georgetownclimate.org/files/GCC-States_CPP_Support_ 
and_Comments-Dec%202014.pdf.  
 387 See ALEC, THE STATE FACTOR: STATES ARE ENGAGING EPA ON CLEAN POWER PLAN (Nov. 2014), 
http://alec.org/docs/State-Factor-EPA-Clean-Power-Plan.pdf; Naveena Sadasivam, Coal States Building Wall 
of Red Tape to Resist EPA’s Clean Power Plan, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Feb. 17, 2015), 
http://insideclimatenews.org/news/17022015/coal-states-building-wall-red-tape-resist-epas-clean-power-plan 
(containing a map of how coal states overlap with states bringing lawsuits). 
 388 For examples of ALEC’s materials, see Clean Power Plan Facts—Maps, ALEC, 
http://www.alec.org/cpp-facts/maps/ (last visited Nov. 29, 2015); EPA’s Regulatory Train Wreck, ALEC, 
http://www.alec.org/initiatives/epas-regulatory-train-wreck/ (last visited Nov. 29, 2015).  
 389 For a discussion of the consequences for states that choose not to submit a state implementation plan, 
see Daniel Selmi, States Should Think Twice Before Refusing Any Response to EPA’s Clean Power Rules, 
COLUM. L. SCH. SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE L. (Mar. 2015), https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/ 
default/files/microsites/climate-change/selmi_-_states_should_think_twice_before_refusing_any_response_to_ 
epas_clean_power_rules.pdf. 
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which could change trends). 390F390 As highlighted in an April 2015 letter by 
several Democratic senators to the National Governors Association, even 
Senator McConnell’s home state of Kentucky has taken steps to develop a 
compliance plan.391F391 
Moreover, the politics and legal dynamics of these challenges to 
greenhouse gas regulation have been and likely will continue to be intertwined 
with related battles over Obama Administration efforts to regulate hazardous 
air pollutants, particularly mercury, from coal fire power plants under § 112 of 
the Clean Air Act. For example, when the Supreme Court held in June 2015 in 
Michigan v. EPA that the EPA unreasonably failed to consider costs in its 
regulation of emissions by power plants of mercury and other hazardous air 
pollutants,392F392 the American Energy Alliance, a group with links to the Koch 
brothers, connected this case to political efforts to resist the Clean Power Plan: 
“[The] EPA can no longer ignore the costs of its reckless agenda. This decision 
shows that states should resist EPA’s calls to submit plans for the upcoming 
 
 390 See Melanie Condon & Jocelyn Durkay, States’ Reactions to EPA Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Standards, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Aug. 13, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/states-
reactions-to-proposed-epa-greenhouse-gas-emissions-standards635333237.aspx; see also E&E’s Power Plan 
Hub, E&E PUBL’G, http://www.eenews.net/interactive/clean_power_plan (last visited Apr. 25, 2015) 
(providing links to state responses). For additional descriptions of the status of state legislation and its 
evolution over time, which vary in tone, see Jeff McMahon, States Ignoring Mitch McConnell, Working On 
Clean Power Plan: EPA, FORBES (Apr. 12, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffmcmahon/2015/ 
04/12/states-ignoring-mitch-mcconnell-epa/; Sadasivam, supra note 387; Jeffrey Tomich & Kristi E. Swartz, 
Clean Power Plan Bills Generate Debate across the Southeast, Midwest, E&E PUBL’G: ENERGYWIRE (Mar. 
13, 2015), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060014977; Karen Ulenhuth, State Legislators Take Preemptive 
Aim at EPA Power Plant Rules, MIDWEST ENERGY NEWS (Apr. 29, 2014), 
http://midwestenergynews.com/2014/04/29/state-legislators-take-preemptive-aim-at-epa-power-plant-rules/. 
For examples of positions by advocacy organizations on both sides, compare Aliya Haq, States Clear Path for 
Clean Power Plan; Coal Industry and ALEC Floundering, NRDC: SWITCHBOARD (Apr. 13, 2015), 
http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/ahaq/states_clear_path_for_clean_po.html, and Bobby Magill, States  
Suing to Stop CO2 Cuts Prep For Them Anyway, CLIMATE CENTRAL (Sept. 11,  
2014), http://www.climatecentral.org/news/states-suing-to-stop-co2-cuts-prep-for-them-anyway-18013, with 
Governors Use ‘State of the State’ Speeches to Open Fire on EPA’s Clean Power Plan, COUNT ON COAL (Jan. 
16, 2015), http://www.countoncoal.org/2015/01/16/governors-use-state-of-the-state-speeches-to-open-fire-on-
epas-clean-power-plan/. 
 391 Letter from Sen. Whitehouse et. al to Nat’l Governors Ass’n (Apr. 14, 2015). For additional materials 
on Kentucky’s decision-making around compliance, see James Bruggers, Kentucky Defends Work Toward 
Climate Plan, COURIER-J., (Mar. 5, 2015, 9:57 PM) http://www.courier-journal.com/story/watchdog-earth/ 
2015/03/05/mcconnell-tells-states-to-resist-clean-power-plan-requirements/24457533/.  
 392 See 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (noting “EPA strayed far beyond” the bounds of “reasonable 
interpretation”). 
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climate rule.”393F393 More substantively, if the § 112 regulations are ultimately 
prevented from moving forward, that aspect of the legal challenge would be 
eliminated.394F394 However, the Supreme Court ruling in Michigan v. EPA is more 
likely to delay than ultimately prevent those regulations. On November 20, 
2015, the EPA proposed a supplemental finding intended to address the 
Supreme Court’s concern in that case.395F395 The D.C. Circuit then issued an order 
on December 15, 2015, declining to vacate the EPA’s mercury rule while the 
agency is revising it in response to the Supreme Court decision, noting that the 
EPA is “on track to issue a final finding” by April 15, 2016.396F396 
Domestic implementation of the 2015 Paris Agreement resulting from 
recent international climate negotiations looms as another likely partisan 
battleground despite the agreement being framed to address U.S. political 
constraints. The Obama Administration has indicated its view that the new 
agreement does not require congressional approval as the binding elements can 
be implemented pursuant to existing areas of executive authority under the 
Clean Air Act and the United Nations Framework on Climate Change (to 
which the United States is a party).397F397 However, the decision by the 
 
 393 Richard Revesz, What the Supreme Court’s EPA Decision Means for the Mercury Rule and Clean 
Power Plan, HILL: CONTRIBUTORS (June 20, 2015, 11:00 AM) (alteration in original), http://thehill.com/blogs/ 
pundits-blog/energy-environment/246516-what-the-epa-decision-means-for-the-mercury-rule-and.  
 394 See Ann Carlson, MATS Rules Declared Invalid in Michigan v. EPA, 5-4, LEGAL PLANET (June 29, 
2015), http://legal-planet.org/2015/06/29/mats-rules-declared-invalid-in-michigan-v-epa-5-4/.  
 395 The finding was published in the Federal Register on December 1, 2015. EPA, Supplemental Finding 
that It Is Appropriate and Necessary to Regulate Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric 
Utility Steam Generating Units (Dec. 1, 2015), https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2015/12/01/2015-
30360/supplemental-finding-that-it-is-appropriate-and-necessary-to-regulate-hazardous-air-pollutants-from. 
 396 White Stallion Energy Ctr., LLC, v. EPA, No. 12-1100 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 15, 2015) (per curiam), 
http://www.eenews.net/assets/2015/12/15/document_gw_05.pdf. Beyond these state-federal dynamics, if the 
Clean Power Plan survives the legal challenges and goes into effect, partisanship may further complicate the 
institutional complexities of implementation. For an in-depth analysis of the need for regional cooperation, 
barriers to it, and institutional possibilities for implementation, see Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiserman, 
Regional Energy Governance Under the Clean Power Plan, 43 ECOLOGY L.Q. (forthcoming 2016), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2678342. 
 397 Karoun Demirjian & Steven Mufson, Trick or Treaty? The Legal Question Hanging over the Paris 
Climate Change Conference, WASH. POST (Nov. 30, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
powerpost/wp/2015/11/30/trick-or-treaty-the-legal-question-hanging-over-the-paris-climate-change-
conference/. Academic opinion backs up this view. See generally David A. Wirth, The International and 
Domestic Law of Climate Change: A Binding International Agreement Without the Senate or Congress?, 
39 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 515 (2015). Indeed, a technical error in the final draft of the agreement—which 
substituted “shall” for “should”—almost derailed the Paris climate negotiations at the eleventh hour as the 
mandatory language would have made the relevant provision binding, hence requiring Senate ratification as a 
treaty. See Andrew Restuccia, The One Word that Almost Sank the Climate Talks, POLITICO (Dec. 12, 2015, 
7:51 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/12/paris-climate-talks-tic-toc-216721; supra note 18. 
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Administration to “go around” congressional approval of the Paris Agreement 
is being scrutinized by Republicans and may end up in the courts.398F398  
As noted in the Introduction, in the lead up to conclusion of the Paris 
Agreement, Republican members of Congress issued defiant statements 
attacking the President’s ability to implement any new international 
commitments made on behalf of the United States. On the floor of the House, 
Representative Edward Whitfield (R–Ky.) stated, “We want the world to know 
that there is disagreement with the President on this issue—not about the fact 
that the climate is changing, but about the priority that is being placed on it.”399F399 
Senator John Barrasso was even more blunt, declaring, “The President’s 
promises cannot be relied on.”400F400 The President’s decision to rely on executive 
authority to circumvent Congress on the Paris Agreement is also susceptible to 
being overturned by the next administration if it has a different view of climate 
change. Republican candidates for the presidency were unusually silent in their 
debate just after conclusion of the Paris Agreement, but many have previously 
expressed skeptical views regarding both climate science and the necessity for 
regulatory measures to address emissions, and some have directly attacked the 
agreement.401F401  
The mitigation actions that the Obama Administration has attempted to 
justify under Massachusetts v. EPA have been accompanied by significant, but 
far less controversial, action on adaptation. President Obama created an 
Interagency Climate Change Adaptation Taskforce during his first year in 
office to explore how federal policies and programs could prepare for climate 
change better. He simultaneously directed federal agencies to “evaluate agency 
climate-change risks and vulnerabilities and to manage the effects of climate 
change on the agency’s operations and mission in both the short and long 
term.” 402F402 
 
 398 Kyle Feldscher, Senate GOP Steels Itself for Fight over the Paris Agreement, WASH. EXAMINER (Dec. 
13, 2015), www.washingtonexaminer.com/senate-gop-steels-itself-for-fight-over-paris-agreement/article/ 
2578253. John Knox argues that in the event of such a challenge, the issue should not be treated as one of 
political question by the courts. See John H. Knox, The United States, Environmental Agreements, and the 
Political Question Doctrine, 40 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 933 (2015). 
 399 David M. Herszenhorn, Votes in Congress Move to Undercut Climate Pledge, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/02/us/politics/as-obama-pushes-climate-deal-republicans-move-to-
block-emissions-rules.html.  
 400 Id. 
 401 Adler, supra note 20; Editorial, Silence on the Climate Pact from the Republican Candidates, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 14, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/15/opinion/silence-on-the-climate-pact-from-the-
republican-candidates.html. 
 402 Exec. Order No. 13,514, 74 Fed. Reg. 52,117, 52,122 (Oct. 5, 2009). 
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Adaptation efforts have continued to develop—often in collaboration with 
smaller scale efforts by cities, states, regions, and tribes that frequently have 
been ahead of the federal government—throughout President Obama’s two 
terms. In 2013, federal agencies released climate change adaptation plans 
covering operations, missions and programs. That same year, the President’s 
Climate Action Plan outlined further steps to prepare for climate change 
impacts. The plan focuses particularly on removing barriers to action, fostering 
state, local and tribal efforts, building scientific capacity, and identifying 
sectoral vulnerabilities.403F403 A further executive order that year directed federal 
agencies to take a variety of steps on adaptation,404F404 and established a 
federal-level interagency Council on Climate Preparedness and Resilience and 
a multi-level State, Local, and Tribal Leaders Task Force on Climate 
Preparedness and Resilience.405F405 
Adaptation measures with a domestic focus, particularly when framed more 
broadly as discussed in depth in Part II.C, have often received bipartisan 
support despite broader partisanship around climate change. Eli Lehrer, 
president of R Street Institute, a conservative, free-market focused think tank, 
explained, “The best adaptation strategies are very good policy in any case. . . . 
And whether intentionally or not, a lot of Republicans are already taking the 
lead on things that are climate adaptation strategies.”406F406 Leaders in both parties 
have shown awareness of possibilities for “going together” on these issues, not 
only in the executive sphere but also in Congress. Senator Roger  
Wicker (R–Miss.) explains his co-sponsorship of legislation to support federal, 
state, and local adaptation planning in these terms: “I do believe it is a way for 
us to do something sensible that is also a little more realistic than trying to 
change the sea level.”407F407 Although not all Republicans support these measures, 
and more internationally oriented action such as President Obama’s $3 billion 
pledge to the United Nations Green Climate Fund that created strong negative 
 
 403 The President’s Climate Action Plan, EXECUTIVE OFF. PRESIDENT 12–14 (June 2013), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/image/president27sclimateactionplan.pdf; see also President 
Obama’s Plan to Fight Climate Change, EXECUTIVE OFF. PRESIDENT (June 25, 2013), http://www. 
whitehouse.gov/share/climate-action-plan. 
 404 Exec. Order No. 13,653, Fed. Reg. 66,819, 66,821–22 (Nov. 6, 2013). 
 405 Id. at 66,822–23 
 406 Zack Colman, Democrats Shift from Climate ‘Change’ to ‘Adaptation’ to Woo Republicans, WASH. 
EXAM’R (Apr. 11, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/democrats-shift-from-climate-
change-to-adaptation-to-woo-republicans/article/2547109.  
 407 Id. 
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reactions by Republicans, executive action on adaptation has received far less 
pushback than that on mitigation.408F408 
While partisan responses to the Obama Administration’s executive action 
vary, his actions form the core of U.S. federal action on both mitigation and 
adaptation. Moreover, his most controversial “go around” regulations of power 
plant greenhouse gas emissions have been protected, at least as long as he is in 
office and they survive courtroom challenges, by the very partisanship that has 
stymied him in Congress. The dynamics that hindered passage of 
comprehensive climate legislation also prevent the repeal of the Clean Air Act 
authority that the EPA relies upon.409F409 Over time, if regulations that survive in 
the courtroom remain in place long enough—facilitated by a stalled 
Congress—there is potential for the change to become entrenched as 
companies’ business planning and the public evolve in response to them. In 
other words, it is possible for “go-around” strategies over time to meld with 
more cooperative approaches to generate broader-based support for measures. 
C. “Show Me the Money” 
      410F410    
 
 408 Id.; Kathleen Hennessy & Neela Banerjee, Obama to Pledge $3 Billion in Climate Aid for Developing 
Countries, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2014, 9:07 AM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-fg-obama-climate-
20141114-story.html  
 409 Moreover, the slow pace of regulatory promulgation and repeal means that regulations finalized by the 
Obama Administration would remain in place for some months, even if a Republican administration 
committed to rolling them back wins the 2016 presidential election. 
 410 © 2012 Wasserman. Boston Globe. All rights reserved. Distributed by Tribune Content Agency; see 
also Michael Shank & Julia Trezona Peek, Opinion, Dirty Energy Dollars: Members of Congress Should 
Refuse Campaign Donations from Fossil Fuel Industries, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Oct. 28, 2014, 9:50 
AM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/economic-intelligence/2014/10/28/congress-should-refuse-donations-
from-dirty-fossil-fuel-energy-companies. 
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The first two sections of this Part have focused on reframing strategies with 
respect to government, whether by scaling down to local government or 
shifting branches. Governments obviously have an important role to play in 
shaping the regulatory response to climate change and in adopting measures 
that can move forward on energy transition. However, just as important, if not 
more so, are actions taken by private actors that are the source of emissions as 
well as the focus of activities to respond to climate change impacts. 
Corporations in particular are the largest and most influential group of such 
actors whose actions are deeply tied to the success of mitigation and adaptation 
efforts. While government regulation plays an important role in shaping 
corporate behavior, and while many of the efforts described previously affect 
(and are fostered or constrained by) corporations, this section considers ways 
in which strategies can influence private actors directly. 
In the world of climate policy, corporations and the private sector—
particularly in the energy industry—are often cast as the “bad guys.” Coal and 
oil and gas companies produce the fossil fuel products that contribute nearly 
70% of global greenhouse emissions when consumed for electricity generation 
and transportation.411F411 These energy companies have at times, and in some 
cases continue to be, actively involved in lobbying efforts at the national and 
international levels to thwart action on climate change.412F412 Others have 
supported groups that promote skeptical views of climate science.413F413 In 
addition, coal and oil and gas companies and their industry associations have 
frequently been at the forefront of anti-regulatory litigation challenging 
proactive climate and clean energy measures taken by the Obama 
Administration and in several states.414F414 
 
 411 CAIT Climate Data Explorer, WORLD RESOURCES INST., http://cait2.wri.org/wri/ (last visited Nov. 29, 
2015) (showing energy sector figures for 2009). 
 412 UNION OF CONCERTED SCIENTISTS, SMOKE, MIRRORS & HOT AIR: HOW EXXONMOBIL USES BIG 
TOBACCO’S TACTICS TO MANUFACTURE UNCERTAINTY ON CLIMATE SCIENCE 9 (2007), 
http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/global_warming/exxon_report.pdf. 
 413 Brant Olson & Nick Surgey, 5 Ways ALEC Denies the Facts of Climate Change, FORECAST FACTS 
(Sept. 25, 2014), https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.forecastthefacts.org/images/ResponsetoALECPressStatement. 
pdf. 
 414 See, e.g., In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing & § 4(D) Rule Litigation, 709 F.3d 1, 2 
(D.C. Cir. 2013); Coal. for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 113 (D.C. Cir. 2012); In re Polar 
Bear Endangered Species Act Listing & § 4(D) Rule Litigation, 818 F. Supp. 2d 214, 217–18 (D.D.C. 2011); 
In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing & § 4(D) Rule Litigation, 794 F. Supp. 2d 65, 68 
(D.D.C. 2011); Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 301 (D. Vt. 
2007); Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Witherspoon, No. 04-6663, 2007 WL 35688 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 
2007). 
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A lot of this activity has a strong partisan edge. For instance, at least two 
thirds of the energy and natural resource industry’s donations since 1990 have 
gone to Republican candidates.415F415 Moreover, this split and the amounts of 
money involved have grown since the Supreme Court’s 2010 Citizens United 
ruling, which increased the opportunities for corporations to influence election 
campaigns through political donations. For example, in the 2012 presidential 
election year, energy and resource industry companies donated $92.6 million 
to Republicans and $22.6 million to Democrats. In the 2014 midterm elections, 
they donated $58.8 million to Republicans—more than the total donations to 
Republicans in the 2008 presidential election year—and $16.3 million to 
Democrats. Average donations to Republican House and Senate candidates 
also rose significantly after 2010. House Speaker John Boehner (R–Ohio) 
received more donations, $1,677,887 million, from these industries in 2013–
2014 than any other candidate, and four of the top five candidates receiving 
donations from the energy and natural resources industries were 
Republicans.416F416 
Although blaming energy companies for failed climate policy may be the 
politically easier course, especially considering these donation numbers, there 
is growing acknowledgment of the need to engage these companies as crucial 
partners in the effort to transition the energy economy.417F417 Fossil fuel 
companies are not actually as monolithic in their anti-regulatory stance as such 
a portrayal would suggest; while the coal industry is steadfastly opposed to 
climate change action, the oil and gas industry has had a far more mixed 
reaction, likely due in part to their greater level of diversification and larger 
profit margin.418F418 The 2015 scandal over Exxon’s obfuscation of climate 
science data has reinforced the public and legal pressure on fossil fuel 
companies to address climate change constructively—Exxon now 
acknowledges climate change risks and claims to no longer fund climate denial 
 
 415 The Center for Responsive Politics maintains information on corporate political donations on its 
OpenSecrets website. See Interest Groups, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., https://www.opensecrets.org/ 
industries/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2015). This information can be broken down by sector. For patterns of 
energy/natural resource donations, see Energy/Natural Resources, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., https://www. 
opensecrets.org/industries/indus.php (last visited Nov. 29, 2015).  
 416 Energy/Natural Resources, supra note 415; see Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 417 Rory Sullivan, Introduction to CORPORATE RESPONSES TO CLIMATE CHANGE: ACHIEVING EMISSIONS 
REDUCTIONS THROUGH REGULATION, SELF-REGULATION AND ECONOMIC INCENTIVES 5 (Rory Sullivan ed., 
2008). 
 418 See Simone Pulver, Making Sense of Corporate Environmentalism: An Environmental Contestation 
Approach to Analyzing the Causes and Consequences of the Climate Change Policy Split in the Oil Industry, 
20 ORG. & ENV’T 44, 52–55 (2007). 
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efforts, and fossil fuel companies generally include pages on climate change on 
their websites. 419F419 In addition, uptake of renewable energy sources and clean 
fuels by energy and transportation companies as an economically-sound 
business strategy is a key element of mitigation action at international, 
national, and state levels.420F420 
Corporations operating in many other sectors of the economy are also 
becoming recognized as vital to effective energy transition and climate 
governance. All companies make energy consumption choices with greenhouse 
gas emissions implications, and a number of major corporations from a wide 
range of industries have shown leadership. For instance, as of November 30, 
2015, a diverse group of 154 corporations had signed the American Business 
on Climate Change Pledge through which they supported “a strong Paris 
outcome” and “ongoing commitment to climate action.”421F421 In the adaptation 
sphere, private businesses involved in infrastructure provision, development, 
and land use, as well as companies that provide property and disaster 
insurance, have an important part to play in helping to reduce communities’ 
vulnerability to climate change. Companies in the financial and investment 
sectors are emerging as key players in the regulatory complex that will be 
necessary to move towards low carbon societies. For example, several reports 
 
 419 See Suzanne Goldenberg, Exxon Knew of Climate Change in 1981, Email Says—But It Funded 
Deniers for 27 More Years, GUARDIAN (July 8, 2015, 4:41 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/ 
2015/jul/08/exxon-climate-change-1981-climate-denier-funding; Shannon Hall, Exxon Knew About Climate 
Change Almost 40 Years Ago, SCI. AM. (Oct. 26, 2015), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/exxon-
knew-about-climate-change-almost-40-years-ago/. Exxon is under investigation by the Attorney General of 
New York regarding whether its statements to investors about climate risks comported with its internal 
research. See Justin Gillis & Clifford Krauss, Exxon Mobil Investigated for Possible Climate Change Lies by 
New York Attorney General, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/06/science/exxon-
mobil-under-investigation-in-new-york-over-climate-statements.html. For examples of company websites, see 
Climate, EXXONMOBIL, http://corporate.exxonmobil.com/en/current-issues/climate-policy (last visited Dec. 
20, 2015); Climate Change, BP GLOBAL, http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/sustainability/the-energy-
future/climate-change.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2015); Climate Change and Energy Transitions, SHELL OIL, 
http://www.shell.com/sustainability/environment/climate-change.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2015). 
 420 For example, when controversy erupted over companies with significant fossil fuel assets or 
investments sponsoring the Paris climate change negotiations, they responded by highlighting investments in 
renewables and moved away from coal. See Tim McDonnell, The Fossil Fuel Industry Is Helping to Bankroll 
the Paris Climate Talks, WIRED (Dec. 2, 2015, 5:12 PM), http://www.wired.com/2015/12/the-fossil-fuel-
industry-is-helping-bankroll-the-paris-climate-talks/.  
 421 Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, White House Announces Additional Commitments to the 
American Business Act on Climate Pledge, WHITE HOUSE (Nov. 30, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2015/11/30/white-house-announces-additional-commitments-american-business-act. However, 
very few major utilities are in this group of companies. Id.; Alejandro Davila Fragoso, Why Have So Few 
Utilities Joined the White House’s Climate Change Pledge?, CLIMATE PROGRESS (Dec. 9, 2015, 9:52 AM), 
http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2015/12/09/3729789/top-utilities-ignore-obama-climate-pledge/. 
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have been released on the so-called “carbon bubble”: the sudden loss in value 
of fossil fuel assets predicted to result from international constraints on carbon 
emissions.422F422 Such developments are leading to growing pressure on 
corporations to improve disclosure of climate-related risk to shareholders and 
investors, and for institutional investors, such as pension funds and banks, to 
divest themselves of fossil fuel assets. 423F423 
Increasingly, many companies are aware of the risks that climate change 
poses to their businesses,424F424 and some are beginning to take proactive measures 
to position themselves to minimize climate-related losses and to take 
advantage of competitive opportunities offered by the growth of the clean 
economy. For this group of companies, partisanship does not seem to play a 
significant role in their decisions to embrace climate-related measures. Rather, 
private sector climate action is promoted as good for companies’ financial 
bottom line. Like Cuba Gooding, Jr.’s character in the movie Jerry McGuire, 
the call is to “Show Me the Money!” Put another way, what makes the 
corporate setting a good non-partisan space for climate action—the lobbying 
activities and political donations of numerous energy companies 
notwithstanding—is that in general companies are motivated to do things that 
improve their financial bottom line. Where initiatives to implement clean 
 
 422 CARBON TRACKER INITIATIVE, UNBURNABLE CARBON—ARE THE WORLD’S FINANCIAL MARKETS 
CARRYING A CARBON BUBBLE? (2012), http://www.carbontracker.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/ 
Unburnable-Carbon-Full-rev2-1.pdf; CARBON TRACKER INITIATIVE ET AL., UNBURNABLE CARBON 2013: 
WASTED CAPITAL AND STRANDED ASSETS (2013), http://carbontracker.live.kiln.it/Unburnable-Carbon-2-Web-
Version.pdf; SIMON REDMOND & MICHAEL WILKINS, STANDARD & POOR’S RATINGS SERVS., WHAT A 
CARBON-CONSTRAINED FUTURE COULD MEAN FOR OIL COMPANIES’ CREDITWORTHINESS (2013), 
http://www.carbontracker.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/SnPCT-report-on-oil-sector-carbon-constraints-
Mar0420133.pdf; PAUL SPEDDING ET AL., HSBC BANK PLC GLOBAL RESEARCH, OIL & CARBON REVISITED: 
VALUE AT RISK FROM ‘UNBURNABLE’ RESERVES 4 (2013), http://daily.swarthmore.edu/wp-content/ 
uploads/2013/02/HSBCOilJan13.pdf. 
 423 An example of this approach is the fossil fuels divestment campaign being run by 350.org. See FOSSIL 
FREE, http://gofossilfree.org/ (last visited Nov. 29, 2015). 
 424 See WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, GLOBAL RISKS 2014, at 13 (9th ed. 2014) (ranking failure of 
mitigation measures fifth and extreme weather events sixth highest risks of concern); CDP S&P 500 CLIMATE 
CHANGE REPORT 2013, at 4–5 (2013), https://www.cdp.net/cdpresults/cdp-global-500-climate-change-report-
2013.pdf (noting 77% of the 334 respondents disclosed exposure to climate change-related risks, up from 61% 
the previous year); Press Ass’n, Rising Number of Top Firms Believe Climate Change Is Threat to Business, 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 12, 2012, 1:30 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/sep/12/climate-change-
business-cdp (noting that of the 379 companies that responded to the Global 500 survey, “[m]ore than one-
third (37%) saw the physical risks of a changing climate as a real and present danger, up from 10%” in 2011; 
“81% identified climate change risks to their business operations, supply chains, and plans, up from 71%” in 
2012). 
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energy behavior align with such economic incentives, this can create a 
powerful momentum for corporate action to address climate change. 
An example of this approach—coupling a call for corporate action with a 
disaster preparedness framing—is “The Risky Business Project.” This non-
partisan, independent coalition of U.S. business and policy leaders—including 
former New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg and former U.S. Treasury 
Secretary Henry Paulson—works to highlight the risks climate change poses 
for U.S. enterprise.425F425 In an open letter to the business community published in 
the Wall Street Journal in June 2014, the group called for awareness of the 
impacts of climate change as a necessity of “[p]roper risk management.”426F426 To 
further this goal, it commissioned the Rhodium Group to conduct a risk 
assessment of the potential economic consequences of following a “business as 
usual” approach to climate change for each region of the United States and for 
selected sectors of the economy. As Michael Bloomberg explained, 
Damages from storms, flooding, and heat waves are already costing 
local economies billions of dollars—we saw that firsthand in New 
York City with Hurricane Sandy. With the oceans rising and the 
climate changing, the Risky Business report details the costs of 
inaction in ways that are easy to understand in dollars and cents—and 
impossible to ignore.427F427 
For companies in the insurance and reinsurance sector, the nature of their 
business makes them particularly susceptible to calls for greater attention to the 
economic risks of neglecting climate change. Not only are insurance 
companies generally risk averse, but they also have much to lose (and possibly 
something to gain)428F428 from their front line exposure to the physical risks 
climate change poses for property and infrastructure. The industry as a whole 
has been one of the most proactive sectors in addressing adaptation issues and 
urging governments to do so also.429F429 Increases in the number, cost, and 
variability of disaster and weather-related losses in the last decade have 
 
 425 See American Business Must Act to Reduce Climate Risk, RISKY BUS. (June 17, 2014), 
http://riskybusiness.org/blog/american-business-must-act-to-reduce-climate-risk. 
 426 For the text of the open letter, see id. 
 427 RISKY BUSINESS PROJECT, RISKY BUSINESS: THE ECONOMIC RISKS OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE 
UNITED STATES (June 2014), http://riskybusiness.org/site/assets/uploads/2015/09/RiskyBusiness_Report_ 
WEB_09_08_14.pdf. 
 428 For instance, climate change may offer opportunities to develop new sorts of products to manage 
climate risk and variability. 
 429 Sean B. Hecht, Insurance, in THE LAW OF ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE: U.S. AND 
INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS 511 (Michael B. Gerrard & Katrina Fischer Kuh eds., 2012). 
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convinced some insurance companies, reinsurers, and their trade associations 
of the need to incorporate climate change into their strategic planning.430F430 Other 
insurance companies—such as multinational reinsurer, the Swiss Re Group—
have gone a step further, taking measures to reduce their corporate carbon 
footprint in addition to measures designed to reduce their future climate-related 
losses. In 2003, Swiss Re launched a “Greenhouse Neutral Programme” that 
aimed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 15% per employee by 2013 and 
to offset remaining emissions through the purchase of high-quality carbon 
credits. This emissions reduction goal was achieved six years early in 2007, 
and the company has since achieved greenhouse gas reductions in its 
operations of over 50%.431F431 
While many companies do not (yet) perceive the business risks associated 
with climate change impacts as significant enough to prompt action on the 
issue,432F432 regulatory risks and associated economic costs from imminent or 
potential climate or clean energy measures are increasingly given greater 
attention. Reports prepared by investor group “the Carbon Disclosure Project” 
(CDP) evidence this trend. For example, the CDP S&P 500 Report for 2013, 
surveying corporate climate responses across top U.S. companies, found that in 
the context of steps taken by the Obama Administration to regulate emissions 
companies displayed “a significantly more mature level of climate 
management—as well as a drive to lead among peers.”433F433 Another report 
issued by CDP in late 2013 found that twenty-nine major publicly traded 
companies based or operating in the United States across a variety of sectors 
used an internal price on carbon pollution in their business planning, ranging 
from $6 to $60 per ton of carbon dioxide equivalent. Most companies covered 
by the report—including large corporations such as Walt Disney, Google, Xcel 
Energy, Wal-Mart, Delta, Microsoft, and PG&E Corporation—stated that they 
expected the eventual emergence of a regulatory approach, of some form, to 
address climate change. Companies establishing an internal carbon price as 
 
 430 Evan Mills, Insurance in a Climate of Change, 309 SCI. 1040 (2005). 
 431 Swiss Re, CLIMATE GROUP, http://www.theclimategroup.org/who-we-are/our-members/swiss-re (last 
visited Oct. 12, 2015). 
 432 GARETH JOHNSTON, DONOVAN BURTON & MARK BAKER-JONES, NAT’L CLIMATE CHANGE 
ADAPTATION RESEARCH FACILITY, CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION IN THE BOARDROOM (2013), 
https://www.dlapiper.com/~/media/Files/Service%20and%20sector%20recommended/climatechangeadaptatio
nintheboardroom.pdf; see also JASON WEST & DAVID BRERETON, NAT’L CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION 
RESEARCH FACILITY, CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION IN INDUSTRY AND BUSINESS: A FRAMEWORK FOR BEST 
PRACTICE IN FINANCIAL RISK ASSESSMENT, GOVERNANCE AND DISCLOSURE (2013), 
http://www98.griffith.edu.au/dspace/bitstream/handle/10072/54579/88671_1.pdf. 
 433 CDP S&P 500 CLIMATE CHANGE REPORT 2013, supra note 424, at 4. 
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part of their business models viewed this “as both an evaluation of risk and a 
business opportunity if they take steps to limit carbon pollution before others 
do.”434F434 
Moreover, these trends do not seem to be limited to the United States. At 
the United Nations Climate Summit in New York in September 2014, one of 
the most significant outcomes was the support offered by 1,042 multinational 
corporations for international carbon pricing. Several of these companies, 
including Nestle, Unilever, and Philips, committed to introduce their own 
internal shadow carbon prices as a measure for reducing their carbon 
footprint.435F435 Perhaps more important than these large companies pricing carbon 
internally is the effect that this move is likely to have on their supply chains, 
which encompass many small and medium-sized businesses. Improving the 
resiliency of the private sector as a whole has the capacity to support the 
adaptation of populations to climate change worldwide and especially in 
developing countries where micro- and small businesses, rather than 
multinationals, tend to be the engines of economic growth and job creation.436F436 
Corporate sector climate change and energy commitments continued in 
conjunction with the Paris climate change negotiations. For example, twenty-
eight major investors—including Bill Gates (Microsoft), Mark Zuckerberg 
(Facebook), and Jeff Bezos (Amazon)—in collaboration with twenty 
governments launched “Mission Innovation” aimed at supporting energy 
research.437F437 In addition, more than a thousand non-state actors, including 
numerous businesses, have joined the Paris Pledge for Action, committing to 
help keep warming below two degrees Celsius.438F438 
 
 434 Major U.S. Companies Disclose Internal Prices on Carbon, Cite Risk from Climate Change and 
Extreme Weather, Business Opportunities, CDP (Dec. 5, 2013), https://www.cdp.net/en-US/News/CDP% 
20News%20Article%20Pages/Major-US-companies-disclose-internal-prices-on-carbon.aspx (quoting Tom 
Carnac, President of CDP North America). 
 435 Jennifer Morgan et al., Analyzing Outcomes from the UN Climate Summit, WORLD RES. INST. (Sept. 
23, 2014), http://www.wri.org/blog/2014/09/analyzing-outcomes-un-climate-summit. 
 436 INT’L FIN. CORP., IFC JOBS STUDY: ASSESSING PRIVATE SECTOR CONTRIBUTIONS TO JOB CREATION 
AND POVERTY REDUCTION 6 (2013). 
 437 Marilyn Geewax, Bill Gates and Other Billionaires Pledge to Take on Climate Change, NPR (Nov. 
30, 2015, 5:29 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/11/30/457900449/bill-gates-and-other-
billionaires-pledge-to-take-on-climate-change. 
 438 PARIS PLEDGE FOR ACTION, http://www.parispledgeforaction.org/. 
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The overall theme of readiness for a climate changed-future being 
considered by some companies as “a source of competitive advantage”439F439 is 
one echoed in interviews we have conducted with attorneys who work as 
corporate counsel. One lawyer who represented a large utility company 
described how his client saw benefit in increasing its renewable and natural gas 
portfolio in order to take advantage of business opportunities afforded by the 
increasing stringency of regulations for coal plants.440F440 From the other side of 
the fence, a lawyer working with an environmental group described how a lot 
of the things they were seeing from power companies and utilities in terms of 
fuel switching (coal to gas or renewables) were in some part “climate-driven,” 
but more often “it’s really the economics” that is the fundamental driver of 
behavioral shifts. Companies see opportunities to make money and follow 
them. 441F441 
Beyond those companies most directly affected by climate change or 
potential regulatory measures, there is increasing interest in the role that 
companies in the finance and investment sectors play in advancing climate 
action. In the mid-2000s, a coalition of non-governmental organizations 
petitioned the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to improve 
company disclosure rules relating to climate change risks facing businesses.442F442 
The SEC issued an interpretative guidance in 2010 which urges listed 
companies to disclose material climate-related risks to their businesses.443F443 
Importantly, the SEC’s guidance extends beyond physical climate change risks 
to regulatory risks—both domestic and international—associated with 
compliance with climate regulatory requirements, indirect effects of regulation, 
or business trends such as decreased demand for carbon-intensive products. 
While climate-related disclosures by companies improved in the immediate 
 
 439 Gretchen Michals, The Boardroom’s Climate Is Changing, DIRECTORSHIP, Dec. 2009–Jan. 2010, at 
14. 
 440 Interview with Participant 5, supra note 17. 
 441 Telephone Interview with Participant 12, supra note 336. 
 442 See Cal. Pub. Emps. Retirement Sys. et al., Petition for Interpretive Guidance on Climate Risk 
Disclosure, at 2 (2007), http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2007/petn4-547.pdf; Letter from Cal. Pub. Emps. 
Ret. Sys. et al., to Florence E. Harmon, Acting Sec’y. of the SEC (June 12, 2008) (requesting Interpretive 
Guidance on Climate Risk Disclosure); British Columbia Investment Management Corporation et al., 
Supplemental Petition for Interpretive Guidance on Climate Risk Disclosure, at 3 (2008), http://www. 
sec.gov/rules/petitions/2008/petn4-547-supp.pdf. For another petition on point, see also Steven J. Milloy & 
Thomas J. Borelli, Free Enter. Action Fund, Petition for Interpretive Guidance on Business Risk of Global 
Warming Regulation (2007), http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2007/petn4-549.pdf. 
 443 Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change Release Nos. 33-910627, 34-
61469, FR-82 (Feb. 2, 2010). 
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aftermath of the SEC ruling, this reform has not had the broader transformative 
change advocates had hoped for.444F444 One interviewee involved in the initial 
petition to the SEC reflected on the reasons for this: 
The response actually wasn’t that great, in part because companies do 
have trouble figuring out what is material and it does sort of run 
against their grain culturally. And I think the important thing is the 
time horizon that corporate managers are looking at tends to be 
shorter than the time horizon that where you can say, you know, it’s 
clear if we have a bunch of refineries that are located in the Gulf of 
Mexico that may be affected by an increase in storm intensity or rise 
in sea levels, that may be a grave concern. But if you are looking for 
something in the next 2 or 3 or 4 years to tell investors about it may 
not.445F445 
Shareholder and investor groups, along with some environmental groups, 
are now investigating additional avenues to pressure companies to improve 
disclosure around the risks climate change poses for their businesses and 
assets. Some U.S. groups have been active in initiating shareholder resolutions 
calling on companies to disclose how climate risk is being managed.446F446 Others 
have targeted institutional investors, such as pension funds, who often control 
substantial capital, including large investments in fossil fuel assets. The 
ultimate aim of these efforts, as one advocate explained, is to attack the 
financial bottom line of dirty energy companies by making fossil fuel 
investment economically unpalatable for large corporate investors: 
The area where the traditional NGOs are very comfortable is stopping 
fossil fuel companies digging up nice parts of the world. That’s 
where they’ve gone. A tree or a reef—let’s go to court. And of course 
most of the time they lose but when they win it’s champagne corks. 
But nothing ever changes. These companies are still looking for those 
opportunities and it just shifts risk to other parts of the globe. We 
 
 444 JIM COBURN & JACKIE COOK, CERES, COOL RESPONSE: THE SEC & CORPORATE CLIMATE CHANGE 
REPORTING 5 (Feb. 2014), http://www.ceres.org/resources/reports/cool-response-the-sec-corporate-climate-
change-reporting/. 
 445 Telephone Interview with Participant 8, supra note 323. 
 446 Shareholder Resolutions, CERES, http://www.ceres.org/investor-network/resolutions (167 climate-
related resolutions as of March 12, 2014; 42 withdrawn on basis that company will address); ICCR’s 
Shareholder Resolutions, INTERFAITH CTR. ON CORP. RESP., http://www.iccr.org/iccrs-shareholder-resolutions 
(last visited Nov. 28, 2015). 
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think starving the capital—the oxygen if you like—is a much more 
solid strategy.447F447 
These efforts are likely to continue to grow and show some promise in shifting 
corporate behavior. 
While partisanship does not appear to be a significant barrier to motivating 
climate action by a wide range of corporations, other potential obstacles should 
not be underestimated. Principal among these is the continuing prevalence of 
short-term thinking in corporate boardrooms, focused on profit opportunities 
and shareholder returns. Indeed, some in the corporate law world remain 
skeptical of the capacity for private sector led change in climate policy. As one 
corporate lawyer put it, directors who attempt to pursue long-term climate-
friendly measures 
are far more susceptible to an action by their disgruntled shareholders 
if they disband some profitable part of their (dirty) business in the 
name of saving the planet. . . . [T]hose directors with “green” 
inclinations would quickly find themselves voted off boards or up 
before the court for breach of the fiduciary duty to make 
[shareholders] pots of money!448F448 
As with the “small is beautiful” strategy described in the earlier section then, 
structural reframing of climate action as an economically beneficial course for 
companies can be a double-edged sword. Leader companies may well see the 
financial bottom-line benefits offered by a more thorough consideration of 
climate change in their internal decision-making processes and in the steps 
they take to reduce emissions and to improve the resilience of their supply 
chains. Others with a substantial economic stake in the fossil fuel economy 
may not be so easily persuaded. And the vast majority of companies remain, 
for the moment, somewhere in the middle: aware of the business risks posed 
by climate change but reluctant to take strong measures to change their 
practices and behavior. Nonetheless, the potential for transformative change 
originating from the corporate sector is significant, especially as financial and 
competitive benefits associated with early climate change action and transition 
away from dirty fuels become more apparent over time. 
 
 447 Skype Interview with Participant 25 (May 21, 2013). The advocate concluded by focusing on the 
liability issue, arguing that the asset owners rather than the regulators would likely end up being the ones to 
force risk management. Id. 
 448 Email from Participant 32 to Jacqueline Peel, Professor, Melbourne Law Sch. (June 11, 2014) (on file 
with author). 
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CONCLUSION: BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS OF POLYCENTRIC, INCREMENTAL 
STRATEGIES 
In this Article, we have essentially adopted a “do whatever it takes” attitude 
to advancing action on climate change and energy transition. If an appeal to 
address climate change does not work due to partisan barriers, try other more 
appealing framings. If Congress is not a realistic option for passing 
comprehensive climate legislation, try other, more amenable forums be they 
local authorities, courts, the executive branch, or the private sector. 
However, as demonstrated through the Article’s application of 
psychological theory to practical cases studies, such an approach need not (and 
should not) simply be opportunistic. Substantive and structural reframing, 
particularly when used in combination, can be a powerful strategy for 
encouraging needed cooperation and circumventing roadblocks. The Article 
highlights the specific substantive and structural strategies that have been most 
effective in doing so. 
There is, of course, now a whole academic literature that has developed to 
advocate the value of such polycentric approaches to climate regulatory 
development—we ourselves have made contributions to that literature and are 
persuaded of the value of multiscalar climate action. The recent conclusion of 
the international Paris Agreement offers new hope for ambitious global action 
to address climate change. But significant question marks remain over issues 
of domestic implementation in the United States, and the potential for 
international government-led efforts to close the gap between current levels of 
emissions and those scientists say are needed to prevent dangerous planetary 
warming. Were the Congress to pass bipartisan, comprehensive, and ambitious 
climate change legislation, we would be among the first out in the streets to 
celebrate this advance. But in the meantime, the strategies offered in this 
Article represent our pragmatic assessment—based on experience, expertise, 
and research—of the most effective strategies to make needed progress despite 
the energy partisanship that characterizes U.S. climate politics today. 
From a more positive perspective, this Article can be viewed as a call to 
climate advocates not to be discouraged by the obstacles posed by the difficult 
political environment. There are viable ways around such barriers for those 
who are committed to making progress on climate and energy issues. These 
strategies have been employed successfully on the ground for decades, and 
thinking about them more systematically provides an opportunity to use them 
even better. 
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However, we are well aware in putting forward these strategies that they 
have their own inherent limits. They are necessarily decentralized and 
incremental. They tend to over-emphasize human values associated with 
climate resilience and the economic benefits of energy transition rather than 
other values. They are piecemeal and the sum of the parts may not be sufficient 
to add up to the required whole. They are often vulnerable to leadership 
change. And they are not foolproof: the goals of creating a clean energy 
economy and building disaster resilience will often align with broader climate 
protection goals but there may be controversial choices with difficult tradeoffs 
(e.g., ethanol as a biofuel or hard coastal armoring damaging neighboring 
properties) on the way. 
We propose these strategies, not as a sufficient substitute for the bipartisan 
reconciliation and political will required to make meaningful large-scale 
commitments, but rather as important ways forward given the current realities. 
Our hope is that an open conversation that focuses on possibilities for 
agreement, and promising forums for making that agreement happen, can help 
spur that needed progress. These strategies are not intended as tricks, or to add 
to the vitriolic dialogue going both directions. Rather, we argue that it is time 
to think seriously and systematically about leverage points based on how we 
can agree and use them to “go together” as much as possible. 
 
